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1. Introduction
1.1 Adaptive autonomous systems
The present paper is an exploratory study directed towards a long-term aim, the
development of a mathematical framework for the study of adaptive autonomous
systems, with an emphasis on the integrative organization of these systems. We wish, as
part of this program, to develop a language permitting us to attach meaning to the notion
of "rationale" for the system's organization. The framework should provide, in the
setting of integrative organization of autonomous systems, notions that can assume the
role played by "laws of nature" in the physical sciences.
We address these questions both in the settings of natural and of engineered
systems. We are not claiming that there is any fundamental congruence between these
two classes of system. However, we do feel that clarification of the contrasts between
their distinct modes of organization may well facilitate the analysis of each. In addition,
we expect that the design of engineered systems which are both adaptive and autonomous
(to the extent that this is possible), will require significant insight into the principles of
organization of natural systems, as well as significant reinterpretation of what is meant by
the "design" process. 2 We have in mind both "small and "large" engineering systems.
Some examples are: the design of an autopilot for a modem aircraft (a "small" system);
defining the design, and understanding and structuring the design process, of a new
aircraft (a "large" system); the design of a global communication network.
A word as to our use of "integrative". Here we do not insist on a "total", top-to-
bottom integrative treatment incorporating all the organizational levels in the system (nor
every level of detail) concurrently. Rather, the emphasis is on issues associated with
maintaining coherence among multiple functionalities or behaviors. In particular, an
"integrative" treatment in this sense in no way prejudices us against contexts where only
schematic vs. detailed treatments are currently feasible (a case in point being higher
cognitive function).
The paradigmatic autonomous systems are biological organisms, including single-
cell organisms such as E. coli . Typically, one has in mind here organisms endowed with
nervous systems, ranging from "simple" systems such as nematodes or insects, to human
beings, with all their higher cognitive faculties, including language. (In fact, the starting
point of the present study was a cognate research program, initiated by of one of us,
taking as a model the nematode C. elegans .3 This organism displays a rudimentary
1 Nor are we suggesting any monolithic uniformity within the "two" classes.
2 When we speak of "principles of organization" we mean this literally. In particular, we mean to
distinguish this from simply the transposition to an engineering setting of "mechanisms" or "design tricks"
drawn from a biological control system.
3 Rockland, C. (1989) The nematode as a model complex system: a program of research.
Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Working Paper (LIDS-WP-1865 ) 1-115 (plus
appendices).
Rockland, C. and S.G. Rowley (1990) Simulation and analysis of segmental oscillator models for nematode
locomotion, MIT Center for Intelligent Control Systems Publication (CICS-P-212).
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"intelligence", despite the fact that its "brain" contains only about three hundred neurons,
and its whole body only about one thousand cells. )
In what sense are these organisms "autonomous" ? The construction of a formal
characterization of "autonomous systems" is part of our long-term goal. Informally,
however, one can point to several salient attributes of such systems: They must maintain
themselves in their environment without the benefit or interference of external
intervention. They must, accordingly, set their own "goals", select the "problems" to be
solved, determine which external stimuli are relevant, and "decide" on choices of action.
They may need to adapt to changes in their environment (and, to some extent, choose
their environment), though they may (and in fact they ultimately do) "fail". All this may
involve learning in various forms.
If we loosen, or relativize, our notion of "autonomous" (or consider subsystem
organization), the systems of interest include individual cells or organized functional
systems of cells. This includes, in particular, the various (quasi-independent or
interdependent) control systems of very complex organisms, such as the nervous system,
the immune system, etc.
Analogous questions can be addressed in settings not involving individual
autonomous systems, but societies of quasi-autonomous systems (not necessarily
"rational agents"), the society being itself regarded as an adaptive autonomous system,
though at a different "hierarchical" level. Three examples are:(i) a large organization,
such as a manufacturing firm; (ii) an economy (national or multi-national); (iii) an
ecology. We think that various of the ideas raised in the present paper may be relevant to
such systems.
In seeking to accommodate such systems within our range of interest, we are not
being overly simplistic, nor engaging in a quixotic search for a "theory of everything".
We recognize that not only at a detailed, but even at a highly schematic level, each such
system is highly distinctive. It is not a case of "one theory fits all". However, at a
minimum, the notion of "society" in the above sense, may be a highly useful metaphor
(e.g., to be used as a counterpoint to the "machine" or "computer" metaphors) even in the
study of a single biological organism. Two cases in point: (i) A cell may, from one
natural perspective be regarded as a manufacturing plant. (ii) The mind of a single
individual may be viewed, in various ways, as a society. 4
Rowley, S.G. and C. Rockland (1991) The design of simulation languages for systems with multiple
modularities, Simulation ,.56:3, 153-163.
4 Two quite distinct examples in the psychology literature are: M. Minsky, "The society of mind", .
Simon & Schuster, 1985; G. Ainslie, "Picoeconomics: the strategic interaction of successive motivational
states within the person", Cambridge U. Press, 1992.
Minsky presents a schema in which individual intelligence arises from the interaction of a society
of "agents" which may themselves be without intelligence in any sense.
Ainslie's theory stems from a study of why individuals (both lower animals and humans)
"irrationally" act upon temporary preferences for objectively inferior (and even harmful ) goals. Anslie
concludes (see p. 362): "The fundamental insight of picoeconomics is that the mind bears less resemblance
to a fact-gathering or puzzle solving apparatus than to a population of foraging organisms. The foraging
entities are interests that grow from rewards, just as populations of organisms grow on the basis of food
sources. Like the variety of organisms that stably occupy a habitat, interests fill various motivational niches
on the basis of their specific abilities to maintain and defend themselves there, which largely depend on the
time courses of the rewards on which they are based."
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1.2 The role of mathematical approaches
Our belief, which we shall argue in detail in subsequent chapters, is that such
traditional metaphors as "dynamical system", "machine", or "computer", which have
underlain the application of mathematics to other scientific domains, are inadequate to
encompass the essential characteristics of adaptive autonomous systems. In particular, it
will be essential for the theory, whatever form it may take, to encompass "intentional"
(or, "subjectivist" vs. "objectivist", or system-centered vs. observer-centered)
perspectives. This will hold even for the case of such "simple" autonomous systems as C.
elegans, to which one surely would not attribute "volition", let alone "higher cognitive
function". The attempt to construct a genuinely scientific theory on such a "subjectivist"
base is a radical step, and many would argue that it is ipso facto self-defeating, if not self-
contradictory. We believe, on the contrary, that what constitutes "our" science in its
present form (and, similarly, "our" mathematics) is, to a considerable extent, conditioned
by historic contingencies (in particular, the types of natural phenomena chosen for
investigation), and should not be viewed as normative of "any possible" science.
In particular, it is not clear to us, for example, that the general idea of
"mathematization" of science which was so successful in physics and, in principle at
least, in chemistry, can be applied, even in principle, to an autonomous system context. In
other words, the traditional ideology that "mathematical physics" is the ultimate state of
an "exact science", may be totally invalid in the present context. The whole methodology
of physics, engineering science, and modem technology in general, is the modeling of the
systems one wants to describe, in a very precise terminology, either using infinitesimal
calculus or other kinds of "calculus" (symbol manipulation), in such a way that one can
simulate the systems, predict their behavior, and act on them, if necessary. 5 In the setting
of autonomous systems, the role of theory may be rather different, and less centered on
sharp prediction of system behavior. We anticipate that this role will be to provide a
framework for discussing the nature of the "coherence" of the system, and how it is
achieved and maintained. Typically, whether in the context of natural or of engineered
systems, the issue of "coherence" is treated as, at best, a background consideration, and
certainly not as. a focus of inquiry in itself. We believe that any theory of autonomous
systems will need to bring "coherence" into the foreground. We expect that,
correspondingly, new kinds of mathematics will be necessary.
It may well be that there are "laws", or principles, of coherent organization.
However, it is doubtful that these take on the character of physical laws, such as
Newton's laws or even the laws of quantum mechanics. Considered in an engineering
5 As one moves away from the traditional "hard core" sciences towards, say, the cognitive sciences
it is common to encounter such arguments as to what kinds of theory are required. A notable example is the
controversy concerning "strong" artificial intelligence, or "computer functionalism". (See, e.g., Simon,
Newell, and Vera as proponents, and H. Dreyfus and J. Searle for two types of dissenting view, among
many possible references.) Nor is it a coincidence that such debates take place also in linguistics ("two" of
the viewpoints put forward being those of "generative grammar" and those of "cognitive grammar").This
question arises also in logics (beginning at least as early as the twelfth century with the "quarrel" between
the Dominicans and Franciscans over universals and the question of nominalism, continuing later with
Descartes' dualism, Leibnitz' monads, Husserl's (and subsequently Heidegger's) phenomenology, and into
our own day under various names).
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context, they are much more likely to be akin to the "principles", explicit or intuitive,
used by a creative designer. A case in point is the design of "layered hierarchical
systems" (cf. Section 2.6e)). Physical laws have a role to play here, but the final design
incorporates principles which may not be expressible within current mathematical
frameworks.
1.3 Organization of the paper
In Chapter 2 we present some examples of complex interactive systems, both
artificial and natural, and examine a variety of approaches that have been applied to the
study of these systems. Our aim here is two-fold: to highlight tools or viewpoints that we
believe can be transposed to the setting of adaptive autonomous systems and, conversely,
to clarify why certain other approaches are ill-suited or inadequate for this setting.
In Chapter 3 we attempt to isolate some of the basic characteristics of adaptive
autonomous systems. In addition we discuss some elements that we feel must enter into a
theory of such systems, as well as the kinds of role we envision for mathematical
approaches.
In Chapter 4 we contrast the notions of "constraint" and "specification", in
conjunction with the two dichotomies "natural/artificial" and "embedded/simulated".
This leads into a discussion of distinct types of "failure modes" and "evaluation criteria"
for the distinct system types.
In Chapter 5 we analyze the notion of "behavior", with an emphasis on its
emergent character, and elaborate on the central notion of the "value system".
In Chapter 6 we enter into a more detailed discussion of "control". This is
facilitated via the introduction of the useful auxiliary notions of "state" and "module".
A recurring theme in the preceding chapters is the rationale for the emergence of a
process of "symbolization" (i.e., the construction and manipulation of symbols), in a
sense quite different from the usual computer-science use of the term, and largely non-
computational in character. We refer to this process as "neural symbolization" since our
thinking here is primarily influenced by, and directed towards, biological organisms
endowed with nervous systems. In Chapter 7 we develop this theme in some detail, and
put forward some elements of a "neural symbol"-based schema for an integrative
functional architecture. This schema, which is closely tied to the value system,
incorporates the formation of associations, categorization, and planning and decision-
making.
We wish to emphasize the fundamentally exploratory and provisional character of
the present study. Our aim here has been relatively modest: to begin the process of
intellectual reorientation which we believe necessary for the study of adaptive
autonomous systems. In fact, much of our effort is directed at the preliminary task of
identifying, and giving definition to, a subject area. Thus, rather than carrying out a
sharply focused and systematic investigation, we approach the subject from a number of
directions, and broach a range of topics. In addition, our treatment is still at a pre-
technical level. This leads to a problem of terminology. We expect that, ultimately, the
subject will require a technical vocabulary of its own. However, given our current state of
understanding, we have felt it more appropriate for the present purposes to borrow
terminology from the various more established disciplines which impinge on the subject.
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When transposed to our setting, this borrowed technical vocabulary should be construed
only in a quasi-technical sense, as "pointers" to as yet ill-defined notions. In particular,
we often intend to draw upon only certain of the various connotations (sometimes coming
from distinct disciplines) attached to a particular term.
The above caveats notwithstanding, we believe that we have succeeded in
bringing to light and weaving together a number of important themes (among them
"coherence", "internalist perspectives", "emergence", the "value system" (basic, higher-
order, and symbolic), "vague specifications", "non-algorithmicity", "neural
symbolization" ), which recur repeatedly throughout the paper. We feel that the work
presented here can serve as a basis for more systematic studies, which we plan to
undertake elsewhere. This includes, in particular, the development and elaboration of
more comprehensive schemata for integrative architectures.
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2. Various examples of complex systems and traditional
approaches
A. Complex interactive systems
2.1 Computer-like systems
The abstract notion of a computer-like system is the notion of automata or, more
generally, of a Turing machine, which is supposed to be the most general manipulator of
symbols or the most general computing-like device. These systems are characterized by a
transformation input -* output working according to prespecified mechanisms. These
mechanisms are fixed once for all, and can only be changed by an external intervention.
In particular, these machines do not adapt and do not learn.1 The machines do not have
any environment, in the sense that they do not have to act on their environment and get
reaction from the environment. In particular, time is not important (it matters only as the
"length" of a computation).
2.2 Various networks, manufacturing control process,....
Again these systems receive various inputs which should lead to desired output
(according to some criteria of evaluation which have to be optimized).
The difference with computer-like systems is that these systems do work in a
given environment, and are subject to feedback (or purely reactive) control which adjusts
the functioning of the system when the desired output is not obtained. These systems can
tolerate a certain amount of error. Time becomes important and a real factor because of
synchronization questions, and because environmental requests have to be fulfilled
without too much delay. Still, these systems are not adaptive. They cannot modify "their"
rules or evaluation criteria, and they do not learn.
2.3 Physical systems
These are structural systems where behavior can be determined and predicted
successfully from the "laws" which govern it, in conjunction with mathematical
reasoning. These laws are conservation laws and optimization laws.
2.4 Biological systems, decision systems
These systems seem to be of a rather different class than the previous systems.
They in general do not associate, in any precise way, a given output to a given input.
Rather, they have to maintain certain relations with their environment, and these relations
are partly fixed by the system itself. 2 In particular, these systems can adapt themselves to
certain changes of the environment. It is clear that they can only adapt to certain classes
of environments, and if the environment fluctuates too wildly these systems can become
disorganized or "disappear". Needless to say, time is a very important variable for these
1 We do not consider "machine-learning" programs as genuine counterexamples, on several counts.
2 Indeed, in various senses, they themselves determine which aspects of their embedding milieu
actually count as their "environment. (See, for example, R. Lewontin, " The organism as the subject and
object of evolution", Scientia 118, 1983, pp. 65-83).
6
systems. Biological systems function, in particular, as control systems. However, they
incorporate principles of adaptation and learning which go well beyond those supported
by the control systems which are currently available for engineering applications. That
is, control theory as currently constituted (i.e., feedback theory for linear and non-linear
multi-variable systems, deterministic and stochastic optimal control, theories of robust
control) cannot accommodate the adaptive and learning behavior manifested by
biological systems.( We shall not discuss here economical systems or ecological systems
which are, in some sense, related to biological systems, as noted in Chapter 1).
2.5 Other distinctions: natural vs. artificial, embedded vs. simulated
These are other very important distinctions which are "transversal" to the previous
distinctions
a) Natural / artificial.
This is a very important distinction : On the one hand we have natural systems
like a cell, a group of cells, an immunological system, a large social organism, physical or
chemical systems, etc. On the other hand we have artificial systems like robots,
computers, networks, machines, manufacturing control processes,... It is clear that
artificial systems which are actually implemented (and not only simulated) rely on natural
systems for their functioning (like motor for the robot, electronics for the computer) and,
as usual, the distinction between natural and artificial is not completely sharp.
b) Intentional / non-intentional
Artificial systems are non intentional in an intrinsic sense. Surely, they serve
purposes, but these purposes are global purposes imposed by their designers. On the other
hand, certain natural systems have an intrinsic(vs. extrinsically imposed) intentionality.
They have their own purposes, which they can modify. They can form new purposes,
and in fact they often do so. They exhibit intrinsically derived (and, in some cases,
volitional) behavior. In particular, we argue that intentionality need not be simply a
viewpoint or "stance" which an external observer can make use of in order to provide a
rationale for, or to predict, the behavior of the system.
Again the distinction is not completely sharp: Does a (living) plant have
purposes? Do immunological systems ?.... In any case, one of the features of an
autonomous system is the ability of the system intrinsically to form its own purposes,
modify them, and select some of them, at a given time, from among a certain range of
possibilities.
c) Embedded / simulated.
An easier distinction is the distinction between an actually built and embedded
system, and a system which is purely formal, or exists merely as a simulation (in general,
on a computer). This distinction is also very important because autonomous systems are
always embedded, and have to deal with an actual environment. The essential difference
lies in the fact that embedded systems are subject to material implication, and not simply
to formal implication. In recent years there has been debate within the field of AI
(artificial intelligence) on the issue of "situatedness", two foci of the debate being implicit
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vs. explicit modes of "knowledge representation", and the importance of "context".3 This
point of view has also led to work emphasizing actual physical embeddedness in the
world.
In connection with autonomous systems it is useful to make a further (at this
point, intuitive) distinction, between "embodied" vs. "embedded" systems. An embodied
system is embedded, but in addition, has the following characteristics: (i) The system is
an "organism", with an "internal" or "subjective" viewpoint. (We are not thinking here
only of organisms with awareness, let alone self-awareness). (ii) The system's body
serves as a "ground reference" for the system to construct this viewpoint. It provides the
system with the means to acquire (or bootstrap) both a kind of "semantics", and a kind of
"pragmatics", the latter via a bodily-mediated "value system". (We shall discuss the
notion of value system in some detail in Chapter 5). Thus, both "meaning" and "value"
are emergent, rather than externally imposed. (The sense of "self', in those organisms
which possess it, would be emergent in the same sense). 4
2.6 A range of metaphors
We can now introduce a rather different category of distinctions between various
systems, linked to the types of analyses, or metaphorical descriptions, typically made of
these systems. Generally, a given system cannot be fully characterized by just one of
these "metaphors", but in practice this is neglected, and usually one attempts to describe
the main features of certain systems via a single dominant metaphor.
a)The mathematical physics metaphor
This serves mainly to describe and model, but also to control, physical and
chemical systems and, in technology, all systems (provided they are not too complicated).
For modeling, this approach relies on the mathematical description of physical laws (the
language of ordinary, functional, or partial differential equations; in particular, dynamical
systems). The control of such systems can, in principle, be accomplished using the theory
of control for differential equations. A good example on the modeling side is celestial
mechanics. A counterpart on the control side is the control of a spacecraft or the attitude
control of a satellite. The approach of mathematical physics is, in some sense, the oldest
and most successful method of analysis, and when it is applicable it gives, in general,
extremely good predictive results.
b) The computational metaphor
This metaphor describes the realm of computing system devices, both software
and hardware, from the standpoint of abstract functionality (or logical implication) vs.
physical embodiment (or material implication). Its basis is the Turing machine, or its
3 See, for example, B.C. Smith, "The owl and the electric encyclopedia", Artificial Intelligence 47
(1991), pp. 251-288, and references cited there. In this very interesting article Smith discusses foundational
issues and guidelines for a theory (and practice) of "embedded computation", which he links to the notion
of "partially disconnected participation". ( He points to "self-involvement" as being more relevant in this
setting than "self-reference". )
4 In the roles we attribute to embodiment, we are close to the views of A. Damasio. (See
"Descartes's error", forthcoming, 1994, Putnam, Grosset Books). See also the references in the footnote to
Section 7.12c)(iv).
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various modifications, such as the RAM (random access machine), and symbol
manipulation. Symbols are manipulated abstractly as independent entities, that is
independent of the environment, of the method used to manipulate them, and of the
content or meaning they are intended to convey. It is clear again that this method of
analysis is extremely successful when it is applicable, namely in the design of software,
and in the analysis of simple information systems.
It is also clear that, in contrast to the mathematical physics metaphor, it is not
usually applicable by itself, in the sense that software requires physically embedded
hardware in order to run; even the symbols need to be physically instantiated. The
description and analysis of the hardware, as a physically embedded system, will be
ultimately done using the mathematical physics metaphor.
In both cases, the mathematical physics metaphor and the computational metaphor
participate to the general ideal of an exact mathematical description and analysis, and
they rely on the traditional algorithmic mathematical ontology. It is also clear that these
two methods of description, when they can be applied, can enjoy a complete success.
Unfortunately, they are somewhat brittle, and when they are inapplicable or inadequate,
their failure can be almost total.
c) The machine metaphor
By "machine" we refer to a physically embedded system, with which one
associates some specific functionalities or purposes. Thus, it makes sense to speak of a
machine as "malfunctioning" or being "broken", whereas it would not make sense, in
general, to speak of a physical system in these terms. In many cases the machine may be
treated via the mathematical physics metaphor. One the other hand, it may also be treated
somewhat non-mathematically, as a "mechanism". By this we mean an interconnected
nexus of physical cause-effect relations.
d) The control metaphor
This arises in the engineering setting, in at least two contexts:(i) Design of a
system to perform certain functions, subject to a range of guidelines, specifications, and
restrictions. (ii) Maintenance of a system's behavior within specified operational
guidelines. Here one begins with a system that is largely already designed as a physical
plant, for which one provides a "controller". Whether the controller is realized as
hardware or software it will likely need to function in "real time". From the standpoint of
autonomous systems the control metaphor has the following drawbacks. The metaphor
suggests, which is in fact the case in practice, that "control" is imposed from without,
even if it is realized "internally" within the system. Similarly, the designer, rather than the
system itself, determines the "problems" the system is to solve. In particular, these
problems do not emerge from the internal "needs" or purposes of the system. 5 This
emphasis on the imposition vs. emergence of control can be misleading as to the nature of
the latitude available in the overall, integrative system design. Thus, while it may take
into account design constraints (i.e., constraints as to which design specifications are
5 This is not to say that the designer's purposes are totally orthogonal to system-centered purposes.
For example, the designer tries to assure that the system does not break down or lose its integrity as a
system. However, from the design standpoint this consideration is secondary, whereas from the system
standpoint this is the base from which all system activities arise.
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permissible) due to the physical embedding of the system, it does not take account design
constraints imposed by the requirements of "coherence" of the system's overall
functioning and behavior. That is, it does not take adequate account of "compatibility"
conditions among design specifications (or, alternately phrased, global constraints on the
"gluing together" of local controls).6 Curiously, this presupposition of design latitude
results in an actual "brittleness" of design. The old "cybernetics" picture does convey a
sense of integrative organization, and an implicit emphasis on "coherence". However, it
does not make this notion explicit and, in effect, provides only a single mechanism for
achieving and maintaining such coherence, namely "feedback". It is far from clear that
this is adequate. In particular, cybernetics, with its emphasis on feedback, focuses on the
maintenance of static equilibrium (steady-state as well as fixed-point), both with the
external environment and within the internal milieu of the system. For an adaptive
autonomous system, on the other hand, coherence is linked to dynamic equilibrium. 7
e) The network theory metaphor and layered hierarchical systems8
We shall discuss the metaphor of electrical network theory in conjunction with
"layered hierarchical designs", such as the design of a communication network permitting
the transmission of data, voice, and images.
Network theory deals with the relations between currents and voltages which
express the laws of behavior of electrical networks. In the most elementary setting these
relations are the Kirchhoff laws. It is significant that the cause-effect relation is not made
explicit a priori, but is instead left as a choice of representation, to be decided according
to the purposes of analysis. The relationship of the network to its environment is realized
via the "load" on the network. The network laws describe the equilibrium (coherence)
that is maintained between the network (the system) and the load (environment).
Networks can be combined by interconnecting them in cascade, in parallel, or in
feedback. The laws of the resulting network are derivable from the laws of the
subnetworks which have been combined and the interconnection constraints.
The design of modern engineering systems such as communication networks
incorporates a "layered hierarchical structure" in the following sense (not to be confused
with standard notions of "hierarchical" or "tree-like" organization). Here, the level of
"abstraction" increases as one moves up the hierarchy, with the lowest layers being the
least abstract. Typically, the lowest layer is the "physical" layer, consisting of
interconnections of various subsystems. These subsystems are modeled (approximately)
using physical laws (viewed as relations between physical variables), and the subsystem
models are then interconnected as in the interconnection of electrical networks. The
signals involved are physical signals (current, voltage, position, velocity), modeled as
analog signals (in the time or frequency domain). Each higher layer takes an abstract
view of the preceding lower layer. In a communication network the next layer above the
6 This issue is emphasized in the C. elegans Working Paper referenced in Chapter 1.
7 In using the term "dynamic equilibrium" we mean, in particular, to take account of transitions
between distinct static equilibria, including the formation of new equilibria. However, we do not wish to
limit ourselves to a (parametrized) dynamical system framework (cf. Section 4.4c).
8 A discussion and analysis of the network metaphor may be found in J.C. Willems, "Models for
dynamics", Dynamics Reported, Vol. 2, 1989, pp. 171-269. (See also the reference to the work of Willems
in Section 2.8.) Layered hierarchical structures are discussed in D. P. Bertsekas and R. Gallager, "Data
networks", Second Edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1992.
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physical layer is the protocol layer (protocol = distributed algorithm), where the signals
are bit strings which are manipulated using discrete (combinatorial) algorithms. The two
layers in this instance have to be "interconnected" by properly designed interfaces which
allow the transformation of signals (analog) to symbols (bit strings) and vice versa. It is a
principle of good engineering design that if the layers themselves have been designed
properly then the design of the interfaces will be simple. Nevertheless, error detection and
correction mechanisms have to be put in place so that the layered hierarchical system
functions in a coherent manner.
As emphasized above, the design principles involved here, unlike those of
structured programming, do not lead to a tree-structure. Each layer is "homogeneous" and
robust, in the sense that uncertainties arising in a particular layer are neutralized as much
as possible within that layer itself, and not allowed to propagate to a higher layer.
Moreover, mechanisms of adaptation and learning are "built in" within each layer in
order to deal with parameter variation and, to some extent, changes in the environment. In
current designs, the "abstraction" is carried out according to principles which are
independent of context, and the symbols at higher levels are genuinely abstract, being
themselves devoid of content and meaning. Even for engineered systems, such as the
above layered structures, one needs a better understanding of the potential role of context
(and of semantics), and how it might be incorporated into the design.
f) The information processing system metaphor
"Information processing" is used in at least two distinct senses, but with the
distinction often being elided in practice. The first is information in the sense of the
Shannon's theory of a communication channel. Here "information" is not linked to
meaning or content, but only plays the role of disambiguation. The second approach to
information processing systems emphasizes "information" as conveying actual meaning,
but with the information, and associated meaning, being independent of the "apparatus"
which produces or manipulates this information. As examples, we can cite various
communicating devices where the content of information becomes important (or at least
certain aspects of the content, and where the usual abstract computational approach will
not be successful. This includes systems where one cannot be content with traditional
time-independent and context-independent logic (such as the first-order predicate
calculus), but where one wants to go beyond that, using various non-standard logics like
temporal, non-monotonic, modal logics, etc. The information processing metaphor in this
"semantic" sense is generally used informally as, for example, in discussions of nervous
system function. However, there has also been work on formal theories of semantic
information, for example in connection with formal treatments of linguistics, an "early",
example being Montague grammar.
g) "The" biological metaphor
It would be misleading to speak of a single "dominant" biological metaphor.
Certainly, the field of biology has given rise to the fundamentally new metaphor of
"natural selection". However, as regards functional organization, the field has largely
drawn its metaphors from outside, rather than generate its own 9, the primary ones being
9 We do not regard "neural networks" as an exception.
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those noted above. Our point of view, which we shall seek to explain and justify in the
remainder of this paper, is that, as regards integrative organization in a setting of
autonomy and adaptiveness, these metaphors will not suffice. The present work is one
attempt to go beyond them.
Our reservations as to the adequacy of the traditional metaphors extend even to
the context of such "simple systems" as C. elegans . One may ask with some justification,
what else is C. elegans but a tiny machine, or automaton, albeit the product of natural
evolution vs. a human designer's blueprint ? What other kind of description is even
conceivable ? This, it is fair to say, represents the consensus viewpoint of the C. elegans
research community towards their model organism. 10 In our opinion, this viewpoint is in
error. Certainly, to gain an understanding of C. elegans from a mechanistic perspective
is an immensely challenging problem. It is an integral, if not essential concomitant of any
attempt to discover, and give expression to, the organism's principles of organization. At
this point one can only speculate at what these principles may be, or even what kinds of
thing they may be. However, we believe that any attempt to express these principles in
exclusively mechanistic terms is doomed to failure, that it is in principle (no pun
intended) impossible. Not only is the mechanistic perspective "incomplete", in the sense
that there are interesting and important non-mechanistic properties of the organism, but it
is not "self-contained"; That is, any attempt to account even for the mechanistic
properties of the organism will need make reference to terms not themselves expressible
within the mechanistic frame. 11
B. Some approaches to complex interactive systems: engineered systems
In this section we briefly touch upon aspects of several approaches which have
been applied to the description, design, and analysis of complex interactive systems in a
computer science or engineering setting. Biologically oriented approaches will be
touched upon in the next section. Our purpose is to clarify the extent to which the
approaches discussed in the present section can or cannot usefully be transposed to the
setting of adaptive autonomous systems. Our presentation will, for the most part, take on
10 Paradoxically, it is the common biological provenance of our object of study and ourselves which
makes it seem to us like the artefact of an alien technology. With hindsight this alienness, or "illogical" (in
particular, far from cleanly modular) organization (to use Brenner's term; cf., Brenner: Why Is
Development So Illogical ), is only to be expected in any biological organism, even one as "simple" as C.
elegans . In fact, it has, until comparatively recently, been a widely held view among neurobiologists, both
in and out of the field of invertebrate neurobiology, that invertebrates (as contrasted with vertebrates,
especially mammals or primates) are "simple systems". That is, not only are they machines, but automata
of comparatively straightforward "logical" design, that would make good sense to a human engineer.
Gradually, this viewpoint is becoming displaced by a recognition that these "simple systems" are far from
simple in the above sense. (Cf. Harris-Warrick et. al.; Mpitsos and Soinila.)
11 We categorically deny that "non-mechanistic" implies a recourse to vitalism.
In some sense C. elegans is on the "boundary" between machine and non-machine and hence is
particularly apposite for studying where the machine metaphor reaches the limits of its validity, and
precisely how it becomes inadequate. In fact, one does not need to go all the way to a metazoan with a
nervous system, like C. elegans ,in order to reach the "boundary" between machine and non-machine. A
case (of a different nature, and admittedly more difficult to argue) can be made to this effect for a single-
cell organism such as E. coli . An interesting research program on E. coli as an integrated system is
discussed in ( Mittenthal and Levinthal).
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a negative cast. In large part, this is because we feel it will be most valuable to use these
approaches as a foil, to bring into relief essential distinguishing characteristics of adaptive
autonomous systems. Our remarks should not be construed as criticisms of these
approaches per se, since we are, after all, seeking to transpose them to settings for which
they were not initially intended. Our criticisms in this section also are, by and large, not
directed to these approaches in their potential role as "meta-level" tools, in conjunction
with an integrative modeling framework. That is, these approaches may well be useful in
conjunction with the reasoning we carry out about the system, even though they may bear
little or no relation to the processes (cognitive or otherwise) that the system itself carries
out. 12
2.7 Approaches to be considered
We begin with a listing of the approaches we will be considering. 13 The major
headings are listed, roughly speaking, in increasing order of concreteness. The ordering
of the subheadings is more idiosyncratic and, indeed, there is significant overlap between
various of the "distinct" approaches, including the major headings. This listing is for
convenience of reference. We shall make no attempt at an actual review or survey of
these approaches, even in caricatural form, nor will we even discuss them one by one.
1.Theoretical computer science and applied logic
1.1 Formal specification and verification methods
1.2 Non-standard logics (temporal logics, modal logic, non-monotonic
logic, fuzzy logic, etc.)
1.3 Concurrent process theory (Hoare, Milner)
1.4 Statecharts (Harel)
1.5 Semantics of programs (denotational semantics)
2. "Abstract" control theory
2.1 "Traditional" control theory (classical feedback control, time-domain
state-space models/optimization of control laws)
2.2 Discrete-event control (Wonham-Ramadge-Ostroff)
2.3 Hybrid control
12 Such an integrative modeling framework is a component of the C. elegans research program
mentioned in Chapter 1. The modeling framework involves the construction of a network of
mathematical/computer "partial models" concurrently representing, from multiple experimental and
analytical perspectives various facets, components, and organizational "levels" of the organism. These
partial models and the constraints linking them are to represent our "picture" of the organism, rather than
the organization of the organism itself. Computer science approaches such as those discussed in this section
(as well as certain AI approaches) may well be appropriate tools for carrying out manipulations and
analyses of this network of models, which is a formal mathematical entity, albeit of nonstandard type. In
the setting of this network, "clean", formal, "externalist" (see Section 2.8) approaches, emphasizing
functoriality, may be precisely what is needed. One example of a potentially useful tool is the "concurrent
constraint programming" approach of Saraswat, which emphasizes partial information and entailment
among partial information (see, e.g., V. A. Saraswat, "Concurrent constraint programming", MIT Press
1992). We would need this in a form incorporating non-monotonicity.
13 This list is not entirely idiosyncratic. It includes approaches we experimented with in the earlier
phases of the present work.
13
3. Genetic algorithms (Holland, Koza)
4. Integrative robotics architectures
4.1 Subsumption architecture (Brooks)
4.2 Computational neuroethology (Beer)
There are basic obstacles to transposing the above approaches to the setting of
adaptive autonomous systems. These obstacles are not associated simply with technical
difficulties, but are deeply rooted in the very nature of the approaches.
2.8 Internalist vs. externalist perspectives
There is no reason that theoretical treatments of autonomous systems should avoid
externalist (or "outside-in") perspectives, i.e., viewpoints taken by the designer (in the
case of an engineered system) or by an observer of the system. However, it is internalist
perspectives (i.e., those arising from the system itself) that must serve as the foundation
of the theory. These internalist perspectives are lacking in the above approaches. 14
For example, the thrust of "formal" approaches (such as 1.1, 1.3, 1.5) is towards
"invariance"; i.e., towards implementation-independence (both hardware and software),
context-independence, etc. In this setting, any particular realization is intended as an
instantiation of the same pre-existent abstraction. In the autonomous system setting, on
the other hand, everything is highly dependent on the individual system, on its history,
and on the context. The system organization is "emergent" rather than being an
"instantiation" of anything external.
An additional example of this externalist perspective is the philosophy of Olderog
and Hoare for modeling of processes.1 5 According to this viewpoint a process is equated
with the set of "observations" which can be made of it. A similar point of view, in the
setting of control theory, has been put forward by J. Willems, in his behavior-based
approach to control of dynamical systems. 16
One concomitant of internalist perspectives it that one can no longer rely on
external a priori "yardsticks" (such as the universal computability of Turing machines or
the universal rationality of game theory; see Section 3.7a)) as "ideal" standards against
which to measure the actual system. However, we do not regard this as a weakness of the
internalist perspectives, but rather an indication of the artificiality of such "ideal"
yardsticks (cf. Section 7.12, including footnotes, for some of the difficulties associated
with ideal rationality). 17
14 For another perspective on internalist perspectives see N. Chomsky, "Language from an internalist
perspective", preprint, 1991.
15 See, for example, the discussion and references in V.A. Saraswat, M. Rinard, and P. Panangaden,
"Semantic foundations of concurrent constraint programming", (POPL 91).
16 See, for example, J. C. Willems, "Paradigms and puzzles in the theory of dynamical systems",
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. 36, No.3, 1991, pp. 259-295. In the "behavior-based"
approach, the "state-space" is secondary and non-intrinsic, and depends on the model representation. The
same is true of "inputs" and "outputs". What is intrinsic is, for example, "controllability", which reflects
the capacity to modify system behavior. (An illustration of the construction of a state-space realization from
the space of behaviors, is the Nerode equivalence of finite automata theory).
17 We have the impression that an insistence on externalist perspectives, together with the
corresponding "ideal" yardsticks is closely related to the "foundational" paradoxes. We touch upon this in
Section 7.3, but hope to examine the question more thoroughly elsewhere. Similarly we hope to make at
14
2.9 Symbols as emergent vs. imposed
Another manifestation of the outside-in perspective, linked to the emphasis on
formal vs. embedded systems, is the traditional distinction between syntax and semantics,
in particular the idea of a functorial syntax --- > semantics mapping. In particular, in these
formal approaches a symbol, as well as the correspondence of the symbol to its referent,
can be introduced arbitrarily. The symbol need not emerge from within the system, and
its meaning need not be tied to its physical action within the system. In biological
systems, on the contrary, symbols really do something, and thereby acquire their
symbolic function.
This formal character figures also in the discrete-event and hybrid control
approaches (2.2 and 2.3). For example, in the case of analogue/discrete systems, the
analogue character tends, in practice, to be introduced by the modeler, as a particularly
convenient or efficient mode for working out a pre-determined abstract computational
problem. Thus, the analogue processes are supervenient on the abstract computation,
rather than vice-versa.
2.10 Emergence of behaviors
A fundamental problem concerns the notion of "behavior" of the system, and
how these behaviors are controlled or coordinated. This is linked to the notion of "state".
Typically, in the approaches listed under 1 (and also, to a large extent, 2), a "behavior" is
a sequence of elementary actions, where an "action" may, for example, be represented as
a transition operation on a given "state space". Our concern here is not with the question
of whether "behaviors" or "states" have primality, but with three more basic issues:(i)
The first is the "extensionality" of the treatment. We are uncomfortable with the notion of
a "behavior space" as some kind of Platonic, pre-existent set of potentialities. 18 (ii) The
second is the existence of basic building blocks, in this case the elementary actions. We
think that this reductionist type of viewpoint does not do justice to the context-
dependence and viewpoint-dependence that will be required. (iii) The third concerns
sharpness of characterization. We think that a certain degree of "blurring", or
"vagueness" is intrinsic to the autonomous system setting, which must be accommodated
by the formalism. Nor can this be done, we believe, by starting with a sharp notion and
factoring out by an equivalence relation. For example, the notion of "behavioral
equivalence" in Milner's CCS calculus is too sharply drawn for this setting. Similarly for
notions of "partial information", as in D. Scott's denotational semantics. A "partial
specification" of an entity suggests a pre-existent feature-template, with certain slots
filled in and others left blank; a "vague specification", on the other hand, would not
presuppose such a pre-existent template. (We do not mean to deny the existence of
relevant constellations of features. However, we expect that these, in general, will be
emergent and context-dependent. Moreover, the potential "contexts" cannot be
least some preliminary comments on the questions associated to "intersubjective agreement" (or
intersubjective "comparison" or "communicability") raised by internalist perspectives. This issue of
"external yardsticks", we feel, also bears upon the topic of "directionality" (towards increased "perfection"
or "complexity) of evolutionary processes.
18 At the very least, we do not see (in a discrete setting) why the system's behaviors should be
recursively enumerable.
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enumerated in advance. In particular, we strongly doubt that "context" can be
accommodated simply as an additional slot or list of slots in a predetermined feature-
template.) We do not think that "fuzzy logic" provides the solution since, in practice, it
begins with a sharp picture which is only subsequently "fuzzified", and then in a rather
precise way. This problem of pre-existent templates also pertains to "possible world"
semantics and the associated modal logics.19
We are somewhat happier with the treatment of "behaviors" in the approaches
listed under 4, but still have basic concerns here. First of all, in these approaches
behaviors are forced on the system. For example, in Beer's simulated "artificial insect",
one "wires" in "edge-following behavior". We would expect, on the contrary, that most
complex behaviors are really emergent properties of the system (on a somatic time scale)
and are not "pre-wired". 2 0 A related concern we have is that the issue of genuine
"behavioral choice" from among "competing behaviors" is not considered. Hierarchies of
behaviors (with some provision for a "reactive" form of context-dependence) are fixed
once and for all, and conflicts are pre-resolved in the specifications of the system.21
2.11 Combinatorial explosion of the state space
The same objections carry over to the treatments of "state". In particular, we do
not think that approaches listed under 1 and 2 will be helpful in dealing with such notions
as "internal state" of the organism or "state of alertness or arousal" of the system, let
alone such notions as "cognitive state" (for example, as in Chomsky's picture of
"language acquisition").
In addition, the same considerations give rise to the risk of combinatorial
explosion, and to the question of control of "search". Granted, approaches to process
theory tend to circumvent the use of a "state" notion precisely so as to evade this
combinatorial explosion problem 22 but, at least in our context, we feel this only hides
rather than eliminates the problem.
19 This is likely to be a difficulty with any form of "objectivist semantics". (See the reference to the
work of M. Johnson and G. Lakoff in the footnote to Section 7.12(iv)).
20 See, for example, R.D. Beer, "Intelligence as adaptive behavior", Academic Press, 1990. We do
not deny that some behaviors of biological organisms (in particular invertebrates) are, to a greater or lesser
extent, pre-wired.
21 Some work has been done to incorporate "learning" into the subsumption architecture framework.
(See, for example, R. A. Brooks, "Intelligence without reason", pp.569-595, IJCAI-91).
22 A classic illustration of this is G. Kahn's "determinate data-flow" model of determinate concurrent
computation. (See G. Kahn, "The semantics of a simple language for parallel programming", in J.L.
Rosenfeld, ed., Proceedings of IFIP Congress 74, pp. 471-475, Aug. 1974).
As an illustration of the combinatorial explosion problems that can arise: We experimented with a
state-space formulation of a variant of R. Milner's calculus, which we applied to the canonical examples in
his book ("Communication and concurrency", Prentice Hall, 1989), notably the "scheduler" example. We
immediately encountered a combinatorial explosion of the number of states, formulas...
We have also experimented a bit with the statechart approach of Harel, which is intended to
mitigate combinatorial explosion via a variety of devices, including a hierarchical clustering of states. We
have found this clustering somewhat unwieldy, leading to a confusion between the state of the system itself
and various parts of the system which are described at the same level. In addition, the statechart approach
may be inherently too flexible to provide, of itself, adequate control of complexity. For example, it permits
arbitrary C-code, unrestricted in complexity, to be associated to the node of a graph.
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2.12 Control and coordination of behaviors
In the approaches listed under 1, the question of control of behavior is not
explicitly raised (except, perhaps, in connection with control of search). In the approach
2.2, the issue of supervisory control of state transitions is explicitly introduced at the
foundational level, but is limited to the disallowing of certain classes of state-transition.
This, together with its restriction to a finite-state automaton (or regular language)
framework, limits the relevance of the approach for our context.
In addition, as discussed in Section 2.9 above, neither of the approaches 2.2 or
2.3 works via embedded vs. formal symbols. Just what a difference this makes can be
appreciated by considering the regulatory and control processes within a single cell, e.g.
the processes of gene regulation or cell metabolism. One might expect here that a picture
of discrete-event control would be highly apposite, but the formal symbol character of the
approach surely loses much of the essence of the underlying processes (e.g., the way in
- which feedback inhibition, say, is actually mediated; the way in which regulatory
pathways interact, etc.). This formal symbol character also overemphasizes the distinction
between controlling and being controlled.
A significant problem with the approaches 2.1 and 3 is the reliance on optimality
criteria. We are not concerned here with the question of how difficult it may be for the
system (or the designer) to actually compute the global minimum (and, in particular avoid
becoming "trapped" in a local minimum). Our concern is with the more basic issue that,
at least in the case of an organism, there is in general no canonical optimality criterion,
and the underlying control organization does not rest on optimization. At a minimum
(pun intended) there are trade-offs and choices to be made among a range of value
criteria.23 This raises also the issues of behavioral choice and conflict resolution
mentioned at the end of Section 2.10.
2.13 Motivation for action
In the approaches listed above there is no intrinsic relation of the system to its
environment (with the term "environment" suitably interpreted for the various respective
approaches). There is no system-centered vs. designer-imposed reason for the system to
do anything in particular, or anything at all., i.e., either to modify its internal "state" or to
interact with its environment. By "reason for action" we mean system-internal needs or
system-centered and system-derived goals whose satisfaction requires the system to draw
information or resources from the environment, or to act upon the environment or itself,
or to refrain from certain actions. That is, (as we shall discuss more fully in Section 5B), a
system-centered framework of "values", so that actions or inaction by the system are
"relevant" to and carry "consequences" for the system itself (with relevance and
consequence "measured against" the value-framework, which is itself grounded in the
system). By "acting upon itself' we include modifying its structure, its "rules" of
behavior, its goals, or even (to some extent) its framework of values. We believe that
genuine "learning" or "adaptation" must be linked to this kind of system-relevance, as
determined via the system's own value framework. We do not consider the pre-wired
23 Even in the setting of natural selection, one cannot really regard "fitness" as a utility-function to
be maximized. If it were, relative fitness would be a transitive relation.
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behavior hierarchies of the approaches listed under 4 as system-centered in the above
sense. 24
The above-noted non-intrinsicness in the system/environment relation associated
with approaches 1-4 is closely linked to the fact that these approaches do not take into
account inherent constraints on the system. 25 The main constraints arise from the fact that
the system has an environment and has internal needs. The environment fixes the three
basic constraints: spatial constraints, chronological constraints and resources constraints
(or space, time and matter-energy). The fourth basic constraint comes from the system
itself, namely the system needs resources to survive and one of the basic things it has to
do is to maintain its metabolism. These constraints are tied to the embeddedness and, to
an extent, the embodiment of the system (see Section 2.5).
A related issue is that the above approaches do not lay stress on the fact that the
existence of the system, and its integrity as a system, cannot be taken for granted. A
central task of an autonomous system is to maintain itself as a system.
2.14 Coherence
We have already raised the problem of "coherence" of behavior and control
organization in Section 2.6d). None of the above approaches addresses this problem
directly, or as a central concern. For example, the integrative robotics approaches listed in
4 take a largely ad hoc (based on neuroethological empirics, design experience and
intuition, etc.) approach to the question of which behaviors can (or must) be included, and
how these behaviors must be coordinated, in order to achieve and maintain coherence. In
24 Beer does, in fact, endow his simulated artificial insect with a form of "internal motivation", via a
feeding arousal system linked to sensing of an internal energy level which runs down unless replenished via
"eating". In our terminology in Section 5B this, in a sense, corresponds to a "primary value". However, it is
problematic whether we actually wish to attribute this label to a simulated vs. embedded system.
25 This is not to say that these approaches do not allow or facilitate the designer's expressing,
imposing, or verifying (formal) specifications on the system/environment interaction. For example, this is
the emphasis of Pnueli's advocacy of temporal logic as a tool to express temporal specifications (of a
limited class) for "reactive" systems. "Reactive", in Pnueli's sense of the term, refers to programs such as
computer operating systems, or airline reservation systems, which do not normally terminate, but must keep
an ongoing interaction with the environment. (See, for example, A. Pnueli, "application of temporal logic to
the specification and verification of reactive systems: a survey of current trends", in J.W, deBakker et al.,
eds., "Current trends in concurrency:overviews and tutorials", Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.
224, Springer, 1986. ) Note that this differs from our use of the term "reactive" in the present paper, to refer
to the absence of control structures mediating the system's response to environmental stimuli. (Related to
this, but distinct, is the use of the term, e.g., by Brooks, to refer to systems not making use of "internal
representations" of the environment. In our opinion the notion of "representation", and consequently this
use of the term "reactive", is somewhat problematic. In particular, how can one tell that these systems do
not, in fact, construct internal representations, albeit in a form neither planned nor recognized by the
designer ?) We note also that there is a range of other formal work besides temporal logic (e.g., in timed
process calculi) intended to provide means of expressing various types of temporal specifications.
We wish to emphasize that system/environment specifications imposed by the designer are not the
same thing as constraints which arise intrinsically from the embeddedness of the system. Also, there is a
significant difference between imposing (and verifying) specifications on an embedded vs. formal system.
This is particularly significant in the context of "safety-critical" design, where system failure can have
consequences which are catastrophic not only for the system but for the people using it. For a discussion
of the problematical nature of "hardware verification" see A. Cohn,"Correctness properties of the Viper
block model: the second level", in G. Birtwistle and P.A. Subramanyam, eds., "Current trends in hardware
verification and automated theorem proving", Springer, 1989.
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particular both the behaviors themselves and a priority hierarchy are "put in by hand". As
the number of behaviors increases, such ad hoc approaches become increasingly difficult
to implement successfully, hence the attempt to incorporate genetic algorithms (acting on
a design space) to aid in the design process. 2 6 However, this brings us back to our
criticisms (see Section 2.12) on optimization approaches. Our use of the term "ad hoc" is
not intended as a criticism of this work per se. It is intended, rather, to point out that
"coherence" has not been taken seriously as a research issue in itself, requiring its own
theoretical treatment. 27
One basic problem that such a theory must deal with is how to even formulate an
operational definition of "coherence". We conjecture that such a definition will be linked
to the value-framework (or value system, as we shall call it in Section 5B) of the system.
This will involve a kind of non-vicious circularity, since we wish the value system itself
to be "coherent". (As we shall see in Chapter 7 various forms of non-vicious circularity
are endemic to the topic of adaptive autonomous systems).
In some sense, "coherence" is the counterpart for embedded or embodied systems
of the notion of "consistency" for a formal system. But we feel that the notion of
"coherence" is much richer and more subtle. For example, there is in essence only one
way to be inconsistent, namely to give rise to a contradiction, whereas there are many
ways for a system to be (potentially) incoherent. 2 8 This is perhaps the basis for the
success of formal logic. Similarly, this is perhaps at the root of the formal mathematical
comparability of distinct formal systems, including model-theoretic methods. It is
unlikely that correspondingly sharp modes of comparison will be available for
autonomous systems. The relevance of "universality" is also in question. Thus, while
there is a (unique up to equivalence) universal Turing machine which can simulate any
Turing machine, it is unlikely in the extreme that there is anything like a "universal"
coherent (autonomous) system. Similarly, we would be much surprised if there were to be
anything in this setting corresponding to the notion of a "categorical theory"(such as the
axioms for the real number system), i.e., one for which any two realizations are
"equivalent" (in any of a variety of senses).
It is important to recognize that "coherence" can accommodate "inconsistency".
This is a key difference between autonomous systems, which are embedded in the world,
and formal systems. For a formal system an inconsistency is generally taken as
catastrophic.29 For an autonomous system, on the other hand, inconsistency need not
26 See, for example, J. R. Koza, "Evolution of subsumption using genetic programming", pp. 110-
119, in F.J. Varela and P. Bourgine, eds., "Towards a practice of autonomous systems", MIT Press, 1992.
27 One explicit formulation of a kind of coherence condition does arise in the context of concurrent
process theory, in the form of "fairness" requirements. We have also noted (cf. Section 2.6e)) the problem
of maintaining coherence in the network theory setting. A complex circuit, built even according to design,
has its own modes of coherence maintenance, which the designer may or may not have an understanding
of.
28 The notion of incoherence is, in two ways, reminiscent of John Austin's notion of "infelicitous"
utterances (see J.L. Austin, "How to do things with words", Harvard U. Press, 1975). First, the hint of
embeddedness/embodiment associated to the utterance considered as a "speech act". Second, the variety of
senses in which an utterance can be "infelicitous", as contrasted with simply "ill-formed".
29 However there is a tradition of work on the logic of inconsistency. (See, e.g., G. Priest, R.
Routley, and J. Norman, eds., "Paraconsistent logic: essays on the inconsistent", Philosophia Verlag,
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cause a problem until it is necessary for actions to be taken; even then, it is a matter of
conflict resolution, possibly on a case by case basis, rather than of rooting out
contradictions in the "foundations" of the system. Some examples are: inconsistent
beliefs held simultaneously, inconsistent goals, conflicting values, etc. "Resolving" these
conflicts may involve the making of "choices". This "decision-making" process, in order
to terminate in timely fashion, may require more than "disinterested" (or "universal", or
"objective") principles of "rationality"; it may require the involvement of "internalist",
possibly body-based mechanisms. 30
2.15 Non-algorithmicity
The approaches 1-4 discussed above are each algorithmic in one or both the
following two senses:(i)They may view the systems that they are applied to as themselves
relying primarily on algorithmic modes of operation. (ii) Alternately, they use algorithmic
processes to simulate or predict the behavior of these systems, not themselves assumed to
be algorithmic.
We believe strongly that biological organisms, while they may in some contexts
make use of algorithms, do not rely primarily on algorithmic modes of operation (even as
regards "cognitive" processes). All the preceding discussion, in particular the emphasis
on emergence and the role of the value system, argues against such algorithmicity. To
illustrate this in a cognitive setting: we are dubious (despite arguments to this effect in the
A.I. literature) that "intuition" can be grounded in algorithmic processes. In particular, we
Munich, 1989.) Work in the AI community on non-monotonic logic, ATMS (assumption-based truth-
maintenance systems), etc. should perhaps also be considered in this connection.
30 We are here only taking note of a vast topic, which we hope to return to elsewhere in more detail.
(In the present paper, the question of "conflict resolution" figures significantly, if largely implicitly, in the
design of the functional architecture schema considered in Chapter 7). We do wish to add a few remarks
here, however. When we speak of "conflict resolution" within or by an autonomous system we have in
mind a range of contexts, as well as time scales. For example, in the setting of biological organisms, this
conflict resolution may involve natural selection acting on populations on an evolutionary time scale (see,
e.g., the footnote to Section 3.1c)), or it may involve processes within an individual organism on a
"somatic" time scale. In this latter context, the issue of "conflict resolution" is pertinent to "simple"
organisms as well as to higher organisms such as humans. In particular, neither higher cognitive processes
nor awareness, self-awareness, consciousness, etc. are necessary concomitants of "conflict resolution" as
we conceive the term.
Conflicts (both conscious and unconscious) have obviously been a major focus of study in the
context of human psychodynamics, and not only from a Freudian perspective. (See, for example, the work
of Ainslie, referenced in one of the footnotes to Section 1.1). In speaking of the need to go beyond
"objectivist" rationality, we are not referring to considerations of limited computational resources, as
associated with the term "bounded rationality". Rather, we are concerned with the more basic issues of
principle addressed by A. Damasio in connection with his "somatic marker" hypothesis. (See the reference
listed in the footnote to Section 7.12(iv)).
In the context of moral philosophy, it has been a major theme in the work of Isaiah Berlin that
ultimate values are inherently incommensurable, and are uncombinable within a single human being or
single society, and that there is no overarching standard by which this conflict is rationally arbitrable. This
idea has subsequently been taken up in the context of political philosophy by Joseph Raz, who refers to
"constitutive incommensurabilities". (See, e.g., I. Berlin, "Two concepts of liberty", 1959; J. Raz, "The
morality of freedom", 1986; as referenced in, J. Gray, review of "Isaiah Berlin: a celebration", Times
Literary Supplement, July 5, 1991, p.3).
(In contrast with the "value incommensurability" discussed above, we think that "theory
incommensurability" ( as emphasized in T. Kuhn's work on the history and philosophy of science) is more
apt to be relevant to the modeling framework mentioned in the footnote at the beginning of Section 2B
than to the organization of autonomous systems themselves).
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think that algorithmically-controlled search of a pre-existent "search space" (cf. Section
2.11) is fundamentally different in character from "search" guided by intuition. (To
oversimplify somewhat, we think of algorithmically-controlled search as an auxiliary
process to be brought into play after non-algorithmic processes have focused on
"relevant" possibilities.)
The fact that a system is not itself algorithmic does not ipso facto imply that one
cannot simulate or predict its behavior to "arbitrary" precision via algorithms run on a
computer. The obvious case in point is planetary motion. (No one would claim that
gravitational forces act via computation. Yet Newton's laws can be expressed in the form
of differential equations, which can then be solved algorithmically.) However, we feel
that the very nature of autonomous systems may impose limitations of principle (in
contrast, say, with limitations associated to inadequate "computing power", or to
sensitive dependence on initial conditions, as in "chaos theory") on the extent to which
the system's behavior can be simulated or predicted. The limitations we have in mind
here are not centered on the coarseness vs. fineness of "mesh" that can be used, but rather
on the possibility that the whole notion of "prediction" must be recast in the present
setting. Rather than being akin to the predictions that a theorist can make about the
motion of a system of particles, it may be closer in character to the kinds of "predictions"
made in a social setting, of one individual about the behavior of another. 31 We put this
"conjecture" forward quite tentatively, but think it deserves serious investigation.
C. Neurobiological approaches to integrative organization
2.16 Approaches to be discussed
There has been a recent upsurge of interest in "integrated cognitive architectures",
particularly in the fields of AI/robotics and cognitive science.32 However, comparatively
few of the recent proposals directed towards the integration of "component" subsystems
have been put forward from the standpoint of cognitive neuroscience, i.e., approaches
grounded in the neurobiology of the (human) nervous system. From this standpoint an
abstract functional architecture is not sufficient. The "components" of the architecture
must be linked to specific anatomical and physiological substrates; reciprocally, there is
an emphasis on the association of functional "roles" to the various structures, patterns of
connectivity, and patterns of physiological activity of the brain, both at a large-scale and
at a fine-grained level.3 3 In the present section we shall briefly touch upon three
relatively recent neurobiological approaches which either propose or aim at
comprehensive cognitive architectures. As in Section 2B, our discussion is intended
primarily to help situate our own ideas, rather than to provide a review of these
31 This divergence as to the meaning of "prediction" may play a role in the difficulties of
human/machine interface as discussed by Lucy Suchman (see L.A. Suchman,"Plans and situated actions",
Cambridge U. Press, 1987).
32 For a sampling of work in the spirit of AI/robotics see, e.g., SIGART Bulletin, Vol.2, No. 4,
"Special section on integrated cognitive architectures".
33 The types of correlation sought here in no way imply a naively localizationist view of brain
function.
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approaches. Accordingly, we will limit comments to the points of contact with our
work. 34 The approaches to be discussed are:
1. The theory of neuronal group selection (G.M. Edelman)
2. Convergence zones and somatic markers (A. R. Damasio)
3. Neural symbolization (J. Kien)
2.17 The theory of neuronal group selection
In its "extended" form, this is a global theory of the brain, encompassing
development, functional organization, and a brain-based theory of consciousness. 35 Our
comments here will be limited to considerations of functional organization. The work of
Edelman and his collaborators emphasizes an embedded, non-algorithmic view of
functional organization, and stresses the need for internalist perspectives, especially in
connection with the emergent processes of perceptual and conceptual categorization by
the organism. The fundamental "mechanism" underlying these processes, according to
this theory, is a process of selection, occurring on a "somatic" time scale (i.e., within the
lifetime of the individual organism) and acting on "repertoires" of "neuronal groups".
This results in the formation of "local maps", with "reentrant connections" among the
local maps leading to the formation of coherent "global maps". A key role in biasing and
shaping the organism's behavior, in particular its perceptual categorization, is played by
a system of evolutionarily selected "value units", or "value repertoires" associated to
basic survival needs. 36
The theory of neuronal group selection emphasizes non-algorithmic, internalist
perspectives, and is concerned with the avoidance of "homunculus problems". In these
respects our own orientation is similar. At a more specific level, the "primary value
system" which we introduce (see Sections 3.3 and 5B) bears some affinity to the above-
noted value units. Also, our broad notion of "neural symbol"(see Chapter 7) can probably
accommodate the above notions of "local map" and "global map", and our picture of
neural symbol manipulation can perhaps accommodate the categorization or manipulation
of global maps which figures in Edelman's treatment of "concept formation". Some
34 In particular, we will not discuss, except in passing, the specific proposals made in these
approaches as to the neurobiological substrates supporting particular abstract functionalities. It should be
clear from our emphases throughout the present paper on "embeddedness" (or "embodiment") and
"emergent" functionality, that we do not regard such questions of substrate as purely incidental
considerations. It is simply that at the present time they do not impinge directly on our own work.
It also should not be assumed that in failing to even mention other work in this very large field we
are either making some sort of implicit value judgment or displaying a complete ignorance of the literature.
We are exercising a deliberate myopia here, and limiting our discussion to work we perceive as having
some particular affinity with our own. In light of our emphasis on non-algorithmicity, this accounts for our
omission of any discussion of "computational neuroscience" or of combined AI/neuroscience perspectives,
even intriguing proposals for comprehensive integrative architectures such as that put forward by Yves
Burnod. (See, Y. Burnod, "An adaptive neural network: the cerebral cortex", Masson, Paris, 1989).
35 See G.M. Edelman, "Neural Darwinism", Basic Books (1987); "Topobiology", Basic Books
(1988); "The remembered present", Basic Books (1989); "Bright air, brilliant fire", Basic Books (1992).
36 For an exposition of the role played by value units in perceptual categorization see, for example,
G.N. Reeke, L.H. Finkel, O. Sporns, and G. M. Edelman, "Synthetic neural modeling: a multilevel
approach to the analysis of brain complexity", in G.M. Edelman, W.E. Gall, and W.M. Cowan (eds.),
"Signal and sense: local and global order in perceptual maps", J. Wiley & Sons, New York (1989).)
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points in which our approach differs from that of the theory of neuronal group selection
are: (i) Selectionist processes do not play such a dominant role. (ii) We emphasize a more
elaborate "value system", including higher-order and symbolic values. (iii) The problems
associated with "coherence" (cf. Section 2.14) and "conflict resolution" (including
conflicts among values) play a more central role. We anticipate that "maintaining
coherence", in the sense that we use the term, will require more than a single dominant
mechanism such as "reentry".
2.18 Convergence zones and somatic markers
A rather different framework for a comprehensive cognitive architecture, also
from an internalist perspective, has been proposed by A.R. Damasio. In this framework
the "body proper" plays a central role in grounding, mediating, and guiding the "higher"
cognitive processes, and even in maintaining the sense of identity of the mind/brain. Two
key components of this architecture are "convergence zones" and "somatic markers".
a) Convergence zones37
These form the neuronal substrate of a "combinatoric" schema whereby
"dispositional representations" activate and manipulate "images" ("topographic
representations"). These "images", which form the contents of consciousness, are
correlated with patterns of neuronal firing at distributed sites in the primary sensory and
motor cortices corresponding to distinct "feature-based" sensory and motor fragments.
The integration of these various fragments is achieved via the synchronous activation of
the corresponding neuronal firing patterns. This activation is mediated by firing patterns
("dispositional representations") supported in "convergence zones". These are neuronal
sites located downstream from the primary cortices which receive feedforward
connections from the distributed primary sites and, reciprocally, form feedback
connections with them. This is envisaged as an iterated, hierarchical arrangement, with
several tiers of successively higher-order convergence zones. This schema serves at once
as a means of organizing memory storage and as a mechanism of recall, via the
synchronous reactivation of distributed feature fragments.
b) Somatic markers38
According to the "somatic marker" hypothesis a system of (visceral) body-based,
emotionally-mediated value markers (both "positive" and "negative"), becomes
associated (via the individual's nervous system) to the consequences of various courses of
action, on the basis of the individual's experiences. This mechanism of somatic marking
plays a fundamental role in guiding and shaping the individual's decision-making (and
"intuition"). Clinical case studies by Damasio and his colleagues, in which ventromedial
frontal lobe damage leads to disruption of the somatic marking mechanism, strongly
suggest that in the "real world" (i.e., in the domain of "social cognition" vs. formally-
structured artificial problem domains) a purely "rational" decision-making process, not
37 For an early reference see, for example, A. R. Damasio, "Time-locked multiregional
retroactivation: a systems-level proposal for the neural substrates of recall and recognition", Cognition, 33
(1989), pp. 25-62.
38 See A. R. Damasio, "Descartes' error", forthcoming, 1994, Putnam, Grosset Books.
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grounded by a body-based value system, often leads to infelicitous consequences. Among
the mildest of these consequences is a tendency towards "infinite" dithering. 39
The above framework places an explicit emphasis on embodiment (cf. Section
2.5c)). Concomitantly, this framework has a strongly internalist character. This is
exemplified by the treatment of the organism's "rationality": as emergent, internal-value
dependent, and non-algorithmic. We feel that our notion of "neural symbol" is
compatible with the concept of "representation" used here, including both "dispositional"
and "topographic" representations.4 0 Moreover we think that there is an affinity between
our picture of neural symbol manipulation and Damasio's picture of representations
manipulating or activating other representations. In addition, our "higher-order value
system" (see Sections 3.3 and 5B) very naturally accommodates the somatic marker
system, and it plays a correspondingly important role in our approach. Again as above,
one difference we see with our approach is the central role we give to the issues of
"coherence" and "conflict resolution".
2.19 Neural symbolization 41
J. Kien, in a discussion of her work with J. Altman on time-frame descriptions of
behavior, makes a persuasive case for the potential relevance both to human memory and
to motor organizing systems of some form of non-computerlike, embedded, context-
dependent process of neural symbolization. Among the roles envisaged for such a process
are: data compression (whereby original "data" can be maintained intact and reaccessed
as needed, while compressed "surrogates" undergo actual "data-manipulation"); serial
ordering; symbolization of relationships (and of relationships of relationships). We think
that the process of "neural symbolization" which we discuss in Chapter 7 has some of the
qualitative characteristics advocated by Kien.
We agree with certain broad features of the multiple time-frame model, in
particular the emphasis placed on the issue of behavioral choice, in connection both with
memory activation and with motor planning. However, once again we would like to give
greater emphasis to questions of "coherence". Such questions could, for example, be
posed in conjunction with the "mechanism" for behavioral choice proposed by Kien and
Altman. This is a highly distributed form of "decision making", involving "consensus"
among strongly interconnected "processing networks" of neurons (modeled as attractor
39 Consistent modes of deviation from normative rationality by normal individuals (without brain
damage) have been noted in the cognitive science literature, but have been interpreted in a pejorative
fashion. (See, for example, A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, "Rational choice and the framing of decisions,"
1986, reprinted in G. Shafer and J. Pearl, eds., "Readings in uncertain reasoning", Morgan Kaufmann,
1990.
40 Our "neural symbols" are not abstract entities, with form divorced from content, subject to purely
formal syntactic manipulation, as in the case of the symbols in a formal language. In particular, we think
that our notion of "neural symbol" in our sense can accommodate both the "rich images" emphasized by
Damasio and "schematic images" emphasized by Johnson and Lakoff (cf. the references in the footnote to
Section 7.12(iv)).
41 See J. Kien, "Remembering and planning: a neuronal network model for the selection of behavior
and its development for use in human language", pp. 229-258 in K. Haefner, ed., "Evolution of information
processing systems", Springer, 1992.
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neural networks) 42 ; in this picture making a decision corresponds to the process of
reaching a stable state (not necessarily a fixed point) of the associated dynamical system.
From the standpoint of "coherence" the relevant questions would include: (i) What
spatio-temporal patterns of stable states correspond to "coherent" behavioral choices ? (ii)
In this particular dynamical system setting, what mechanisms (not requiring the
intervention of the modeller during "somatic" time) insure that coherence is maintained ?
42 In the sense of D. J. Amit. (See, for example, "Modelling brain function", Cambridge U. Press.
1989.
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3. Characteristics of adaptive autonomous systems:
what must a mathematical framework accommodate ?
In this chapter, we will seek to isolate some of the characteristic features of
systems that one would regard as adaptive and autonomous. We want to explore the
following types of question: (i) What kind of "ontology" must a mathematical framework
for such systems accommodate? (ii)What kinds of problems of integrative organization
will mathematical approaches need to address ? (iii) What kinds of mathematical
approaches are possible, and what are their limitations? In the discussion below, the
notions introduced, such as "goals", "values", etc. will be used with their intuitive
meaning, rather than in any special technical sense. We will examine these various
notions in more detail in subsequent chapters.
A. Characteristics of adaptive autonomous systems
3.1 The basic requirement: relative adaptation to the external environment
a) The environment
By definition, any interactive system, even a Turing machine, has an environment
of one sort or another, even if this environment is extremely schematic (a tape, in the
case of the Turing machine). 1 Depending on the nature of the system, its modes of
interaction with the environment may take various forms, for which a variety of
descriptive "metaphors" may be to a greater or lesser extent apropos, often concurrently.
In some cases it may be appropriate to speak of "inputs" and "outputs", which may be
(sometimes simultaneously) "signals", "substances", "actions", etc. (reading or writing
symbols on the tape, in the case of the Turing machine).The environment, as well as the
system, may be "modified" in its "state" or in its activity as a result of this two-way
traffic; in particular, intermediate outputs may influence subsequent inputs (as in the case
of "reactive" systems in the sense of Pnueli, mentioned in Section 2.14, footnote). In
some cases it may be appropriate to think of specific, discrete "channels" of
communication, either fixed or time-varying. In other instances, as in the case of an
organism, or even of a cell embedded in its milieu, where the interface between system
and environment is a complex membrane of selective and modifiable permeability, such
a picture would be highly caricatural. Moreover, even in the context of discrete channels,
"communication" need not be point-to-point targeted, but may be of a diffuse "broadcast",
nature, and the "tokens" of communication may be heterogeneous in structure and
polymorphic in their effects. Also the effect of "signal reception" may involve a complex
triggering and transduction process rather than a simple passage from outside to inside. In
addition, the system may be able to exercise considerable selectivity in its receptiveness
to "inputs".
1 An autonomous system may to some extent decide what aspects of its embedding milieu constitute
the "environment". (See the footnote to Section 2.4).
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b) Maintaining specified relations with the environment
Many artificial systems are supposed to maintain a certain number of relations
with the environment. For example, a reservation system should be able to deliver tickets
and schedules to the environment, which, in this case, is a file of customers; a plant
transforms certain industrial inputs into outputs which should be adjusted to the
customer's demand; a transportation system should efficiently transport people...
Abstractly, these systems are "reactive" (in the sense of Pnueli, noted above); that is, they
receive inputs from the outside and produce outputs modifying the environment, but they
are intended to produce outputs in such a way as to maintain given relations which are
specified by the designer of the system. These specified relations can be very precise
(e.g., in an air traffic control system, two airplanes should not collide), and may be
expressible via mathematical equations or inequalities, or via some formal specification
language.(However, it should be noted that expressing the specifications, enforcing them,
and verifying or monitoring that they are being or will be met are distinct matters). On the
other hand, they can be much less sharp, possibly admitting of varying degrees of
compliance. Towards one end of this "sharpness" spectrum are relations which can be
specified only using natural rather than formal language, and where compliance or
noncompliance is subject to interpretation. Many examples of such relations arise in
"normative" systems, such as legal systems or systems of social conventions. In such
normative systems even the question of whether a particular situation falls within the
scope of a given "law" or "rule" is subject to conflicting interpretation. We shall return to
this question of sharpness in a later chapter, in connection with "vague" specifications. 2
c) Natural systems:maintaining a state of relative adaptation with the environment
A natural system, like a cell or an animal, which is not subject to designer-
imposed specifications, relates to the environment in a rather different manner. Being
embedded in its environment it must, to preserve its very existence and its autonomy,
maintain a state of relative adaptation. The term "relative adaptation" (as used by K.F.
Liem3 in the context of form-function evolution ) is intended to convey several important
connotations: (i) In a rapidly changing and rich environment, it may be inadvisable, if not
impossible for the system (on a somatic time scale; or for a population, on an
evolutionary time scale) to implement a "strategy" of maintaining fixed relations with the
environment. Instead, the system will need to adapt to the environment, which means, in
particular, that it may need to vary the relations it maintains with the environment (cf. the
reference to "dynamic equilibrium" in Section 2.6d)). (ii) This adaptation is "relative" in
two senses. First, even supposing there were some intrinsic utility function correlated
2 It makes sense to request an independent review of a given judicial opinion, but surely it is
preposterous to ask for a "proof of correctness". Speaking rather informally here, our view is that the
degree of "vagueness" of specificity (not intended here as a pejorative!) associated with biological systems
lies somewhere towards the middle of the spectrum between sharp specificity and the looser specificity
associated with normative systems.
3 Liem, K.F., Adaptive significance of intra- and interspecific differences in the feeding
repertoires of Cichlid fishes , Amer. Zool. 20 (1980), pp.2 9 5 -3 14 . Liem presents a picture of the
organism as a "network of interacting constraints", or a "form-function complex". Interpreting these as
design solutions, he emphasizes the integrative character of the "designs", so that modifications with
respect to some particular design feature may enhance some capabilities of the system while at the same
time diminishing others. Apropos "structural integration" see also S.J. Gould, "The evolutionary biology of
constraint", Daedalus, Spring 1980, pp. 39-52.
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with "degree of adaptation" of behavior, the environment might be changing too rapidly
for the system to ever succeed in optimizing this utility. More importantly, there is no
reason to think such a utility function exists. The environment, rather than setting fixed
"problems", affords various possibilities to the system, and behaviors which take
advantage of some of these preclude taking advantage of others. Moreover, what is
needed is not individual behaviors but an integrated repertoire of behaviors. Thus,
depending on the degree of stereotypy of its environment, the system, in order to
maintain a degree of relative adaptation adequate for survival and autonomy, may require
a capacity for learning, or even for context and history-dependent behavioral-choice. (A
potentially helpful analogy: rather than determining how to play a particular game, the
question is which game to play).
3.2 Basic constraints 4
a) Constraints of time and metabolism.
The functioning of a system, whether it acts purely reactively or draws upon
higher-order control, requires time and resources. In most modeling, the resources are
forgotten (a formal automaton does not need food or fuel !). For embedded systems,
whether machines or animals,... the metabolism (or energy) constraint and the time
constraints are of first importance. Indeed, at least for "lower" animals, much of their
time is devoted to searching for food, which is necessary to maintain their metabolism
within appropriate limits.
Moreover resources are scarce. This means that various subsystems of the system
will need to "compete" for access to resources, either external or internal, including
metabolic resources. Certain of these resources may be needed in order to manufacture
other resources not directly available from the environment. The system, if an organism,
may also need to compete with other organisms for external resources. Nor is it simply a
matter of "competition". Scarcity of resources may compel coordinated activity, or
"cooperation" by subsystems. 5
4 As we shall elaborate in Chapter 4, the primary distinction we wish to emphasize is between the
notion of "specification" and the notion of "constraint". However, one could also note distinctions among
constraint "types". For example, certain constraints are physical laws, which any embedded system is
subject to simply by virtue of being physically embedded. Others are of a more conditional nature. For
example, the "metabolic" constraint introduced in this section is not a physical law, but must nevertheless
be satisfied if the system is to remain alive. The same holds for other "homeostatic" or "safety"
constraints.
5 J. E. Mittenthal and his collaborators, in their work on principles of integrative organization in
organisms, have stressed the driving role of resource limitations in shaping the specific organizational
structures that emerge. (See, e.g., J.E. Mittenthal, A.B. Baskin, and R. E. Reinke, "Patterns of structure and
their evolution in the organization of organisms: modules, matching, and compaction, pp. 321-332 in J. E.
Mittenthal and A.B. Baskin, eds., "Principles of organization in organisms", Proceedings Vol. XIII, Santa
Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Addison-Wesley, 1990.) A nice discussion of this, in the
context of the integrative organization of E. coli is given in J.E. Mittenthal, M. Clarke, and M. Levinthal,
"Designing bacteria".




Additional basic constraints on embedded systems are associated with space.
Some examples: First, the system (say, an organism) may move in its environment.
Second, the various subsystems of the system must act in spatial coordination with one
other, taking into account their positions, shapes, contiguity relations, etc.
3.3 Goals, values, and optimality
a) Goals
An autonomous system has its own goals. By this we mean that its goals are not
fixed by a designer, but are emergent properties of the system in its interaction with its
changing environment. 6 By "own goals" we also mean that the complex forms of
behaviors are not a priori pre-specified and "pre-wired", but that they are emergent. In
particular, there is not a fixed repertoire of behaviors, organized into a pre-set priority
hierarchy. The term "goal" as used here is very broad. For example, it need not be tied to
any "awareness" or "consciousness" or "volition" on the part of the system. Nor need it
convey any intentionality insofar as this is directed towards any specific object or aim or
end external to the system. The minimal goal (or proto-goal) is implicit and system-
referred 7: to maintain itself as a system. This requires maintaining a state of relative
adaptation with the environment and, in particular, maintaining metabolism within safe
bounds. Outward-directed goals emerge as conditional concomitants of the system's
modes of fulfilling (and of giving explicit form to) its implicit proto-goal, and these
modes are themselves conditioned upon the system's internal organization and
"resources", and on the state of the environment.
"Emergent" does not mean emergent out of nothing; there must be a kernel, or
ground, starting from which the system, in interaction with its environment, is able to
"bootstrap" itself. This kernel includes a physically embedded structural/functional
substrate which supports mechanisms to induce and sustain the fulfillment of the proto-
goal. We shall, somewhat metaphorically, refer to this structural/functional substrate as
the "basic circuitry" of the system, and shall make suggestions below as to what types of
"components" it may minimally need to incorporate. We shall also propose a possible
realization of the "inducing and sustaining" mechanisms: namely, a "primary value
system" embodied in the "basic circuitry".
6 This characteristic of "autonomy", suggests that our use of the term is different from that of
designers who seek to build "autonomous robots". That is, is it possible to arrange the design so that the
system is autonomous in our sense, yet at the same time meets specific goals of the designer (e.g.., specific
tasks to be performed, or ends to be achieved in the environment)? Perhaps this is to some extent realizable
in the form of additional proto-goals built into the "circuitry" and "value system". However, it is unlikely
that a specific task, such as driving a nail into a wall at a specified location on the wall can be "emergent".
More likely what is desired is a "quasi-autonomous" system with the following characteristics: (i) It can act
autonomously (i.e., "take care of itself' and "not cause damage") when not required to perform specific
tasks. (ii) When required, it accepts and is able to interpret and execute (in a context-dependent fashion)
instructions (expressed in a high-level language) specifying the task to be performed but not the details of
execution.
7 Making a rather strained analogy with a formal system setting, the idea of system-referral vs.
external-referral, is akin to a recursively- defined condition on a function or process.
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A couple of points of clarification: (i) The "basic circuitry" (certainly the
particular form/function complex comprising it) is not "canonical", and may vary from
system to system. 8 Moreover the basic circuitry in any individual system need not
comprise the entire "circuitry" of the system, and must be integrated with the rest of the
system organization. In particular, the "basic circuitry" should not be confused with the
"initial circuitry" of the system, the latter being the initial state (at "birth" or time of
"construction") of the overall "circuitry" of the system. (ii) The circuitry and value
system are not static. Over time (i.e., the "somatic time" of the system), both the
"circuitry" and the value system, in interaction, will undergo modification, and may or
may not reach a quasi-steady state, or pass through a succession of such states. In
particular, the value system, which initially consists only of the primary value system,
will expand to incorporate "higher-order" values, as well as "symbolic" values. These
modifications of the "circuitry" and of the "value system", which serve to enhance the
adaptiveness of the system, involve processes of learning and memory. To an extent, the
substrates supporting these processes may themselves be emergent, and undergo
modification over somatic time. Referring to the "time scale" terminology discussed
below, we shall (essentially as a tautology) assume that the "initial circuitry" and "initial
value system" of the given system are the result of evolution (resp., the designer) working
over evolutionary time (resp., design time). The other constituents of the value system
will be emergent. Here, and elsewhere, when we speak of "emergence" we shall mean
emergent in somatic vs. design time, unless we explicitly state otherwise.
b) Time scales
We like the idea emphasized by Edelman (see Section 2C) of introducing distinct
time scales. In the case of a biological organism these include: evolutionary time,
developmental time (i.e., the time of passage from zygote to adult, or to some
intermediate state of maturity), and somatic time (the lifetime of the mature individual, or
relevant epochs of varying scales within the individual's lifetime).
Inasmuch as our focus is on autonomy and adaptiveness, and not on "life", we do
not wish to emphasize reproduction (or self-reproduction) as an issue, and certainly not in
the context of artificial systems. Also, we wish to allow significant structural changes
during the entire lifetime of the system. Thus, we shall not be concerned to distinguish
developmental time, and shall generally subsume it under somatic time. Moreover, in the
context of artificial systems, we shall substitute "design time" for "evolutionary time".
This is the time during which the designer may generate and test a (parametrized) family
or "population" of designs. We picture this design time not so much as a distinct time
scale, but as a distinct time axis, interleaved with the somatic time axis. During design
time any testing, modification, or selection is done by the designer on a population of
systems or of system designs. During somatic time the designer does not intervene, and
there is only the individual system and not a population. The only "exploration" is that
done by the system, and the domain explored is the environment, via direct interaction,
rather than a "design space". Such interaction may result in (beneficial or harmful)
8 In particular, we do not mean to suggest anything like a canonical functional microcircuit serving
as a repetitive building block for the system, as has been proposed for neocortex (see, e.g., R. J. Douglas,
K.A.C. Martin, and D. Whitteridge, "A canonical microcircuit for neocortex", Neural Computation 1, pp.
480-488, 1988).
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modification of the system, including modification of the "circuitry" and of the "value
'system". Such modification may, in particular, take the form of "learning". If the system
has the capacity for "planning" this provides, in somatic time, a kind of "virtual"
population, as a sort of partial "surrogate" for the actual population of design time.
c) The basic circuitry
We imagine that the "basic circuitry" would, at a minimum contain mechanisms
which manifest sensitivity to alterations in the internal state of the system, as well as
mechanisms capable of restoring the internal state to a "baseline", or "dynamic
equilibrium" level. This may require more than a simple feedback loop; e.g., it may
require significant internal structural or functional reorganization of the system achieved
via internal effectors acting "mechanically", in conjunction with cascades of "chemical"
processes, Moreover, the "mechanical" processes may themselves need the support of
the "chemical" processes to fuel their activity. In addition, the activity of one set of
effectors or processes may give rise to the need for additional mechanical and/or
chemical activity, for example, to eliminate waste products. Part of the "job" of the
effectors may also be to alter the situation of the system in the external environment, in
particular via locomotion. The system will also require "interfaces" with the external
environment, in order to take in resources and to eliminate waste products. We do not
expect the interface to be a purely passive conduit. Hence there will be the need for
effectors to physically control the activity of the interface, as well as mechanisms
sensitive to alterations in the state of the interface. The state of the interface should
undergo some (localized or diffuse) alterations induced by physical stimuli impinging on
it from the external environment, so that the system has the possibility of taking account
of "resources" or "risks" in the environment. (We expect the basic circuitry to act
predominantly in an "autonomic" fashion; i.e., independently of direct control
intervention by other parts of the circuitry, as in the case of the autonomic nervous
system. By this we mean that the remainder of the system does not directly monitor, and
hence does not directly regulate the state of the basic circuitry; rather, it influences the
behavior of the basic circuitry only by influencing the state of the external environment of
the basic circuitry).
We have spoken of "sensitivity" rather than of "sensors" so as not to appear to
suggest some apriori modes of categorization by the system of the sensory "inputs". We
expect this categorization to be an emergent process. Similarly, the sensitivity may be of
a diffuse vs. sharply localized or sharply specialized character. The system need not be
sensitive to precisely where a signal has impinged, nor need the system cleanly segregate
signals of different physico-chemical type. Nor need the signals result in elaborate
internal representations of the environment; for example, photosensitivity need not imply
a sense of vision. The sensory and effector apparatus may become refined and elaborated
over time (evolutionary/developmental/somatic). 9 This refinement will typically go along
9 We do not rule out multifunctionality. Thus, the same physical component or activity pattern may
serve both sensory and effector functions.
In an interesting dissertation, Peter Cariani seeks to develop a framework in which to distinguish
between computation, measurement, control, and non-symbolic functionalities. He proposes a taxonomy
distinguishing between "nonadaptive" devices ("formal-computational" and "formal-robotic");
"computationally adaptive" devices (e.g., neural nets or genetic algorithms); and "semantically adaptive"
devices ("evolutionary" devices). The devices in this last class adaptively construct their own sensors and
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with an elaboration and reorganization of the overall structural/functional architecture of
the system. The sensory apparatus need not function in a purely "passive" manner.
Rather, the system may actively "explore" for "relevant" signals in the external or
internal environment.
It is conceivable that, from the standpoint of a strictly formal/logical vs.
embedded system, a complete list of the logical "components" required for (one of the
variants of) a "basic circuitry" may be very brief (as is the case, say, with von
Neumann's "self-reproducing automata";see Section 3.7). However, when one considers
an actual embedded circuitry, the situation may be quite different. As hinted at in the
above partial enumeration, the inclusion of any one component gives rise to requirements
for additional supporting substrates or processes, which in turn generate support
requirements of their own, etc. By the time one attains "closure", or "self-containment"
(in dynamic equilibrium with environmental resources), one may have a very complex
system. For example, a cell, even if we disregard apparatus specifically associated with
replication (the cell cycle) is tremendously complex. Nor would we say that a virus
(which draws on a host cell's reproductive apparatus) is "simple".
d) Values
An adaptive system, embedded in a complex environment, cannot try out actions
completely "at random" all the time. (Here "at random" may, but need not, connote
"stochasticity". The emphasis, rather, is on "non-directedness"). Even if certain actions
are done at random, as may particularly be expected early on in the "lifetime" of the
system, there should be a system of values or rewards which has the effect of retaining
"valuable actions" for the system. We envision this value system as an outcome-based
biasing system, rather than as an encoding or representation (explicit or implicit) of pre-
set behaviors; indeed, in general, the value system will have no way of "knowing" (nor
need there in principle be a way of knowing) what the (a posteriori) beneficial behaviors
or goals actually are. In particular, the value system should be consonant with
situatedness, or context-dependence, of action, and with behavioral choice. As discussed
above, initially the value system consists exclusively of the primary value system, which
is associated with the minimal, proto-goal, and is realized via the basic circuitry. Over the
course of (somatic) time, the value system can expand, with certain new values
appearing, and others disappearing or being modified, depending also on changes in the
environment. As emphasized above, these values are emergent, and not imposed by an
external agent.
In speaking here of a "biasing system", we shall not (for purposes of the present
chapter) seek to distinguish between: the system for generating the "biases", the physical
substrate which supports the "biases" thus generated, or the "biases" themselves. (For that
effectors contingent on their performance. Cariani links these three classes of devices to different forms of
Robert Rosen's notion of "emergence relative to a model", i.e., the deviation of the behavior of a natural
system from a model of it. (This is to be contrasted with "computational emergence" and "thermodynamic
emergence").According to Cariani, the nonadaptive devices do not yield emergent behavior; the
computationally adaptive devices require only adjustment of model parameters (or state transition rules) to
recover predictability; and semantically adaptive devices require the continual introduction of new
observables in order to regain predictability. (See P. Cariani, "On the design of devices with emergent
semantic functions", Ph.D. Dissertatation in Advanced Technology, State University of New York at
Binghamton (1989); R. Rosen, "Anticipatory Systems", Pergamon Press, 1985.
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matter these distinctions, certainly that between a bias and its substrate, are quite murky).
In particular, the primary value system involves all the above, including certain "pre-set"
biases determined in evolutionary time (or in "design" time). Nor do we mean to suggest
a uniformity or homogeneity of "mechanism". As one example, even in the case of the
primary value system, certain of the primary values, such as those directly linked to
homeostatic constraints, may involve error-correcting mechanisms of the traditional
"feedback" variety. Others, probably constituting the general case, will have more of the
"unspecific" or "diffuse" character emphasized in the preceding paragraph. l 0 We should
also note that when we speak of individual "biases" or "values" as entities in their own
right, we do not intend this in any literal sense: first, because a particular "value" makes
sense only as part of an overall system; secondly because, as emphasized above, values in
the sense we have in mind tend to manifest a kind of generalized, or diffuse vs. hard-
edged quality.
e) Non-optimalitvy
Reiterating the point made in Section 3.1c), the "optimality metaphor" does not
apply to the workings of an adaptive system. In general an adaptive system does not try,
either through its own "intent" or through the nature of its underlying "design", to
optimize anything in particular. There may be many conflicting, incommensurable
criteria of utility present concurrently, rather than a single overarching criterion. 11 When
the system, or some subsystem, does optimize a particular "utility function", this utility
criterion may readily vary from one context to another. Moreover, even when an
behavior does in fact "optimize" some criterion, we expect this criterion itself to be
emergent from the interaction of:the system with its environment and not, in general,
prefigured in the "design" of system.
3.4 The need for control: achieving and maintaining coherence
All adaptive systems (whether natural or artificial) will tend to be rather complex.
Even to maintain themselves as systems, let alone to accomplish a specific set of
outward-directed goals or tasks, they will need to integrate the activity of multiple
interacting subsystems. Moreover, this internal organization of structural resources into
functional subsystems may be dynamic rather than static. In addition, distinct "levels" of
subsystem "decomposition" may be superimposed. (This is illustrated most readily in the
case of societal organization: among the superimposed levels are the political, legal,
economic, familial, etc.)
10 In this respect they will be more akin to the "value units" or "value repertoires" appearing in the
work of Edelman and his collaborators (see Section 2C). In this setting there is a corresponding
"diffuseness" vs. sharp localization in the patterns of connectivity of the value repertoires with the other
parts of the nervous system. Diffuseness of effect also figures in conjunction with the quite different,
emotion-based somatic-marker schema of Damasio (see Section 2C). Here the diffuseness is associated
with the central autonomic effectors, notably the amygdala, which can activate somatic responses in
viscera, vascular bed, endocrine system, and nonspecific neurotransmitter systems.
11 We think that the "optimality metaphor" is fundamentally out of place in this setting. In particular
we don't think that any aid or comfort is to be drawn from the techniques of so-called "multi-criteria
optimization", e.g., forming new utility functions from weighted averages of component utility functions,
or drawing on Pareto optimization ideas from microeconomic theory. We note in passing that in Pareto
optimization theory one does not have a canonical way to choose from among the many Pareto optima.
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However, as we have emphasized in Sections 2.6d) and 2.14, a collection of
subsystems put together willy-nilly cannot be expected to yield "coherent" behavior, let
alone behavior continually maintaining a state of adaptation with the environment. Even
if the subsystems are themselves individually "coherent", they may very well tend to
compete in an anarchical way for access to various resources. (This need not be limited to
a societal organization; to take a very simple biological example, antagonistic muscles
could attempt to work simultaneously).
One is thus faced with the question of "control": namely, what is the means by
which the system achieves and maintains coherence in a context of emergent
functionality? We feel that this conception of the problem of control will require that one
go well beyond the traditional perspectives on control engineering discussed in Section
2.6d). Even in the setting of artificial systems, the various subsystems may each have
several naturally associated "utility functions". Correspondingly, the design of the
control system may involve complex tradeoffs. 12 In particular, it will be necessary to
reexamine the extent to which control can maintain its traditional "supervisory"
character. In a setting of emergence and situatedness, a putative supervisor (associated
with any aspect of the overall organization) might, in principle, have no way of
"knowing" (certainly not to a high degree of "specificity") what task, state-of-affairs,
internal state, etc., should definitely be achieved or definitely be avoided by that portion
of the system under its influence, let alone what behavior should be "induced" so as to
bring this about. We think that a more radical revision of viewpoint will be needed here
than simply to jettison "instructionist" approaches in favor of "selectionist" ones. 13 We
anticipate that a richer space of possibilities will need to be considered than the points on
the one-dimensional instructionist-selectionist axis.
3.5 What else is needed?
We have discussed above in intuitive language, but still at a rather abstract level,
some of the basic components that may be expected to figure in the organization of
adaptive autonomous systems. Have we omitted anything essential ? We shall give three
different answers from three different perspectives: (i) Undoubtedly yes. It is unlikely
that we have not omitted some basic component. (ii) The question makes no sense. There
is no such thing as a minimum set of "logical" components that are common to all
adaptive autonomous systems, and certainly no such thing as a set of necessary and
sufficient components. In particular, since we are dealing with systems with emergent
functionality, it makes no sense to discuss the "logical" or formal level in isolation as a
separate level. Everything is dependent on the actual concrete embedded system (see
Section 2.8). (iii) Perhaps not. All specific examples that come to mind of adaptive
12 A separate question which we shall not take up here, and which is perhaps relevant primarily in
the design (i.e., artificial system) setting, is that of incrementality of control design. For example, one may
not want, when "gluing together" subsystems , to have to do substantial internal "rewiring" of the
subsystems. In that case, one must constrain the control design so as not to permit (or require) it to make
use of detailed knowledge of what is happening internally within the subsystems.
13 A couple of difficulties facing a "pure" selectionist approach are: (i) Certain contexts may simply
not afford either the actual or virtual populations on which selective processes can act. (ii) Time
constraints may not afford selective processes adequate time to act.
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autonomous systems appear to present these "basic" features in one form or another.
Admittedly, they individually present additional features as well, which may depend
markedly on the particular type of system considered. But perhaps these features are
secondary concomitants (and in some cases even "logical consequences" of) the "basic"
features, serving simply as tools to implement or enhance the "basic" features. As
examples of these "secondary" features , we can cite "associative learning",
"categorization", "planning", "abstraction", "symbolization", ...
We do not feel impelled to make a choice from among these perspectives, of
which (ii) and (iii) are surely the more interesting. We shall however, have a bit more to
say along the lines of (ii) in Section 3.7, and shall discuss some of these "secondary"
features in Chapter 7, where we explore some elements of an integrative functional
architecture schema.
B. What can one expect from a mathematical
theory of adaptive autonomous systems ?
3.6 Is such a theory possible?
The main question is "Can one hope to develop a mathematical theory of
adaptive autonomous systems, and if so, at what levels of description ?". This question is
not easy to answer - as probably it was not easy to answer what kind of mathematics, if
any, could be used to describe a falling body or the planetary motions in the fourteen
century, or to describe the action of heat and atomic motions in the middle of in
nineteenth century. As a step towards addressing the question, we begin by taking note of
some potential obstacles to the development of a mathematical theory. With some degree
of arbitrariness, we divide these into difficulties of "practice" and difficulties of
"principle".
a) Difficulties of practice
(i) Complexity
One possible objection to the relevance of mathematics could come from the
"numerical"complexity of the organisms to be described. For example, a human brain has
on the order of 1011 neurons making, on average, several hundred (and some on the order
of 104) synapses. But a priori, this is not a compelling reason. Statistical mechanics can
describe systems of 1023 molecules in a rather satisfactory way. To this the skeptic may
reply that this is not the point, since the collective properties that emerge on a statistical
mechanical scale actually simplify the problem. The issue is not numerical complexity
but the complexity of the middle ground, "organized complexity".14 Here we readily
admit the difficulty of the problem, but not it's impossibility. New mathematics may well
be needed, but this was never in doubt.
14 In the sense, say, of Weaver (cf. W. Weaver, "Science and complexity", Am. Scientist 36, pp. 536-
544, 1968). For systems lying in this middle ground (i.e., systems which are "large", but not large enough)
the simplifications associated with passing to infinite-limit approximations (e.g., via statistical mechanics,
diffusion approximations, the central limit theorem, etc.) may not be available.
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(ii) Degree of detail
A related difficulty centers on how much of the actual fine-structure of the system
a mathematical treatment can hope to incorporate. To take an example, we agree that it is
out of the question to describe in detail all the ongoing biochemical activity in even a
single cell or, for that matter, the detailed biophysical activity at a single synapse. But to
insist on such detail is to argue for reductionism not only in principle but in practice. In
fact, for many purposes, the underlying organization may best be revealed by passing to a
more macroscopic level, where the "relevant" variables may be few in number, such as
thermodynamic variables, or large-scale dynamic modes.
(iii) Empirical substrate
Whether one regards the primary goal to be the understanding of actual systems,
or whether one views the development of a theory as an end in itself, it will surely be
necessary to turn to "model" systems for guidance. For the foreseeable future this means
biological systems. But the data here are at the same time too much and too little. On the
one hand, the available information is too extensive and rich to even sift and integrate
properly, nor is it a priori obvious which of the manifold "phenomena" should actually
figure in, let alone be an "explanatory focus" of a theory. On the other hand, no matter
what system one selects there are fundamental gaps in what is known, and one may
question whether there is an adequate empirical substrate to support the development of a
theory.
We agree that this presents serious difficulties for modeling . Indeed, it is the
source of the jarring mismatch in level of sophistication that one on occasion encounters
within mathematical models proposed in the neurobiological literature. We are referring
here to the introduction of detailed and mathematically sophisticated treatments in a
setting where the qualitative mechanisms are still poorly understood, and the main
concepts have not been precisely analyzed.
However, this need not be an obstacle to theory development, even if one of the
goals of the theory is to assist in the construction of mathematical models of particular
systems of interest. Moreover, with historic hindsight, the present situation is not
qualitatively distinct from that facing would-be theorists of past epochs.1 5
b) Difficulties of principle
(i) Contingency
This is at the core of the ambivalence felt by many biologists towards the role of
theory in their subject. 16 On the one hand, in part as a reaction against vitalism, and in
part because of the great successes of molecular biology, the field has been fervent in its
embrace of the Cartesian machine metaphor, with the result that the field is far more
15 Enrico Bellone (see "A world on paper: studies on the second scientific revolution", MIT Press,
1980), depicts the multiplicity of conflicting and shifitng conceptions by working scientists of the period
1750-1900 as to what constituted a properly "Newtonian" or "mechanistic" approach, as well as what was
the proper relation of the "paper world" of mathematical theory to the world of experience. The difficulties
and dangers in attempting to construct major correlations among seas of widely disparate data are well
brought out in Bellone's essay (in the above collection ) on the researches into electricity and magnetism
circa 1750 by Jean Antoine Nollet (see "The empirical ocean and the conjectures of abbe Nollet").
16 This ambivalence is well described in R. Rosen, "Life itself', Columbia U. Press, 1991.
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mechanistic in outlook than, say, the field of physics. Here the disdain towards
mathematical theory is tied to objections of the type discussed above, such as
"complexity", or to the argument that the absence of mathematical theory has not as yet
led to any slowdown of progress.
On the other hand, there is a growing receptiveness towards mathematical theory
on the part of biologists concerned with integrative organization, who would at the least
be pleased to have available formal languages appropriate for describing such integrative
organization. 17 However, even here there is a sense of misgiving, to the effect that the
subject matter is inherently unamenable to theory. As a counterpoint to the mechanistic
determinism emphasized above, there is at the same time a sense of inherent
"unlawfulness", associated to the contingent, "unentailed" character of evolution via
natural selection.
This is a concern which we do not dismiss. However, rather than regard such
"contingency" as a barrier to any possibility of theory, we view it as a signpost, pointing
towards ways in which our traditional conceptions of what constitutes a "theory" will
need to be widened in order to accommodate the subject.18
(ii) Non-algorithmicity
A related concern is the inherent non-algorithmicity of adaptive autonomous
systems, that we have ourselves emphasized in both this chapter and the preceding one,
and which goes counter to the prevailing emphasis of "strong AI".1 9 After all, is not
mathematics in some sense the realm of algorithmicity ? Also, won't non-algorithmicity
wreak havoc with any attempts at a predictive theory ?
We shall return to this issue of non-algorithmicity at greater length later in this
paper, but will make a few remarks here. To begin with, most of the mathematics of the
19th and 20th centuries has not been algorithmic in character or in focus (leaving aside
altogether the patently non-algorithmic character of the processes of mathematical
discovery and invention). The current resurgence of emphasis on algorithmicity has more
to do with the prevalence of the computer and computation in our society. As regards
"unpredictability", algorithmic processes are themselves at risk: the study of dynamical
systems (where the dynamics is fixed by rigid rules) leads to chaotic behavior; the
17 Such receptivity may be found, for example, in cognitive neuroscience, and in systems
neuroscience more generally. However it not limited to these quarters. For example, S. Brenner has
emphasized the need of biology for a theory of "elaborate systems" (cf. Judson, "The eighth day of
creation"). See also the work described in the reference listed in the footnote to Section 3.2a).
18 An interesting perspective on the tensions and interplay between "lawfulness" and "contingency"
is the settings of evolutionary and developmental biology may be found in the work of Stuart Kauffman
(see S.A. Kauffman, "The origins of order: self-organization and selection in evolution", Oxford U. Press,
1993).
In a related vein, we feel that in the contexts we are concerned with it is inappropriate to regard
"determinism" and "stochasticity" as the only possibilities, inasmuch as this leaves no avenue for "choice"
to enter except as a form of randomness. This strikes us as highly artificial. At the same time, we are not
convinced that the "solution" needs to be tied to some form of "wave function collapse", as associated with
quantum measurement theory.
19 To clarify, we do not claim that algorithmic processes cannot play a significant role, in particular
in connection with higher cognitive processes. However, even here we think that there is an intertwining of
algorithmic with non-algorithmic processes, with the latter having "primacy". At a minimum, theremust be
a non-algorithmic substrate to support algorithmic processes. Moreover, we expect that the process of
choosing from among several algorithms is itself non-algorithmic.
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definition of Turing machines leads to undecidability and unpredictability (although the
functioning of a Turing machine is perfectly deterministic and rigid). Moreover, as we
have suggested in Section 2.15, the relevant issue in regard to adaptive autonomous
systems is not that of "predictability" vs. "non-predictability"; rather, it is the elucidation
of the character of the predictions that can in principle be made, either by an external
observer, or by one system of another (or of itself). To the extent that this lies beyond the
scope of traditional conceptions of "predictability", we expect this will be of a much
subtler character than the unpredictability attendant upon algorithmic systems. As with
the issue of "contingency", we regard this as an opportunity to widen our conceptions
rather than as a deterrent to inquiry. 20
3.7 Historical background
- To help provide perspective on the role of mathematical theory, we shall briefly
discuss three comparatively recent (beginning circa 1930) efforts at developing serious
mathematical approaches to subjects outside the traditional "exact sciences".
a) Turing machines and computer science
According to the Church - Turing thesis, a Turing machine is the mathematical
formalization of the heuristic notion of computation or algorithm, or of systematic,
purely mechanical manipulation of symbols. So, in some sense, a universal Turing
machine is a caricature of the most general computer, an extremely simple caricature
where the only operations allowed are copying and erasing. Though, as everyone is
aware, beyond a very abstract functional level, Turing machines bears little resemblance
to actual computers, and the formal languages that they "make use of' are extremely far
removed from any concrete computer language. 21
The remarkable confluence of work in the 1930's leading to this formalization in
fact stemmed from concerns in mathematical logic and foundations of mathematics (e.g.,
associated with Hilbert's program of "meta-mathematics"), rather than computer science
which, it is fair to say, did not at the time exist as a discipline. That it, in fact, turned out
to be possible to give a mathematically precise characterization, not depending on the
particular formalism used, of the class of processes that can be carried out purely by
mathematical means was considered miraculous by G6del.22
20 We shall also need to look for other relvant notions of compexity than those associated with an
inherently algorithmic framework,such as "computational complexity" or "Kolmogorov complexity".
21 In particular the "state" space of a Turing machine need not bear any canonical relation to the
"space" of states of an actual computer. It is not an "absolute" invariant of the the computational process,
but a model-dependent one; i.e., it depends on the use of a Turing machine model.
22 The equivalence is between the class of general recursive functions (in the sense of Gbdel-
Herbrand), the X-definable functions (in the sense of Church's X-calculus), and the functions computable
via Turing machines. Thus, Church's thesis was initially stated in terms of X-definability.
G6del's view was publically expressed in Remarks before the Princeton Bicentenial Conference
on Problems in Mathematics-1946- (see M. Davis, ed., "The Undecidable", Raven Press, 1965):
"Tarski has stressed in his lecture (and I think justly) the great importance of the concept of
general recursiveness (or Turing's computability). It seems to me that this importance is largely
due to the fact that with this concept one has for the first time succeeded in giving an absolute
definition of an interesting epistemological notion, i.e., one not depending on the formalism
- chosen. In all other cases treated previously, such as demonstrability or definability, one has been
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It is this formalism-independence (as well as the persuasiveness of Turing's
formulation) that has lent such strong weight to the Church-Turing thesis, to the effect
that this mathematical definition does in fact correspond to our intuitive notion of
computation. For whatever reasons , this persuasiveness has extended further, to the point
where the Turing machine has been put forward as a model for the human mind, and
mental processes equated with computation. Our own view of the matter is that such
formalism-independence or "universality" is not to be expected in the setting of actual
embedded systems with emergent functionality, and without pre-set "problems", let alone
the necessity to act as universal computational devices.
Moreover, although the definition of Turing machine is extremely simple and is
easily stated without an elaborate formalism, it leads to a variety of problems that would
seem, if anything, to diminish the adaptive fitness of an organism encumbered with them:
to the problematics of undecidability and unpredictability; to the distinction between the
pure algorithmic (recursiveness) and the general manipulation of symbols (which is only
recursively enumerable and so, a priori unpredictable, although one has a finite set of
rules); and to unforeseen although simple results, (for example undecidability essentially
can only occur when one allows erasing of symbols, etc...). Of course, Turing's purpose
in devising these "machines" was precisely to investigate issues of this sort. But the
perspective of the organism would be different.
(Although we shall not elaborate on game theory in this paper, we feel that similar
arguments can be made against the relevance for real-world decision-making of the kind
of "universal" rationality associated with game-theoretic pictures. We recall that in von
Neumann's later work on game theory, he was very much influenced by the conception
of the universal Turing machine. In the same sense as a universal Turing machine can
simulate the behavior of any other Turing machine, game-theoretic strategies were
intended to simulate the behavior of any opponent, and thus serve as a kind of general
theory of rationality, of a rule-governed, machine-like character.) 23
b) von Neumann's "self-reproducing automata"
At the end of the 40's, von Neumann began the development of a theory of
"automata". This was envisaged to be a systematic theory of the principles of
organization of these systems. However, while the theory was to remain at a logico-
mathematical rather than empirical level , its concern was with actual, physically-
embedded systems, both natural and artificial, rather than with formal systems. This
meant that questions associated with the embedding (not the "contingent" features, but
the logical concomitants of the embedding) were to be incorporated within the theory,
rather than be regarded as incidental features to be given ad hoc treatment.
able to define them relative to a given language, and for each individual language it is clear that
the one thus obtained is not the one looked for. For the concept of computability however,
although it is only a special kind of demonstrability or decidability the situation is different. By a
kind of miracle it is not necessary to distinguish orders, and the diagonal procedure does not lead
outside the defined notion...."
(See also, M. Davis, "Why G6del didn't have Church's thesis", Information and Control 54, pp. 3-24, 1982;
J.C. Webb, "Mechanism, mentalism, and metamathematics", Reidel, 1980.)
23 See Philip Mirowski, "What were von Neumann and Morgenstern trying to accomplish ?",
pp.113-148 in E. R. Weintraub, ed., "Toward a history of game theory", Duke U. Press, 1992.
39
One part of Von Neumann's work dealt with a theory of "self-reproducing"
automata. This work, aside from its intrinsic merits, sheds light on possible
interpretations that one may give to the notion of "mathematical theory" in the setting of
embedded systems. One interpretation is that of "theory schema". In the context of self-
reproducing automata, von Neumann constructed a schema requiring only a handful of
components:(i) An automaton A, which when furnished with the description of any other
automaton, in the form of an instruction I, will construct the automaton so described. All
the automata constructed by A, as well as A itself, are presumed to have a place where an
instruction can be inserted. (ii) An automaton B that makes a copy of any instruction I
that is furnished to it. (iii) A control mechanism C that does the following: When A is
furnished with an instruction I, the mechanism C will first cause A to construct the
automaton described by I. Second, C will cause B to copy the instruction I and insert the
copy I' in the automaton just constructed. Finally, C will separate the resulting entity
from the system A+B+C and set it loose. (iv) Let D denote the system A+B+C, and let ID
be the instruction describing D. Insert ID into A, and let E be the resulting entity. It can
be verified that E is self-reproducing. This schema, developed several years before the
work of Crick and Watson on the double-helix structure of DNA, predicted a fundamental
role for a doubling, or copying mechanism. Even this degree of verisimilitude is quite
remarkable, given the total absence of any empirics in the theory. As it stands, this theory
has no way of even referring to, let alone predicting, specific biochemical properties of a
cell.
Von Neumann wished to go beyond the level of schema, to some form of
"realization" (though not necessarily a "physical implementation"). In some sense, the
realization of such a schema might be viewed as the analog, in a quasi-embedded setting,
of a model (in the standard model-theoretic sense) of a formal theory, but taking some
account (real or simulated) of physical constraints. His initial plan was to construct a
"kinematic model", incorporating geometric-kinematic aspects, such as movement,
contact, positioning, cutting, etc., but ignoring problems of force and energy. Among the
primitive elements of the model were to be logical and memory elements, sensing
elements and effector elements, and "girders", to provide structural rigidity. This
program was not actually carried out, it being not readily amenable to a strictly logico-
mathematical treatment. Instead he constructed a "cellular automaton model", with less
of a genuinely embedded character. This involved an infinite 2-dimensional array, with
each cell containing a copy of the same 29-state finite automaton, communicating with its
nearest neighbors. 24
c) Formalization of linguistics
A good contemporary example is provided by attempts at development of
theoretical linguistics. At least since the initial work of Chomsky in the early 1950's on
generative grammar, the field has been in a continual state of ferment and reappraisal,
giving rise to a succession of distinct contemporaneous "schools" of thought (several of
them linked to the generative tradition, and sometimes centered around the same
24 There were also three other types of "model" contemplated but not actually constructed. A detailed
account of von Neumann's work on automata, together with supplementary references, may be found in J.
von Neumann, "Theory of self-reproducing automata", edited and completed by A.W, Burks, U. of Illinois
Press, 1966.
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individuals), differing not only on properly "technical" issues, but on fundamentals.
These foundational concerns include, e.g., whether linguistics should be a study of
language "in the abstract", or of a particular human biological endowment (cf. the
different conceptions of Montague and of Chomsky of the notion of "universal
grammar"); or, granting the latter viewpoint, how prominently the actual biology needs to
figure (i.e., is it enough that the subject be "biologically predicated", or must it be
"biologically based", and tied to specifics of neurobiology); whether syntax can or should
be studied autonomously, or whether it must be treated as subordinate to "semantics"
and/or "conceptual structure"), etc... This has lead to widely divergent viewpoints not
only as to what kind of mathematical formalisms may be needed, but as to what formal
elements must be incorporated or excluded, and even what the theory should be called
upon to explain. 25
Aside from its interest in its own right, we think that the work on theoretical
linguistics may be relevant to the development of a theory for adaptive autonomous
systems. For one thing, with its emphasis on heterogeneity and on the fundamental role
of constraints, it provides a useful counterpoint to dynamical-system inspired pictures.
Second, we think there is a significant parallel between the dichotomy of formal language
vs. natural language and the dichotomy of formal system vs. natural system (or
organism). In particular, we anticipate that the kind of theoretical framework required for
the integrative organization of an organism will bear a qualitative resemblance to that
needed for natural language. For example, the coordination of behaviors of an organism
(with its qualities of "emergence", situatedness, "blurred specificity", etc...) is much
closer in character to the grammar of a natural language than it is to the transition matrix
of a finite automaton.2 6
25 Since we are not ourselves linguists, we shall not attempt to elaborate here on these foundational
and methodological questions, nor shall we attempt to provide a representative set of references to the
literature. We do, however, wish to mention, in passing, references to two approaches at rather different
positions on the linguistics "spectrum": A presentation of the philosophy underlying generative grammar is
given in N. Chomsky, "Knowledge of language: its nature, origin, and use", Praeger, 1986. The program of
"cognitive grammar", which aims at a very comprehensive theory not in the generative grammar tradition,
is described in R. W. Langacker, "Foundations of Cognitive Grammar", Vol . I, 1987; Vol. II, 1991,
Stanford U. Press.
We also wish to mention an interesting treatment addressing the "bootstrapping" role that
nonlinguistic (indeed, emotionally-grounded) cognitive faculties may need to play in supporting more
properly language-specialized "modules", and in precipitating the child's path to "language acquisition"
(See John L. Locke, "The child's path to spoken language", Harvard U. Press, 1993).
26 This kind of analogy has been made before from a number of distinct (and even conflicting)
perspectives. For example, Lashley, at the 1948 Hixon Symposium (at which von Neumann presented his
schema for self-reproducing automata) speaks of the problem of "syntax of action" (see K.S. Lashley, "The
problem of serial order in behavior", in L.A. Jeffress, ed., "Cerebral mechanisms in behavior", Wiley
&Sons, 1951); Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (see "Plans and the structure of behavior", 1960) propose an
analogy between "plans" and phrase-markers, and ask for the analogue of a transformational grammar in
this setting; more recently, some investigators have argued for the evolution of primate motor systems as
preadaptations for the development of human language ability, with a consequent parallelism between
temporal organization of motor activity and of language (see, for example, J. Kien, "Developments in the
pongid and human motor systems as preadaptations for the evolution of human language ability", to appear
in Studies of Language Origins).
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3.8 What kind of mathematical approach do we envision ?
a) Conceptual architectures
We regard our primary problem to be the development of "logical" or
"conceptual" architectures for adaptive autonomous systems. From this perspective, all
questions of technical feasibility aside, it would be inappropriate to focus effort on an
actual full-scale implementation of a "total", top-to-bottom integrative treatment of a
chosen model system. 27 Rather, for the purpose at hand it is more relevant to "integrate" a
model system in principle than in practice. That is, to use the model system as a source of
gedanken experiments to bring into focus the "necessary and sufficient" conceptual
components, and as a touchstone against which to compare our attempts at a synthesis of
these components. So as not to inadvertently omit "components" essential for "self-
containedness" 2 8, it will be important to maintain a scrupulous distinction between what
the system can actually do autonomously, given the architecture available to it, and what
in fact is an act of "transference" on the part of the theorist. In particular, it will be
important to distinguish the "semantics" and "interpretation" internal to the system itself
from attributions of meaning made by an external "observer" (even one who is not
limited to observing external behavior, but who can look inside the system). At a
minimum, we expect that such an effort at development of conceptual architectures
should result in a clarification of the vocabulary. This in itself is a far from easy task
because of the divergence and disagreement about the intuitive meaning of many terms
used in artificial intelligence, in theoretical computer science, and in neurobiology.
b) Choice of model system
Even at the level of "conceptual architecture" we shall not attempt to incorporate,
or study, all desirable functionalities at once, but shall proceed incrementally. Thus, we
shall be experimenting with a succession of conceptual architectures. These may be
overlapping to a greater or lesser extent, but need not be nested, since we may be using
distinct architectures to highlight distinct sets of issues. For this reason it may be
preferable to make use of several model systems, each particularly suited to a specific
range of questions (either because of inherent properties or capacities of the system, or
because of the types of data or experimental techniques available), rather than insisting on
a single model system. By the same token, while our focus is on principles of integrative
system organization, our models need not be limited to "entire" organisms.
c) Plausibility
We have no hesitation as regards incorporating exploratory or provisional ideas in
our "models". Indeed, we don't see how this can be avoided. However, we do want to
observe at least some minimal guidelines as to "plausibility". If we are focusing on
27 Such a full-scale treatment was proposed for the model system C. elegans in the Working Paper
cited in Chapter 1.
28 The notion of "self-containedness" (relative to an embedding) can perhaps be regarded as a kind of
analogue, in the setting of embedded (or embodied) systems, of the notion of "closure" or "completeness"
in the context of formal systems. We are aware that the notion is a highly problematic one from the
standpoint of "conceptual architectures", since certain of the necessary "logical" components may be
"entailed" not by other logical components, but rather by the specifics of the supporting physical substrate.
(See also the remarks in Section 2.14 and in Section 3.5(ii)).
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biological organization (resp., artificial systems), we want to respect the actual
possibilities of biology (resp., technology). By this we do not mean, for example, that a
mathematical theory must take full account of the details of biochemical processes. We
mean simply that the functionalities or structures that we introduce should not be at
variance with known biological principles or modes of operation.
d) Maintaining coherence: "gluing together" local logics
As emphasized both in the present chapter and in the preceding one, we want to
give center stage to the issue of "coherence". The general idea is that an adaptive
autonomous system is embedded in a rich environment, and develops "local" logics both
for analyzing and acting on its environment, and to satisfy its various goals. The problem
is that these local logics must coexist and must, in some sense, be "glued together" so as
to be compatible. Our concern will be to elucidate the nature of this "gluing". As yet there
is no standard mathematical theory that is directly applicable, only a number of
suggestive mathematical analogies to go by. For example, this idea is not totally unlike
the idea of a "variety" or a "scheme", in geometry, which is obtained by pasting together
"small" building blocks (like balls in differential geometry, or affine Zariski open sets in
algebraic geometry).2 9
Here "logic" should not be taken in its usual mathematical sense, e.g., as Boolean
or predicate logic, nor is "local" intended in a technical sense. Rather the term "local
logic" is meant to indicate the "coherence" of various subsystems in relation to their
respective environments. The problem is to maintain coherence for the system as a whole.
(As noted in Section 2.14, the pitfall for embedded systems is incoherence rather than
logical inconsistency, as would be the case for formal systems).
We use the term "gluing" in a broad sense, to indicate a kind of "non-
independence" or " imposed coordination" among the entities "glued". In particular, it is
in no way limited to situations where there is an actual physical joining or
interconnection of "parts". We shall illustrate what we have in mind with a couple of
schematic examples in which subsystems are represented as abstract control "modules"
(please refer to Figure 3.1). We begin with a "parallel juxtaposition" as in diagram (i), in
which the modules A and B have access to distinct sets of effectors (or sensors). In
diagram (ii) the situation has been altered so that A and B have access to the same set of
effectors, resulting in a "juxtaposition gluing". This gluing is, of itself, unsatisfactory in
general, because the lack of coordination between A and B can give rise to conflicting
"demands" on the effectors. Two ways of introducing such coordination via additional
"gluing" are illustrated in diagrams (iii) and (iv), respectively. The first involves the
direct interaction of A and B, say via reciprocal inhibition. The second involves the
introduction of an additional set of modules C controlling the "communication" between
A and B and the effectors. In diagram (iv) we have included not only "forward" arrows
from C to A and B, but also reciprocal, "backward" arrows from A and B to C. This is
not only so that "information can be passed back to C. In addition (cf. Section 6.10c)), we
29 An extensive discussion of questions (and mathematical analogies) associated with the "gluing
together" of entities of heterogeneous type is presented in Section 3.3 of the C. elegans Working Paper
cited in Chapter 1, from a perspective close to that of the present discussion.
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want to allow for the possibility that A and B may learn to access C, and to "ask for
help". 30
e) Dynamic vs. static gluing
Returning to the above analogy with geometric gluing, we wish to emphasize one
major conceptual difference (among several) between the concept of gluing in geometry
and the concept of gluing local logics. In the geometric setting the gluing is fixed, or
static (though perhaps a parametrized family of such glued structures may be considered
concurrently). In the present context of "local logics" the gluing will of necessity be
dynamic, or time-varying. This stems from the fact that we are dealing with an adaptive
system, which implies that its architecture should be able to modify itself depending on
the interaction of the system with the external environment. In other words, even leaving
out of consideration strictly "developmental" or maturation processes, a particular gluing
that is consonant with the system's being well adapted to one class of environmental
situations may become inadequate or infelicitous if the environmental situation changes.
To some extent this shift from adaptedness to nonadaptedness may be linked to
differences with respect to certain of the statistical regularities presented by the distinct
classes of environment. 31
In addition to adaptation to the external environment, there may be a need for
architectural modification or reorganization in response to changes in the internal milieu,
the most drastic being "breakdown" or "failure" of system components. (Such damage
certainly occurs in biological systems, including nervous systems, as well as in artificial
systems, with the major difference that the former are much less brittle and far more
failure-tolerant. This is reflected in the corresponding modes of adjustment. In biological
systems this adjustment is based on a general context-dependency of over-all system
functionality, rather than on "redundancy". It is more akin to a process of "relaxation"
from one coherent dynamic functional equilibrium to another than to the shunting of a
sharply "pre-specified" functionality to a "back-up" subsystem.)
30 In our broad use of the term "gluing", the "convergence zones" of A. Damasio's retroactivation
schema (cf. the footnote to Section 7.12(iii)), which mediate the synchronous reactivation of neuronal
firing patterns in lower-order convergence zones or in primary cortices, may be viewed as a kind of gluing
of these lower-order zones (or primary cortices). Notice that in this setting the same lower-order zones
(including the primary cortices) may participate in a multiplicity of such gluings.
31 We should perhaps clarify that, while we use the term "gluing" in a broad sense, we don't wish to
deprive it of all meaning by using it in an all-encompassing sense. Thus, we will not wish to regard every
alteration in system architecture as ipso facto a change in "gluing".
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4. Descriptions and prescriptions for adaptive systems
In this chapter we begin to discuss certain "primitive" intentional concepts which
are typically attached to intuitive notions of intelligence and adaptation, and are used for
system description and prescription.l These concepts are also used freely in artificial
intelligence and robotics. Our aim here is not to set up formal definitions, but rather to do
some clarification of the intuitive content of these concepts, as a preliminary to eventually
developing a more adequate technical vocabulary. We shall focus on the two notions of
"constraints" and "specifications", and emphasize certain basic distinctions between
them. As it stands, the notion of "specification" while probably indispensable for
artificial systems, carries certain connotations which make it rather ill-suited for the
description of natural systems, especially adaptive autonomous systems. However, it
would be desirable to have some sort of "substitute" notion which is adapted to the
context of natural systems. We shall examine certain respects in which this substitute will
need to differ from the original notion.
A. Constraints and specifications
4.1 Necessity vs. choice
The basic distinction which it will be useful to make between "constraints" and
"specifications" centers on the polarity between "necessity" and "choice". Thus, we shall
use the term "constraint" as a generic name for relations which are necessarily satisfied
by a given system. Here, the system might be the adaptive system that we are trying to
study, a certain subsystem of this adaptive system, the environment considered as a
system, the total system which is the union of the adaptive system in its environment
etc... The term "specification", by contrast, will refer to relations that may be "imposed"
or "chosen", but need not hold a priori. (In speaking of "system" we have in mind
embedded vs. formal systems, and our discussion is primarily intended for this context.
However, some of the points made may also be germane to the setting of formal
systems).
We shall elaborate in the sections below on what we have in mind when we
speak of "necessity" or "choice". Before doing so, we want to make a few clarifications.
(i) Although we feel it is important to emphasize the basic distinction between the two
notions, in any actual context the "constraints" and "specifications" are highly
intertwined; for example, constraints may give rise to specifications. which may give rise
to additional constraints, etc... (ii) Constraints may play an enabling as well as a limiting
role. For example, specifications may be dependent on constraints (such as physical laws)
for their realization. Similarly, constraints may serve as mediators between specifications
of structure or connectivity of the system and specifications of its behavior. As another
example, the very restrictions of choice imposed by constraints may, in fact, facilitate the
process of choosing. (iii) We do not view the distinction between "constraints" and
specifications" as a matter of fundamental "ontology", but rather as a useful perspective
1 This is not to say that they need to form the "primitives" of an actual theory.
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to bring to a study of system organization. Certainly there are cases where it is difficult to
determine which term (if either) is appropriate.
4.2 Constraints
a) Necessity
When we speak of relations which are necessarily satisfied, "necessity" can
signify either logical necessity or physical necessity. For example, any physical or
chemical law is a physical constraint; a logical consequence of a certain set of
"hypotheses" (regarding the system and/or its environment) is a logical constraint; the
fact that shared variables take the same value is a logical constraint, etc...2 We also wish
to allow "material consequences" as well as logical consequences. "Hypotheses" can take
a variety of forms, for example: (i) Other constraints; (ii) Particular properties that
happen, in fact, to hold for the system and/or its environment. Sometimes it will be
natural to speak of these facts as themselves constituting "constraints", e.g., the limited
availability of certain resources. (iii) Specifications. These need not be specifications that
have in fact been implemented, but may only be under consideration for implementation.
Hence, the term "hypothesis". The latitude allowed to the term "hypothesis" reflects the
relative, or conditional, or context-dependent character we wish to permit to the term
"necessity". 3
b) Some basic constraints
Let us now examine certain basic constraints associated with an adaptive system
which is physically (and perhaps biologically) embedded in its environment. These are,






(v) Constraints on the internal structure of the system
c) Homeostatic constraints
We include under this heading the basic regulatory constraints, such as those
associated with the traditional "cybernetics" perspective. Notable among these are the
"metabolic constraints", these being associated to the fact that any realistic organism
(indeed, any system, whether natural or artificial) needs energy to function (and in
general, several different sources of energy), produces entropy (and so degrades its
environment), and in general can only function when certain physical or chemical
variables, either of the environment or of the system itself are maintained between certain
2 We are not attempting here to set up some kind of basic taxonomy of constraint types; the labels
"physical", "logical", etc. are simply used here for convenience of reference.
3 Certainly we are using the terms "conditional" or "context-dependent" in an intuitive sense here.
However, it is possible that some type of formalization, akin to the formalization of "conditioning" in the
stochastic process context (conditional probabilites; conditional expectations) may be appropriate.
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bounds (which may or may not be sharp)4 . For example, a living organism cannot live in
too high or too low temperature conditions. Among the metabolic constraints is the fact
that the organism's energy reserves are continually being depleted, even if the organism
"does nothing" (i.e., engages in no "activities" other than those minimally necessary to
stay alive, such as respiration). This implies that in order to maintain the relevant
variables within the admissible bounds, the organism must take action within its
environment (to acquire food). 5 Provisionally, we shall also subsume processes of
reproduction under the heading of "homeostatic constraints".
d) Sensory constraints
We have already discussed (see Section 3.3 c)) the inherently emergent character
of the system's categorization processes. Here we shall allow ourselves to speak more
loosely, and to reify "information", as if it were something to be "extracted" from the
environment. From this perspective, any adaptive system (and in fact any natural or
artificial system) has access to its environment through perceptual devices which extract
certain information from the environment. This information is then "shared" by various
subsystems of the system. The implications arising from this need to share form the basic
class of sensory constraints.
The second class of sensory constraints corresponds to the fact that an adaptive
system has few perceptual resources or modalities with which to interface with a rich
environment. Given these constraints, the system must find strategies to overcome the
"information bottleneck".6
4 The satisfaction of the metabolic constraints may, via "material implication", involve the broader
class of homeostatic constraints, not concerned exclusively with energy. For example, there may be a need
for support processes to transport "materials" which are used at other "stations" to actually produce energy.
This starts to look like a "factory".
5 Actually, we should be a bit more careful here and distinguish, e.g., between metabolic
constraints and metabolic specifications . Thus, we would continue to regard as metabolic constraints
physical or chemical laws, say that ingestion of food produces a rise in certain metabolic variables and that
a decay of the external temperature induces a decay of the internal temperature or a consumption of a
certain amount of metabolic resources. Another metabolic constraint is that certain metabolic variables are
always decreasing, with the rate of decrease depending on the animal's activities, but always strictly • 0.
From these constraints and the fundamental specification would follow the metabolic specification that the
system's internal metabolic variables be maintained within a certain domain. Of course, this and,
consequently, the "fundamental specification"(see Section 4.4a) ) may, in fact, fail to be fulfilled, since the
animal can starve or freeze (or die of "natural causes"). However, under this interpretation only
specifications and not constraints are being violated.
These specifications do not, however, of themselves imply precisely which actions the organism
must take at any particular time or in any particular context in order to acquire food. This may, to a greater
or lesser extent, permit "choice" on the part of the organism. (We note in passing one basic difference
between this continual need for energy on the part of an organism and the energy needs of a machine, say a
computer. The machine can be turned off when not in use, so that it consumes no energy. On the other
hand, if the external temperature is allowed to become sufficiently low, the machine may be damaged
whether it is on or off at the time.)
6 One is tempted here to emphasize the often-made parallel between energy (in this case, the
metabolic constraints) and information (in this case, the sensory constraints). However, even if one goes
beyond the picture of "extracting" information from the environment to that of "constructing" information
from "raw materials" drawn from the environment, the supposed parallel is highly misleading: For
example: it tends to confound information in the sense of Shannon with "semantic" information; it
suggests an interconvertability of different "forms" of information; and it, in particular, suggests that
information is in some sense a scalar quantity.
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e) Effector constraints
Any adaptive system acts on its environment (as, for that matter, do essentially all
natural or artificial systems) 7 . The actions are performed by means of various effector
devices. Distinct subsystems of the system may have joint access to certain of these
effectors, and thus are obliged to share the possibilities for action. This is the basic class
of action constraints.
The second class of effector constraints correspond to the fact that an adaptive
system has few effector resources with which to act on its environment, and with which
to carry out a rich repertoire of behaviors. Again, given these constraints, the system must
find strategies to overcome the "action bottleneck".
Notice, here, the symmetry between the sensory constraints and the effector
constraints. We note also that considerations similar to those we have discussed in
connection with the overall system embedded in its external environment hold as well for
subsystems embedded in their respective "proper" environments (as defined in Section
7. 10a)).8
f) Chronological constraints
This refers to the various constraints associated with time, which is itself a
"shared" variable for the environment and for the various subsystems constituting the
system, resulting in the necessity for the temporal coordination of events and actions.
Among the constraints are those associated with temporal coincidence, temporal duration,
and temporal ordering. In particular the system needs to work in "real time". (See also the
footnote to Section 7.5(i)).
g) Constraints on the internal structure of the system
This is not to suggest that this internal organization is either rigid or static, but
rather that the "tools" or "functionalities" available at any time are limited in number
and/or "capacity" (an example being limitations of various forms of "memory
capacity"). 9
4.3 Specifications for an artificial system
Let us for the moment restrict ourselves to the class of artificial systems (i.e.,
man-made systems, adaptive or not). As a concomitant of being embedded, these systems
must ipso facto satisfy certain constraints with respect to their environment, including (at
7 This action may be incidental to the primary functionality of the system, as in the case of the heat
generated by a computer.
8 We should perhaps clarify that, in focusing attention here on sensors and effectors, we are not
claiming that they somehow come "first", either temporally or logically, with the internal architecture
"filled in" secondarily.
9 We note in passing that the sensory and effector constraints could perhaps be included under this
heading since they are linked to a scarcity of "means" (either sensors or effectors) internal to the system (as
well as to an "overabundance" external to the system). This may be contrasted with the metabolic
constraints. These constraints are partly associated with the internal constitution of the organism, but also
(at least as regards the modes of behavior by which the system can cope with these constraints) are partly
attributable to a scarcity of external resources.
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least in the case of adaptive autonomous systems) the five classes of basic constraints
enumerated in the preceding section.
a) Specifications vs. constraints
The designer1 ° of an artificial system always designs with certain purposes in
mind. We shall reserve the term "specifications" for the various prescriptions imposed on
the system by the designer. This designation is to distinguish these prescriptions from the
constraints, or necessary relations satisfied by the system. While the constraints are
necessarily fulfilled, regardless of what the specifications happen to be, the specifications
may not be fulfilled, in which case the system "fails" in some sense. (We shall return to
the failure problem in Section 4B). 11 An additional sense in which the specifications are
not "necessary" relations is that the designer could have imposed a different set of
specifications.
Some examples of specifications are prescriptions regarding: structural
components, connectivity or interface relations, types of information used by the system,
behavior types, preference relations or choice procedures among behaviors or resource
allocation, optimality criteria, goals or aims that the system is to achieve, how the system
is to be assembled, etc... (There may also be guidelines, or principles of evaluation, that
the designer uses for selecting among different qualitative classes of design
specifications, e.g., emphasizing parallelism, or modularity, or reusability of components,
etc...).
b) Descriptions and prescriptions
In "writing out" the specifications of the system, the designer may make use of
various modes or formats of expression, including a variety of formal specification
languages. 12 However, at least when the specification is for an embedded system, there
will typically be no need to attempt to formally write out the constraints on the system as
part of the system prescription. The constraints come along "for free", even though they
may be doing most of the "work" of enforcing the intent of the specifications. (For
example, if the system were to be embedded in a different environment, with different
constraints than those holding in the original environment, the original system
specification may no longer be appropriate). However, for certain purposes, such as
system simulations, it may be necessary to explicitly include certain of the constraints as
part of the system description. (See Section 4B).
10 We recognize that to speak of "the" designer is an idealization. Most design projects of even a
"moderate" scale will involve teams of designers, even at the level of the "conceptual design". Achieving
global coherence of the resulting design given the distributed nature of the design process is a major
problem in its own right.
11 We are speaking here as if there is an already constructed system, on which the designer is seeking
to impose some additional specifications, say regarding behavior. On the other hand, the unfulfilled
specifications may be a design "on paper" which cannot be carried through to the actual construction stage.
This may stem from a variety of possible difficulties, including: (i) The specifications are inherently
inconsistent or incoherent. (ii) The resources for construction are insufficient. (iv) The specifications are
insufficiently complete. (v) The specifications are in a "declarative" form, and there is no procedure
available for converting them to the "imperative" mode.
12 A word of caution. In the context of these formal languages it is not uncommon for specifications
(in our sense) to be referred to as "constraints". The same holds for the C. elegans Working Paper cited
in Chapter 1.
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We have spoken above of "writing out" specifications but, as we shall discuss
later (see Sections 5B and 7.11 la)) there are cases (indeed, we regard them as the most
interesting cases) where it is not possible to do so explicitly. By "explicit" we refer not
only to extensional descriptions, but also finite intensional descriptions which might
"generate" infinite extensional descriptions. 13 Of course, the effects of "specifications"
include not only the specifications themselves but the ensuing logical and material
consequences. 14 These propagated effects, together with the fact that the specifications
may not be explicitly describable, can contribute to the "unpredictability" of the system.
4.4 Specifications for a natural system
a) "Specifications" in a wider sense
The term "specifications" tends to carry connotations of a "finalist" point of
view. Hence, while the notion of "constraint" does not need reinterpretation in the context
of natural systems, the term "specification" will need to be taken in an analogical sense,
because there is no designer a priori. 15
There are at least three analogical senses in which one may wish to speak of
"specifications" in this context: (i) Evolution is sometimes metaphorically spoken of as
the "designer" (or tinkerer) of living organisms. 16 (ii) An external observer may observe
13 This point bears some relation to the observation made by von Neumann, in connection with the
question of trying to give a description of "visual analogy". He proposed that the simplest way to do this
might be to describe the structure of a device which makes such analogies. He expressed this alternatively
as the conjecture that in such settings a real object might constitute the simplest description of itself. He
also suggested that "some results in modern logic" supported this conjecture, and refererred to a result of
Godel.. (See J. von Neumann, "Theory of self-reproducing automata", edited and completed by A.W,
Burks, U. of Illinois Press, 1966, esp. pp. 53-56. As described in these pages, Burks, the editor of this
posthumous work, consulted G6del to determine what results in logic von Neumann might have been
referring to. G6del suggested two possibilities: " I think that the theorem of mine which von Neumann
refers to is not that on the existence of undecidable propositions or that on the lengths of proofs but rather
the fact that the complete epistemological description of a [formal] language A cannot be given in the same
language, because the concept of truth of sentences of A cannot be defined in A. It is this theorem which is
the true reason fot the existence of undecidable propositions in the formal systems containing
arithmetic....The same theorem was proved by Tarski in his paper on the concept of truth... Now this
theorem shows that the description of what a mechanism is doing in certain cases is more involved than the
description of the mechanism, in the sense that it requires new and more abstract primitive terms, namely
higher types. However, this implies nothing as to the number of symbols necessary, where the relationship
may very well be in the opposite direction... However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears
more clearly from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the complete description of its
behavior is infinite because, in view of the non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior,
the complete description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of course this presupposes
that only decidable descriptions are considered to be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the
finitistic way of thinking... [emphasis ours]). As regards "types", see also Section 7.3. As regards
"predictability", see Section 3.6(ii).
14 It is somewhat problematical as to whether these effects should be classed as "constraints" or
(implicit) "specifications" (or neither). They are perhaps best regarded as "closure" and compatibility
conditions on the overall set of specifications.
15 We are not altogether happy with speaking of "specifications" outside the artificial system setting,
and regard it as a purely provisional terminology which we are using in order to highlight certain
distinctions between artificial and natural systems.
16 In this setting, people have in fact begun to speak in terms of the interplay, or creative tension,
between the inherent freedom of specification allowed to the "designer" and the underlying constraints.
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the system and, on the basis of the observations made, may conclude that the system
satisfies certain possible relations which are non-necessary. The observer, in order to
"rationalize" and to predict the behavior of the system, may impute some sort of
underlying intentionality, or self-imposed behavioral "specifications" to the system.
This is the so-called "intentional stance" of Dennett. (iii) An autonomous system may, in
fact, impose "specifications" on itself, as regards goals, plans, behaviors, modes of
effecting these behaviors, etc... This imposition of specifications may be only partially, if
at all, "volitional", and may incorporate both "conscious" and "unconscious" processes.
These "specifications" will, however, be markedly different in kind from the "sharp"
specifications typically imposed in the context of artificial systems; instead they will have
a "blurred" or "vague" character (cf. paragraph b) below, and the discussion of "vague
specifications" in Sections 2.10, 7.11a), and 7.13c)). One additional distinction (to be
developed more fully in Section 4B) is that in the case of natural systems, the
specifications imposed have relevance to the system itselfl7; hence failure to satisfy these
specifications (most notably, the "fundamental specification") has consequences for the
system itself.
So we can widen the scope of the notion of "specifications" to include possible
relations which are "in general satisfied", but are not "necessarily satisfied" (i.e., they are
not constraints), and which are either imposed on the system by a "designer" (in the wide
sense), or imputed to the system by an external observer, or imposed on the system by
itself.
One class of "specifications" deserves special mention, namely those associated
with the proto-goal of autonomous systems, namely to maintain themselves as systems
(cf. Section 3.3a)). In the case of a biological system this implies, among other things,
that the system must stay alive. We shall speak of this proto-goal as itself being a
"specification" (indeed, the fundamental specification). Certainly, at least for biological
systems, this specification is eventually violated. 18 (We note that this is a "fundamental"
specification, in the sense of being a sine qua non, for all systems, whether or not
autonomous. However, in the case of autonomous systems this is the underlying rationale
of the system organization, and the foundation of the "value system", whereas in the case
of a (non-autonomous) artificial system it is no more than an implicit, though critical,
side-condition on the design. Also, in the case of autonomous systems, this is the
"responsibility" of the system itself during "somatic time").
b)Vague specifications
At present we are not prepared to enter into a genuinely technical development,
and wish here only to add a couple of comments to the intuitive discussion of this notion
(See, e.g., S.A. Kauffman, "The origins of order: self-organization and selection in evolution", Oxford U.
Press, 1993; S.J. Gould, "The evolutionary biology of constraint", Daedalus, Spring 1980, pp. 39-52.).
In any case one would not speak here of "goals" or "external (to the organism) evaluation criteria"
of the "designer". The perspective is ex post facto "internalist".
17 Even if they are "imposed" by evolution.
18 It is perhaps the case that, from an internalist perspective, this specification is not, in fact, violated.
From this perspective, "time" begins with the coming into being of the organism and comes to an end with
the death of the organism. (This also suggests the possible alternative route of regarding this proto-goal as
the fundamental constraint rather than the fundamental specification ).
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given elsewhere in this paper (cf. Sections 2.10, 7.11a), and 7.13c)). In the preceding
chapters we have stressed fundamental differences in character between artificial systems
(as currently conceived) and natural systems (or, more generally, adaptive autonomous
systems). In our view, a key to coming to grips with these differences, at a technical level,
lies with the elucidation of the differences in the corresponding notions of
"specification". These differences include: vagueness vs. sharpness (not to be confused
with partiality vs. completeness), situatedness vs. context-independence, emergence vs.
external imposition, and self-relevance vs. outward-directedness. As regards
situatedness, we want to mention the importance of accommodating incrementality of
specification, including allowing multiple time-scales for "choice". This includes not
only the broad distinction between choices made on evolutionary vs. developmental vs. -
somatic time-scales, but also different time-frames within somatic time (cf. Section 2.15).
This, in particular, allows for the dependence of certain "decisions" on data, input,
experiences, etc. which could not have been anticipated prior to the actual experience, as
well as mitigating the "computational burden" associated with the perfect foresight and
understanding assumed in game-theoretic "rationality" or in "classical planning" in the
sense of AI (cf. Section 3.7a)). 19 As regards the choices made on different time scales,
one should remember that among the "choices" or "specifications" made, say, on an
evolutionary time scale are some which, in effect, determine "internal resources" (i.e.,
the system's "architecture", including its nervous system if it has one, its sensory and
motor apparatus, etc.) available to the system for making choices on a developmental or
somatic time scale, including decision-making "biases" or "biasing mechanisms" (cf.
Section 3.3d)). 20
It is not sufficient to "declare" specifications, but to actually put them into effect.
This is an issue in both the artificial and natural system contexts. It involves, in particular,
converting or refining "high-level" specifications, perhaps via a succession of stages 21 ,
into explicitly executable "low-level" specifications. The way this process is conceived
is, however, very different in the two distinct contexts (cf. the remarks on "context-
dependent compilation" in Section 7.13c)). In the artificial system context, one
emphasizes the top-down character of the refinement process. The high-level
specification is taken, by and large, as a given, and the issue is to verify ( and perhaps to
"prove", using formal verification methods) that the low-level implementation does, in
fact, faithfully instantiate the high-level specification. We envision the process to be quite
different in the setting of natural systems (or adaptive autonomous systems). The high-
level "specification" is vague rather than sharp, and the process of "refinement" has more
the character of actively "deciding", based on the "local" context, what meaning should
be given to the specification than of passively accepting a set of instructions. (As we have
19 We feel that the notion of "vague specification" is also more apposite in the context of
development (of an organism) than is the notion of "specification" or "instruction" in the traditional sense.
We have in mind, in particular, the role of the genome in development.
20 Since an autonomous system to some extent chooses its own "problems", based on its over-all
"architecture", these "specifications" not only influence the somatic-time decision-making processes, but
also the "problems" around which decisions are made.
21 As will be emphasized in Chapter 7, such notions of "stages" or "levels" should not be taken too
literally in the autonomous system context. One can envisage many types of "organizational chart" drawn
from many different perspectives. We expect "hierarchy" to not to figure prominently in most of these
charts
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already emphasized in Section 2.10, we do not regard this "vagueness" as a weakness, but
as a key factor sustaining system autonomy and adaptiveness. We shall argue in Section
4B that this vagueness and the associated differences in the specification "refinement"
process, point to a fundamental non-algorithmicity of operation). Moreover, higher-level
specifications (even the "highest-level") 22 are subject to revision in conjunction with this
refinement process. (As one example, events occurring within one somatic time-frame
may precipitate revision of "plans" associated with longer time-frames; cf. the remarks on
"expectation" in Section 7.9d)). In particular, the processes of construction (or selection)
of specifications and the processes of implementation are intertwined rather than
consecutive. This intertwining contributes towards assuring "coherence" of behavior (and
of specifications). We feel that the above processes cannot adequately be subsumed
under the rubric of "feedback loops". 23
c) Natural systems as dynamic vs. static
By this, we refer not to "dynamical systems" in the usual sense of the term, but to
genuinely emergent properties of the system, including structural and functional
reorganization or alteration, including gain, loss, bifurcation, or refinement of internal
"resources" or functionalities. Such emergence, leading as it inevitably does, to
"emergence relative to models" (cf. the footnote to Section 3.3c)), presents basic
difficulties of principle to modeling and simulation studies. One manifestation of such
difficulties is that the traditional "dynamical system" picture of "time evolution" is
inadequate to accommodate such emergence. This amounts to treating time as just as
additional spatial parameter. In particular, this picture presupposes an a priori fixed "state
space", with the time evolution corresponding to moving from one point in this fixed
state space to another (or, alternately, as assigning a new set of values to a fixed set of
"slots").
In the context of artificial systems one may, to a greater or lesser extent be able to
disregard issues of emergence, but we feel that this is not the case for natural systems (or
adaptive autonomous systems). For example, a characteristic feature of such systems is
the emergence of "macroscopic" organization, very possibly not "predictable" from the
"microscopic" organization, yet which can causally influence or bias the future time
evolution of the microscopic organization.24 This kind of emergence, together with its
22 We reiterate here: Despite our reference to "levels", we do not have in mind anything like a
hierarchical organization.
23 We feel that what is involved here is not a matter of feedback vs. feed-forward, or of closed-loop
vs. open-loop control. Rather, what is pointed to is the need for a different conception of the nature of
"control".
24 This alteration of the original microscopic dynamics by the newly emergent macroscopic
structures is a fundamental difference between emergence in the above sense and "computational
emergence" (cf. the footnote to Section 3.3c)), such as figures in the work on "artificial life". (See, e.g., C.
G. Langton, ed., "Artificial Life", Santa Fe Institute Studies, Vol. VI, Addison-Wesley, 1989). In
simulation studies such causal influence can be "put in by hand" by the modeler, via the introduction of
new models, but this substitutes the cleverness of the modeler for that of the model.
One framework (that of "component" systems) for accommodating emergent systems has been
proposed by George Kampis. (See, e.g., "Self-modifying systems in biology and cognitive science: a new
framework for dynamics, information and complexity", Pergamon Press, 1991).
As regards predictability of the macroscopic organization (and of its causal consequences),
compare the remarks in Section 3.6c)(ii).
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attendant "unpredictability", is a prominent characteristic on both the developmental and
somatic time scales, but it is, perhaps, taken most seriously in the setting of the
"historical" sciences.25
We have already emphasized in paragraph b) that both the "situated-
interpretation" and "revision" of specifications are ongoing processes in the setting of
natural systems. On the one hand, this is necessary because of the above-noted dynamic
character of the system itself. Reciprocally, the necessity of embodying and
accommodating this "specification dynamics" is one of the "reasons" for the dynamic
character of the system.
4.5 Examples of specifications and constraints
Example 1: optimal control theory
In this example, we have a dynamical system whose state depends on the value of
a control parameter fixed by an external agent. In this case, one expresses the constraints
by means of differential equations (giving the law of motion). The specifications are
given by the usual boundary conditions and by the functional of the trajectory which
should be optimized. The system may "fail" in the sense that there might be no trajectory
satisfying the boundary conditions (i.e., these boundary conditions are not reachable).
Example 2: a thermostat
Let us now consider an archetypal servo-control problem, namely the control of
the temperature of a room by a thermostat. The constraints are given by: the heat
conduction law; the physical structure of the thermostat and its response function to a
variation of temperature; the fact that when a certain amount of fuel is burnt, the
temperature of the room rises; the fact that when the outside temperature is varying, the
room temperature has also to vary accordingly. The specification is that the room
temperature should be maintained within two bounds T 1, T2.
We can also conceive of a more complex thermostat which indicates the amount
of fuel left in the tank. Then an additional specification might be that the level of fuel in
the tank should be maintained within two bounds fl, f2. An additional relevant constraint
would be the relation between an increase of temperature and the consumption of fuel.
This example illustrates the conditional character of the "necessity" associated to
25 For discussion of "hierarchy theory" in the context of evolution, see, for example S.J. Gould,
"Punctuated equilibrium in fact and theory", and N. Eldridge, "Punctuated equilibria, rates of change, and
large-scale entities in evolutionary systems", both in A. Somit and S.A. Peterson, eds., "The dynamics of
evolution", Cornell U. Press, 1992.
Philip Mirowski argues the need for other mathematical frameworks (based more on a
hermeneutic perspective) than those of a mechanistic, mathematical-physics character in order to describe
economic organization, in particular institutional economics. For example, he suggests: "Institutions can be
understood as socially constructed invariants that provide the actors who participate in them with the means
and resources to cope with change and diversity..." (See, p. 132 of P. Mirowski, "Against mechanism:
protecting economics from science", Rowman & Littlefield, 1988).
The distinguished neuroscientist Roger Sperry has, over the years, espoused a framework within
which "consciousness [is] a nonreductive emergent with causal potency and downward control ". (See
p.204 of R.W. Sperry, "Mind-brain interaction: mentalism, yes; dualism no", Neuroscience Vol. 5, 1980,
pp. 195-206.
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constraints. Thus, if we change the design of the heating system (converting from the use
..of fuel oil to the use of coal or electricity) then the above constraint chaanges.
Example 3 : a railway station
Let us examine two examples in the context of a railway station. A railway station
is an extremely large control system. An obvious physical constraint is that two trains
cannot simultaneously occupy the same place and, as a result, an obviously critical safety
specification is that trains should not collide. For added security , one may wish to
impose the more stringent specification that two trains should not be on the same track at
the same time. A different class of specifications, not directly concerned with safety,
might center on the scheduling of the train service. 26
Example 4: an elevator
This is another example of a "transport system". Constraints would include the
law of gravity, Newton's equation, cable-strength... A specification on the design of the
elevator might include the maximum load and speed under which it will be expected to
operate.2 7 Here the "constraints" and "specifications" thus far considered imply
additional consequences, for example, specifications as to the maximum power output
required from the motor.
There are also specifications regarding "scheduling", i.e., the policies of response
to user requests for service. One high-level specification might be that people should wait
the smallest amount of time possible. Another might be that the elevator takes on waiting
passengers according to some set priority (for example, first-come first-served). Still a
third might be that the elevator does the minimal amount of travel between floors. It is
clear that, in some sense, one would like to satisfy all these specifications together, but
this may be impossible in principle. Thus, this example is a case where it is not at all
obvious as to what high-level specification should be imposed. Moreover, having
determined on a high-level specification, it may be a very difficult (if not intractable)
problem to determine how to program the elevator so as to (approximately) conform to
this specification, in particular if the elevator has limited computational resources and can
only be allowed minimal time to reach a "decision". The implementation problem
becomes considerably more difficult if the high-level specification is to be satisfied
conjointly by a bank of elevators rather than a single elevator.
Example 5 : biological organisms
We have already discussed some basic constraints on an organism in Section 4.2,
and have given examples of specifications made both on an evolutionary and on a
somatic time-scale in Section 4.4. Some of these latter specifications will be fleshed out a:
bit more in Chapter 7.
26 Apparently, the study of the use of "formal specification methods" in connection with safety-
critical applications (including railway safety) is a currently active area of research.
27 Once the elevator is actually built so as to satisfy this specification, these operating conditions may
perhaps be regarded as constraints on this particular elevator.
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B. Embeddedness and failure
4.6 Stances towards system failure
In this section we shall examine some problems associated with "system failure".
Loosely speaking, this term refers to the failure of the system to satisfy some
"specification". More precise interpretations will depend on the particular perspective
taken towards the notion of "specification". We earlier introduced three such
perspectives, or "stances": that of a designer, that of an external observer, and that of the
system itself. Failure of the system to meet the observer's expectations will not concern
us here; we shall regard this as "model failure" rather than "system failure". Thus, we
shall reserve the latter term for use in connection with the perspective of the designer or
that of the system. Our discussion will be organized around two dichotomies which we
introduced in Section 2.5: simulated vs. embedded systems, and artificial vs. natural
systems (under which heading we include, more generally, adaptive autonomous
systems).We shall discuss artificial systems from the perspective of the designer, and
natural systems from the perspective of the system (together with some ancillary remarks
concerning evolutionary "design").
4.7 The problem of failure for simulated systems
a) Simulating constraints
An embedded system, whether or not it fulfills the intentions of its designer or
satisfies its design specifications, cannot fail to satisfy the constraints inherent to
embedding, such as physical or chemical laws. Now, simulating a system on a digital
computer is quite a different matter, because everything becomes a "game", where
physical laws can be suspended or altered, and must be "put in by hand" as part of the
simulation process. In particular, the system's environment must be simulated, as must
the associated constraints. This requires that the relevant relations regarding the
environment and the constraints, as well as the specifications, must be assumed to be
"known" and expressible in a format compatible with computation..28 This is, in effect,
an attempt to use formal implication, algorithmically implemented, as a surrogate for
causal, or material, implication. The causal and temporal relations among the physical
events taking place inside the computer or the computer monitor bear no relation to those
associated with the actual system embedded in its environment. Surely, these distinctions
are commonplaces, but they are well worth bearing in mind, in particular in connection
with the question of " system failure". 29
28 This latter condition on expressibility is, in fact, quite restrictive; it is, for example, far from clear
that "vague specifications" (cf. Section 4.4b)) can be so expressed.
29 We are aware that the same comments regarding substitution of formal for material implication
hold for all traditional modeling in the style of mathematical physics, with no harm done thereby. Nor are
we by any means claiming that simulation is of no value to the designer or analyst. Indeed, the expectation
would be that an iterated process of "model testing and refinement", including under this heading the
formal representation of the environment and of the constraints, would be part and parcel of the simulation
enterprise.
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b) Failure due to logical inconsistency
: What we have in mind here is the inability of the system to iake any "action"3 0
without violating some specification or other (or some simulated constraint). In effect, the
system has no "legal moves" available to it. Here "doing nothing" counts as an action, the
"null action", so that "no legal moves" means that even the null action is disallowed.
Thus we have a genuine logical inconsistency.
(i) Simulated systems
It is surely possible for a set of formally expressible specifications and constraints
to be inconsistent, both in principle and in fact. Indeed, due to problems of "constraint
propagation", one would expect it to be difficult to write down a set of such
specifications with any assurance as to their mutual consistency. Thus, a formal system
characterized by such a set of specifications can very easily enter a state from which no
"legal move" is possible. We illustrate this by taking as our system a universal Turing
machine, with an "action" corresponding to a move on the machine's tape, which
constitutes the machine's environment. Let q be the state of the machine, and x the
symbol it reads on the tape. Then the pair (q, x) is a "blocking configuration", i.e., a
configuration from which the machine cannot take any action, if M(q,x) (the set of
allowed moves of the machine reading x while its state is q) is the empty set. A standard
result in the subject (essentially dual to the corresponding result for the "halting
problem") states that it is an undecidable question (for the Turing machine builder)
whether or not the machine enters a blocking configuration. That is, there is no "effective
procedure" for determining whether interaction with given "environments" (i.e., tapes)
will lead to blocking configurations.
(ii) Embedded systems
As we have argued in Section 2.14, "inconsistency" cannot occur for an
embedded system, in particular a natural system. 31 The behavior of the system may be
incoherent, but the system will do something, whether this includes actively modifying or
simply violating some "specification". It may, in fact, wind up violating the "fundamental
specification", which could include undergoing a physical breakdown. In particular, the
simulated system will no longer be a valid model of the embedded system. Perhaps the
closest "embedded" analogues of such logical inconsistency take the form of conflict or
indecision, for example: (i)The problem of "deadlock" for an actually running computer
program, leading to a system "crash"; (ii) Two conflicting instructions (say, "turn right",
"turn left") sent "simultaneously" to a robot motor apparatus. Here anything can happen
(most likely, one command being received slightly prior to the other), but in any case
something will happen, even if the "wrong" thing. (iii) A "simple" organism may need to :
30 There is a wide variety of interpretations that can be given here to the term "action". For example,
we may wish to view the system as a discrete-time dynamical system, with an action at time t
corresponding to any of the admissible state transitions of the system as a whole. Similarly, an action may
correspond to a transition from one "behavior" to another. A rather different type of interpretation may
focus attention on some particular system "component" (or "module") which may engage in a range of
activities, of which we may wish to single out some class, e.g., "emitting messages", for consideration as
"actions".
31 In fact, we argue that it is a category error to speak of "consistency" or "inconsistency" in
connection with embedded systems as such.
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"decide" between two attractive stimuli, and may indeed spend a certain amount of time
"dithering". Almost surely, one of the two stimuli will eventually exert the stronger
influence. But in any case the organism will always be doing something, even if it means
disregarding both stimuli.
4.8 Inadequacy of algorithmic models
The foregoing remarks add to our misgivings regarding the adequacy of
algorithmic models for autonomous systems:
a) Embedding vs. simulation
Our first point is a comparatively minor one, namely that attempts to simulate an
embedded system, while they may reveal the presence of inherent conflicts among
specifications, will probably not reveal how these conflicts will actually be resolved "in
the world".
b) Non-algorithmic modes of operation
Our second point is more serious, and concerns whether a "robot" consisting of a
set of physically embedded sensors and effectors interfacing (with one another and) with
a controller that manipulates abstract symbols according to a finite set of rules could
potentially function as an autonomous system.3 2 By the Church-Turing thesis we may,
without loss of generality, assume that the controller is a universal Turing machine. The
remarks above suggest that the Turing machine by itself could enter blocking
configurations. It then becomes, at a minimum, a question of whether the sensors and
effectors can somehow circumvent this problem. We have nothing remotely like a
"proof"' to the effect that this is impossible; however, simple arguments suggest that there
are significant obstacles to getting around the problem. 33
32 We do not claim that the difficulty lies with "symbol manipulation" per se, but with the
exclusively algorithmic, rule-based, manipulation of abstract symbols. In particular, this framework is
purely "syntactic", with no provision for "semantics". If we were not concerned with "autonomy" this
might be less of a problem, since the designer could perhaps assume the "semantic burden", and
continually intervene to maintain the necessary "semantic/syntactic" harmony for the system. However, in
this setting of autonomous systems it is necessary to insist that "semantics" must be internally emergent.
We should make a couple of points of clarification. First, we are not seeking here to make a contrast
between the "physical symbol" approach of traditional AI and "connectionist" approaches, which are
likewise algorithmic in character. We do not feel that the latter approaches address the internalist semantics
issue any more effectively than do the former. Second, the above remarks do not bear directly on the
"autonomy of syntax" controversies of linguistics, which actually center on a rather different set of
questions (which we shall not elaborate upon here).
In Chapter 7 we introduce a non-rule-based schema for the manipulation of physically-embedded
"symbols", as part of a tentative approach intended, in particular, to take account of the problem of
internalist semantics.
33 We shall consider two potential routes around the problem, and then show where they appear to
encounter difficulty. The first route is for the sensors and effectors to have limited interaction with the
Turing machine, so that its "environment" is very simple, and hence unlikely to lead to a blocking
configuration. However, this has the consequence that the sensors and effectors are left largely on their
own, and must thus function fairly much in a purely reactive fashion, linked fairly directly to the physical
constraints of the embedding. The second route is for the sensors/effectors to "advance the environmental
tape" themselves if the Turing machine is blocked at the current position. However, this will either require:
(i) that the Turing machine be able to "recognize" that it is blocked, and then signal accordingly to the
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It may be appropriate to reiterate here what we regard as one of the most telling
objections to the view that algorithmic modes of operation are adequate for autonomous
systems: namely, our intuition that "vague specifications" (cf. Section 4.4b)) can most
likely not even be expressed in forms sufficiently sharp to serve as inputs to an algorithm.
c) "Real" planning vs. "classical" planning
The same objections may be raised against "classical planning" in the Al sense,
i.e., the (algorithmic) construction of "plans" by computer programs, based on symbolic
representations both of "goals" and of the "world". In a sense, such "classical planning"
bears less resemblance to "planning" as done by humans than it does to "automated
theorem proving", in a sequent calculus style.34
One solution, favored by some workers in AI, is to seek to bypass "planning"
altogether, and emphasize "reactive" system architectures. While we agree on the
importance of embeddedness and situated action, we feel that this in no way militates
against "planning" of a non-algorithmic character. In the same vein, we feel that a
correspondingly non-algorithmic mode of "symbolization", enabling the system to
perform and evaluate "symbolic" actions, can carry significant adaptive value for the
system. These considerations will be emphasized in Chapter 7.
4.9 The problem of failure for artificial systems
a) Failure to meet specifications
As we have seen, an embedded system (natural or artificial) cannot enter a state of
logical inconsistency, nor can it fail to satisfy its constraints. However, it can fail to fulfill
its specifications. The cardinal system failure (for any system, only more so for an
autonomous system) is violation of the "fundamental specification", i.e., to maintain itself
as a system (cf. Section 4.4a). Other examples are: (i) Failure of a "part" to function as
expected (say, due to poor-design, or to improper manufacture, or to normal wear and
tear, or to abnormal operating conditions, etc.). Indeed, an artificial system is conceived
and built to fulfill certain specifications with a delimited class of operating environments.
But the state of the environment may evolve outside this class, so that the system is no
longer adapted to it. For example, the temperature of the environment can rise to a point
sensors/effectors, or(ii) that the sensors/effectors be able somehow to monitor on their own that the Turing
machine is blocked. The first alternative seems impossible to realize, due to the undecidability of
"blocking. The second alternative very likely faces the same difficulty.
34 We do not have the same objections to the idea of algorithmic "checking" of plans constructed
non-algorithmically (to the extent that the resulting plan can be expressed sufficiently formally), or to the
incorporation of algorithmic components into an overall non-algorithmic process. Two analogies may be
helpful here. First, the difference between the mode of "planning" by a human chess master and that of a
chess-playing computer program. (Here it isn't a matter of winning or losing, but "how you play the
game"). Second, the difference between theorem discovery and theorem proving, or even the difference
between the modes of theorem proving used by a (human) mathematician and those used by an "automated
theorem prover". We do not feel that "intuition" should be placed beyond the pale simply because it cannot
be accommodated within an algorithm.
As we remarked in Section 2.5c), there is an ongoing controversy in the field of AI regarding
"planning" vs. "situatedness", so that "planning" has fallen somewhat out of favor. As noted in a recent talk
by a proponent of planning (supplemented by "reinforcement learning"), the concerns raised within the AI
field about classical planning include: computational tractability; closed-world assumptions; inability to
respond rapidly to unexpected events; inability to handle stochastic or changing worlds and world models.
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where the system is destroyed, or the system may run out of power, because the
environment does not provide an energy supply. (ii) Inability of the system to act without
thereby violating some specification or other, due to incompatibilities among the
specifications, given the underlying constraints. (iii) A somewhat more subtle, but hardly
uncommon situation, is that the system satisfies all the explicit specifications in its
design, yet behaves in the "wrong" way. Here "wrong" is an intentional word which
means that the designer or the user of the system realizes that the actions undertaken by
the system in a certain context are not the actions expected, or that he judges that the
actions do not fulfill certain criteria he had in mind. That is, the explicit specifications are
"wrong", and do not realize the implicit specifications or intentions of the designer or the
user. Possibly this state of affairs can be altered simply by modifying the explicit
specifications. However, just as likely, it will be necessary to rethink the implicit
specifications and to resolve conflicts or make choices among different criteria of value
(cf. Section 2.14). Indeed this may require an iterative, or cooperative process of
refinement, of both the implicit and explicit specifications, not totally unlike the process
of implementation of vague specifications (cf. Section 4.4b)).
b) Examples of failure for artificial systems
Rather than staying at an abstract level, we pass to a series of examples taken
from Section 4.5:
Example 1: traditional optimal control problems
Here, we must make a distinction between the mathematical model and the actual
system. The role of the mathematical model is to determine an optimal course of actions,
or a strategy, given some criteria. This may well run into logical inconsistency; for
example, the final boundary condition may not be reachable from the initial boundary
condition. As a specific example, one can consider the landing problem, or the moving of
an object in given environment). In this case, the mathematical model would predict that
no course of action is available (which is a logical inconsistency). But the embedded
system would, in any case, do something. In the case of the landing problem, e.g., the
system may "do nothing" and undergo free fall, or "it" may try to use its braking
systems as much as it can. In any event, the specifications would be violated by the
course of action, in this case perhaps resulting in the destruction of the system.
Example 2: the thermostat
Suppose the system is a sophisticated thermostat which must maintain the
temperature between T 1, T 2, and the level of fuel between f 1, f2 , and must interrupt the
heating system while the tank of fuel is being filled (for security reasons). Then it could
very well be that, in a rather cold environment, the level of fuel is almost at its lower
limit and hence, because it takes a certain time to fill the tank, the temperature goes
below the lower limit T 1, so that the system fails to fulfill its specifications. Ordinarily,
security considerations should have priority over everything else in case of conflict. In
keeping with this, the designer of the system might have included a specification that the
security specification should always be obeyed. On the other hand, the user of the system
might well not be happy with the result. Still, the embedded thermostat would do
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something (namely interrupt the heating system), and no logical inconsistency would
arise.
Example 3: the railway station
In principle, the railway station is designed so that trains pick up passengers on
time. This is their primary specification. But there are also security specifications, in
particular the specification that no two trains be on the same platform at the same time.
Now it could be that the delay of train nl 1 induces a delay of train n°2, because the train
dispatcher have to obey the security specification; but, in any case, we would not run into
a logical inconsistency.
Example 4: competition among controllers
On certain aircraft there may be a competition between a human controller (i.e.,
the pilot) and one or more automatic controllers. The system specifications, as built in to
the actual hardware, may include the specification that in certain circumstances the
automatic controller has priority over the pilot and should take over control of the
aircraft, perhaps with the proviso that if the pilot objects ( in case of conflicting "sensory"
information) then the artificial controller should make the "minimal" action allowed to it.
Again, there is no logical inconsistency, and the system will take some course of action.
However, it may end with the destruction of the aircraft.3 5
Do to the complexity of modem aircraft there are circumstances where a human
pilot cannot "process" incoming information rapidly enough or respond quickly enough
to ensure safe operation. Hence, some role for an automatic controller is unavoidable.
However, it is far from clear what the proper trade-off should be, nor to what extent the
designers should seek to "hard-wire" the trade-off and to what extent allow the pilot to
decide when to relinquish control voluntarily. After all, the amount of time required by
the pilot to reach and implement decisions may be unacceptably high. 36
c) Sources of system failure
Returning to our more "abstract" discussion, we want to list a few of the possible
sources of "failure" for an embedded artificial system.
1°)Incoherent evaluation criteria
In general, there is no one canonical criterion for evaluating system performance.
More commonly, the designer or user (jointly, or individually) have in mind several
plausible, yet mutually incompatible, criteria. Thus, the system may fail according to one
evaluation, and be successful according to another. As noted at the end of paragraph a)
above, such conflicts are not uncommon at the level of "implicit" specifications. They
may, however, also make their way into the explicit specifications. In any case, it will be
necessary to resolve these conflicts, for example by making choices as to which criterion
35 This example is not of purely academic interest. The situation depicted is believed by some to be
the source of the Airbus catastrophe of 1989.
36 This example brings into view two interesting types of design trade-off: (i) the trade-off between
situated (as well as non-algorithmic) action by the pilot vs. pre-planned algorithmic control by the
automatic controller; (ii) the design decision as to how much decision-making should be done in "design
time" and how much choice allowed in "somatic time".
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to use in any given context. Depending on the plasticity of the system architecture,
instead of having to make this decision in advance, once and for all, it may be possible to
make it on a case by case basis as the cases arise.
2°)Incoherent specifications
Similar considerations to those above hold for the "resolution of conflicts" among
specifications more generally. (Compare Sections 4.4b) and c)).
3°)Inability to anticipate contingencies
If the system must function in a real-world environment rather than in a highly
stylized workplace, the designer will not be able to make an exhaustive list of all
possible types of situation that may arise, let alone take them all into account in the
design . In particular, extreme situations may have been unforeseen or discounted, and the
system may not be designed to deal with these situations successfully. 37
We will also list under this heading failure to anticipate required functionalities or
resources in the "internal" environment of the system. We may perhaps phrase this as an
inability to determine the "closure" of the set of initial specifications and constraints
under the operations of logical and material implication.
4 °) Overspecification
The following may perhaps be regarded as a special case of 2 °) above. In certain
situations of the environment, the system may need to resolve conflicts over resources:
for example, access to effectors. Relative to such situations, the system appears to be
"overspecified" because, roughly speaking, two subsystems "compete" for simultaneous
access to the same effector system, perhaps by sending out "request" signals. Again, for a
simulated system this would lead to inconsistency. But for an embedded system,
something will happen in any case. For example, one signal may arrive before the other,
or the two signals may be unequal in magnitude, or the two signals may cancel each
other, so that neither receives access, or the system may "crash", ... Still, in this situation,
the system would not be functioning in a satisfactory manner (perhaps acting at random
according to the fluctuations in the transmission of signals). In this case, it is necessary to
introduce another "control layer" which decides what to do, i.e., which subsystem should
have access to the effector.
In other words, the system, given its current structure, cannot fulfill all its
specifications in certain situations. (It is, in some sense, unadapted to these situations).
This induces conflicts which are, in any case resolved, but in an "unintelligent" way. To
bring about coherent behavior it is necessary for the designer (or the system, if it can
modify itself) to introduce additional "control" to assist in regulating access to the
resources (here the effector resources). This is tantamount to introducing new
specifications concerning the control, or revising the logics of the system (cf. Section
3.8d)). 38
37 All systems fail eventually, if for no other reason than normal wear and tear or aging. This surely
should not be attributed to a failure to anticipate contingencies. However, faulty manufacture aside,
premature failure of artificial systems may fall under this heading.
38 Other reasons, besides conflict resolution, for introducing additional control layers include: new
functionality, enhanced efficiency, etc...
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d) Dealing with the possibility of system failure
If a part breaks down, it may be necessary to replace the part; whether or not this
is possible, the system may need to go over to alternate modes of operation. If the system
cannot meet all its specifications it will be necessary (though perhaps not possible
without introducing other ill effects) to change some specification. The determination of
which changes in specification to make, and how to implement them, will need to be
made either by the designer (on the "design time" axis; cf. Section 3.3b)), or by the
system itself (on the "somatic time" axis).3 9
The system must be able to "deal with" the possibility of system failure. This
involves the capacity for anticipating, preventing, monitoring and/or detecting, and
recovering from or adjusting to system failure. This goes hand in hand with the capacity
to construct, test, modify, and implement specifications at various "levels". We reiterate
here the important distinction noted in Section 3.3b): If specification construction is done
by the designer, on the design-time axis, then the designer can generate an actual
population of candidate specifications for testing either "off-line" or in the environment.
If, on the other hand, the specification construction must be done by the system itself, in
somatic time, then either: (i) The system must experiment purely by direct interaction
with the environment, and suffer the consequences, or: (ii) The system may draw on the
"memory" of previous experience to select a "likely" specification for direct testing, or:
(iii) The system may generate "plans" and do plan evaluation prior to testing via actual
implementation. In the latter case, the system is still subject to "real-time" constraints,
since it must arrive at a decision in a timely fashion.4 0 These considerations hold for
natural as well as for artificial systems.
4.10 The problem of failure for natural systems
Certainly, biological systems can and do "fail". They can fail to maintain
themselves as systems, or they can fail in less conclusive fashions. For example, "parts"
can suffer damage, or the system's environmental situation can evolve so that the system
is no longer adapted to it, either biologically or socially (take a fish out of water, or put a
baby in a math class, or install a monkey at the White House or Elys6e). However, the
problem of failure takes on a different cast for natural systems (or adaptive autonomous
systems, more generally) than it does for artificial systems. This is due to the inherently
internalist perspectives that must be taken to the term "failure" (cf. Section 2.8).
a) Internalist vs. externalist perspectives
We say that an organism should be adapted to, or maintain a state of relative
adaptation to its environment. Still, observing the organism, we may incline to say that it
is taking "wrong" actions, even in "reasonable" environments. Of course we are here
introducing our own, external, criteria to judge or evaluate the behavior of the organism.
For artificial systems, built expressly in order to satisfy the goals of an external "agent",
39 Similarly, in the first example the "repair" (and/or the determination of whether and how to go
over to other operating modes) may either be done by the designer or by the system itself.
40 We recognize the highly caricatural nature of the preceding discussion. For example, we surely do
not wish to suggest a sharp dichotomy between memory and planning.
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external criteria of evaluation are totally appropriate. How else to judge "wrongness" than
by external criteria, notably those of the designer, or of some user of the system, or of
some third external party suffering the consequences of the system's actions? In the
setting of natural systems, such external evaluations are by and large of secondary
significance. What matters here is what is relevant to the organism itself, as judged by an
internal evaluation system. This is not to say that the organism's "point of view" needs to
be wholly opaque to an external observer. The observer , in seeking to "model" the
organism, may attempt to externally (i.e., external to the organism) represent the
organism's "point of view". This may arise in the context of social interaction ("theory
of other minds") or, at the other extreme, in a scientific setting, where one may aim to set
up "objective" external criteria consonant with the subjective criteria of the organism.
One example of this might be to determine what some of "specifications" of the organism
"must" be, given the constraints on the organism; for instance, to take a reductionist
illustration, what are the relevant metabolic variables, and what is the range of values
within which the organism must maintain them? Such "objective" modeling may to a
greater or lesser extent be feasible. However, this is largely besides the point. The
organism, being autonomous, must take care of itself, without the assistance of the
external observer, and hence is obliged to make use of an internal system of evaluation,
just as it must rely on its internal physical resources. Moreover, as we have argued in
Section 3.3, this system of evaluation must be tied to the fundamental "proto-goal" of
maintaining itself as a system, and must be grounded in and supported by the organism's
functional and structural architecture.41
c) The need for an internal evaluation and reward system
To reiterate, any natural system, in order to be adapted to a class of environments,
must have the necessary "tools" and "resources" to bring about and maintain this state of
adaptation; this includes the sensory and effector apparatus, control organization, etc...
which enables the organism to deal with a typical situation of the environment. Among
these tools and resources, we regard as crucial an internal evaluation and reward system,
i.e., "value system" (cf. Section 3.3). Indeed, in order to be able to maintain a state of
relation adaptation to a changing environment, the organism must not be too specialized
(or too sharply specified). In particular, this means that it will be necessary for "choices"
41 In saying that the evaluation system is "tied to" the fundamental "proto-goal" we do not mean to
suggest that entire "value system", including the "higher-order value system" needs to be involved
primarily in supporting basic survival needs. Rather, what we have in mind is: (i) The original provenance
of the "value system", in "evolutionary time" is rooted in basic survival needs, including adaptivity. (ii)
The primary value system (and the basic circuitry more generally) form the kernel out of which the higher
order value system is "bootstrapped". Correspondingly, the functional and structural architecture of the
higher value system is not disjoint from, but instead intertwined with, that of the primary value system,
even when it functions in "higher order" capacities. Thus, a somatically-grounded reward (or "valence
assignment") system may support and be intertwined with the "processes" involved with intuition and
aesthetics in "abstract" domains far removed from survival concerns. This is consonant with taking an
emergent, internalist perspective to intuition and aesthetics. (In emphasizing this intertwining we are, in a
sense, making a similar emphasis to that of Damasio's "somatic marker" hypothesis; cf. Section 2.18). (iii)
We are emphasizing the emergent character of the value system and, more particularly the "internalist", or
"self-referred", or "self-involved", or "self-centered" character of the emergence (where "self' refers to the
system). (iv) A related consideration is that of evolutionary "preadaptation", such as the hypothesized
preadaptation of pongid and human motor systems for the evolution of human language; cf. the footnotes
to Section 3.7c).
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or "decisions" to be made on a somatic time scale (cf. Section 4.4b)) to take "actions"
neither "prespecified" on an evolutionary time scale nor directly imposed by the
environment. 42 For example, the scarcity of resources, say effector resources, induces
conflicts for access to effectors. Since the organism is embedded, such conflicts would, in
any case, resolve themselves one way or another. However, the resolution thus reached
might well be inauspicious, indeed actively harmful, for the organism. The role of the
internal evaluation system is to "bias" decision-making to the advantage of and "for the
sake of' the organism itself. This includes maintaining overall "coherence" of decision-
making and behavior. In keeping with: (i) our "internalist" conception of the evaluation
system as emerging from within and "for the sake of' the organism itself, and (ii)the fact
that the evaluation system, like every other facet of the organism's organization, must be
supported by the organism's structural/functional architecture, we conjecture that the
evaluation system is bootstrapped by and intertwined with a somatically-grounded
,"reward", or "valence assignment" system; that is, "knowing" what is good is, at some
level, tied to "feeling good" (cf. Damasio's "somatic marker" hypothesis, Section 2.18;
see also the footnote to paragraph b) above).43
d) Symbolization
Metaphorically speaking, our view is that the evaluation system "announces" to
the organism, in a symbolic way, that it could be induced to lose its state of relative
adaptation with the environment if it were to pursue the kind of action presently being
undertaken (or presently being "contemplated") in comparable situations.44 The key word
here is symbolic (used here in the sense of "surrogate"): the organism is spared the
consequences of experiencing an actual bad situation, by experiencing a symbolically bad
situation. 45 As a result, the organism may be led to change a particular decision, or, if
necessary, to modify its decision procedures4 6 and even its own evaluation procedures
(so as to maintain overall coherence of evaluation, decision-making, and behavior). In
42 In speaking of "choices" or "decision-making" in this setting, we are, of course, not thinking here
in terms of a "rational agents" picture. Indeed, what we are calling decision-making may be carried out by
"unintelligent" subsystems, engaging in non-deliberative processes which would be not be regarded as
"thinking". In speaking of "actions" we are referring not only to actions on the external environment, but
also actions ("deliberate" or not) by the system to modify its own internal organization.
43 We want to emphasize that, in speaking of "somatically-grounded reward", we are not seeking
to base everything on classical conditioning or reinforcement theory, either at an abstract functional level or
at the level of underlying "circuitry".
As a separate point, for the moment we will not attempt to be precise as to whether the valence is
"attached" to the consequence of the action or to the action itself, or to both via some type of "association"
process. Actually, this way of putting the issue is somewhat simplistic, given such considerations as
context-dependence. Moreover, it may be misleading in suggesting an inherently "propositional"
evaluation and reward system, albeit one which is instantiated or realized via the "circuitry" of the
organism. In fact, given the emergent character of the value system, to speak of "assignment" or
"attachment" of valence or value should be regarded purely as a faqon de parler.
44 The judging of two actions or of two situations as being "the same" involves, we think, the
interaction of the "value system" and the "categorization" processes acting in a "reciprocally recursive" (or
"chicken and egg") fashion. This is a non-vicious circularity, one of many arising in the context of
autonomous systems (cf. Section 4.10e); Chapter 7).
45 "Symbolic" does not imply "abstract". In particular, the "symbolic" experience may, in
conjunction with the reward system, generate an actual unpleasant somatic state.
46 We use "procedure" in an intuitive sense, with no connotation of "effective procedure" or
"algorithm".
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other words, it may begin to learn both decision and evaluation procedures, as well as
new behaviors or behavioral "policies" (e.g., that certain behaviors should be carried out
or, at least, attempted in certain contexts). Each time the organism is confronted with a
significant variation of the situation of its environment, its current policies may become
inappropriate, and the actions it carries out (or anticipates carrying out) in accordance
with these policies may be evaluated negatively (and perhaps forestalled) by the
evaluation and reward system. The evaluation process will , via its "symbolic" valence
assignment, bias the system away from (re-)experiencing bad situations in the new
environment, and induce it to learn new procedures and policies if necessary.
To summarize, we can say that a biological system must be able to face rather
large variations in its environment, so that it must be a pluri-potential system capable of
achieving relative adaptation to a large class of situations. Because of this requirement, it
cannot be completely prewired and preprogrammed. What should be prewired are basic
intrinsic evaluation processes (perhaps themselves subject to modification in somatic
time) which, symbolically, can reinforce or inhibit courses of actions which tend to lead
the system out of its state of adaptation, so that the system does not actually experience
real maladaptation, but only symbolic maladaptation.
In speaking here of substituting symbolic for real experience we do not wish to go
to an extreme. First of all, "learning from direct experience" cannot be altogether
circumvented. 4 7 A "learning period", involving a certain amount of "experimentation"
and active exploration, may be needed to adapt to a new situation. Moreover, even in
ostensibly familiar situations, "plans" can fail to work out as expected, indeed may even
fail to be "executable", despite being tested and evaluated "symbolically". This means
that the evaluation system must be capable of accommodating the vagaries of "real-
world" as opposed to "classical" planning, and have a correspondingly non-algorithmic
character (cf. Section 4.8c)). 48 In particular, the evaluation system must be monitoring
and revising itself as necessary so that, over time, there is not an excessive degree of
mismatch between the symbolic testing and evaluation of plans on the one hand and the
evaluation of actual outcomes of plans as actually put into effect, on the other hand. (Of
course, the burden of change here is on the "symbolic" portion of the evaluation system).
e) Learning and memory from an internalist perspective
We feel that in the context of natural systems (or, more generally, adaptive
autonomous systems) an internalist perspective must be taken also to learning and
memory. The issue goes deeper than simply the distinction between supervised and
unsupervised learning typically made in the context of "machine learning". Not only does
the organism (or autonomous system) need to learn without supervision, but what is
47 Indeed, at least for humans, exposure to novelty is an expected and desired part of living.
48 We should perhaps clarify two points regarding our use of the terms "learning", "planning", and
(at least implicitly) "memory" in the above discussion. First, while we regard these terms as convenient
intuitive labels, we are by no means claiming that they each correspond to a single undifferentiated class of
domain-independent "cognitive processes" or structural/functional mechanisms (cf. Section 7.9 b)). In
particular, we do not wish to propose a single "operational" definition or characterization of "learning".
Second, we are not making extravagant claims as to the learning or memory capacities of lower organisms
(although even C. elegans exhibits some forms of both associative and non-associative learning; cf. the
references in the Working Paper cited in Chapter 1). We expect lower organisms, by and large, to be
limited to a primary value system, capable of at most limited modification in somatic time.
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learned and remembered must be relevant to the organism, as "judged" by the organism's
value system, both primary and higher-order.4 9 Thus, not only does the value system
"determine" what is worthwhile to "do", but also what is worthwhile to learn and to
remember. This requires some prioritization, since the capacities for learning and
memory are limited resources. This is a reciprocal bootstrapping process: On the one
hand, the current state of the value system (including "goals" and "plans") "determines",
given the current situation of the organism in its environment (including the organism's
internal state), what is currently most relevant for the organism to learn or remember. On
the other hand, the capacities for learning and memory, as well as the actual "substance"
of what has been learned or remembered thus far, are themselves determinants and
"constituents" of the current state of the value system. 50
Such an internalist perspective to learning and memory differs from the extrinsic
evaluation procedures used in the context of (non-autonomous) artificial systems,
whether the learning is done by the designer (in "design time"), or by the system in
somatic time (assuming the system has been provided with "learning algorithms").
4.11 Concluding remarks
a) Artificial vs. natural systems: specifications and evaluation
For artificial systems, the basic concept is that of "specification". The notion of
"specification" summarizes both the purposes of the system and the basis for evaluation
of the actions of the system, but it is linked to external criteria of evaluation, either those
of the designer or of the user. By contrast, for natural systems (and, more generally,
adaptive autonomous systems) the notion of "specification" is somewhat contrived,
except in an analogical sense. A natural system has its own intrinsic evaluation processes,
49 In stressing the unsupervised nature of learning, we are to an extent disregarding those contexts
involving parental or cultural transmission of "knowledge". However, even in such contexts it may, in
many instances be more appropriate to regard this less as "supervision" in the sense of machine or "neural
network" learning than as: (i) exposing the individual to certain experiences which form the potential
substrate for the acquisition of "knowledge" or "skills", and (ii) persuading the individual of their
"relevance". This may result in the engagement of active, or at least passively receptive, learning processes
("conscious" or "unconscious")within the individual. (These learning processes draw upon the individual's
"background knowledge" and "background capacities". A particularly strong form of this assertion, in the
context of language acquisition, is the "poverty-of-stimulus" argument of Chomsky; cf. the reference in the
footnote to Section 3.7c).) Here "persuasion" may be effected on an affective or "emotional" basis as well
as, or instead of, on an "intellectual" basis. Even the "teacher's" providing positive or negative feedback in
response to the individual's efforts may have a "persuasive" as well as a "supervisory" role. (For a
discussion of the role of affective processes in the context of "language acquisition" see John L. Locke,
"The child's path to spoken language", Harvard U. Press, 1993). Moreover, it may be more correct (though ';
perhaps a bit repellent) to speak in terms of persuading the individual's "value system" rather than
persuading the individual regarded as a "rational agent". For example, the primary value system of an
organism might be "genetically primed" to respond to certain environmental "releasing mechanisms".
The need to regard memory from the standpoint of its relevance to the organism has been stressed
by the cognitive scientist Endel Tuving: "A biological memory system differs from a mere physical
information storage device by virtue of the system's inherent capability of using the information in the
service of its own survival". (See, M.S. Gazzaniga, "Interview with Endel Tuving", J. Cog. Neurosci., Vol.
3., Number 1, Winter 1991, pp. 89-94).
50 It would not be surprising if, in many instances, learning what is worthwhile to do and learning
how to do it were closely linked. In speaking here of "capacities" we do not wish to suggest that what is at
issue is simply "storage" capacity, as if one were dealing with a computer information-storage device.
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linked to the fundamental proto-goal of maintaining the system as a system. These
evaluation processes serve at the same time both to "define" and to maintain "coherence"
of system organization and behavior. One aspect of this is the role of the "value system"
in substituting, where possible, "symbolic" for actual system failure and, in particular,
sparing the system the necessity of experiencing genuinely dangerous situations which
could violate the proto-goal.
b) Maintaining coherence: dynamic vs. static "equilibria"
A key point that we have sought to emphasize throughout this chapter is that
"coherence": of behavior, of "specifications", of "evaluation", of "decision-making",... is
a "moving target", and that "maintaining coherence" involves a continually ongoing
process of monitoring and revision at all levels. In particular, both the system and its
"specifications" are emergent, and dynamically evolving. In some sense, the system
continually redefines itself while, at the same time, maintaining its "dynamic" if not its
"static" identity. 51 Our remarks here, while directed primarily at adaptive autonomous
systems, may perhaps serve also as a useful vantage point in reconsidering the process of
design of artificial systems more generally.
51 What we are saying here is surely in some sense obvious, and certainly would be no surprise to
Heraclitus. However, what we are really aiming at, albeit very gropingly, is a scientific/technical
framework which can accommodate, without forcing or artificiality, this type of inherently internalist
perspective.
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a-5. Some intentional notions for adaptive autonomous
systems: behaviors, goals, and values
In this chapter we continue our analysis of basic intentional and
phenomenological concepts entering into the description of both natural and artificial
systems. We shall start with an analysis of the concept of "behavior". Although it is
intuitively very attractive, we shall see that in the setting of genuinely adaptive systems,
whether artificial or natural, this concept does not appear to lend itself to formalization of
traditional type. This suggests that we shall either need to develop richer formalisms or,
alternatively, will be obliged to relegate "behaviors" to epiphenomenal status in the
mathematical framework we are seeking to construct. We shall follow up with an
elaboration of our treatment in earlier chapters of the notion of "value system", which we
regard as critical for a theory of adaptive autonomous systems. We shall, in particular,
explore some preliminary steps towards a formalization of the concepts of "goals" and
"values".
A. Actions and behaviors
5.1 Actions and elementary actions
a) Representing the system from multiple (externalist) perspectives
Particularly when the system in question is an organism, we may wish to examine
the system (consecutively or concurrently) from multiple perspectives or viewpoints,
representing the system's various facets, components, and organizational "levels". For
certain of these perspectives it may be feasible, and desirable, to express these
representations formally, in the form of mathematical or computer models.1 We feel that
these various viewpoints are inherently heterogeneous; i.e., it need not be possible, even
in principle, to pass to a single, "lowest level", most detailed representation, whose
"primitives" form building blocks for the entities in all the other representations. In this
sense, among others, our approach is not reductionist. Thus, while we shall informally
speak of "levels" of description, we do not intend to thereby suggest a "hierarchy" of
decscriptions.
b) Actions
It will sometimes be useful to speak of an "action" by the system, either on itself
or on its environment. For example, we made use of the notion of "action" in Section
4.7b), in conjunction with simulated systems. Typically, we shall find it convenient to
think of an action as being decomposable, or resolvable into "elementary" actions. We
regard neither notion as in any sense intrinsic to the system, but rather, as being very
much "model dependent", i.e., depending very much on the viewpoint taken, or "level of
description" in the above sense. For example, in some models "actions" occur
instantaneously, i.e., without reference to duration, whereas in others duration is an
1 Cf. the integrative modeling framework described in the C. elegans Working Paper referenced in
Chapter 1. For any given "informally" expressed representation there need not be an intrinsic, or canonical,
formal representation to associate with it.
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important factor. As an illustration, we consider a robot or an animal moving around in
its environment. At one rather coarse-grained level of description, we could say that a
"unit" move forward is an elementary action and also a small rotation of the body of the
robot or of the animal is an elementary action. But at a more detailed level of description
it-is clear that this "elementary" action is extremely complicated because it involves
flexion or extension of a certain number of muscles, and then, of fibres of muscles and we
could go on, down to the biochemical level. In particular, the concept of "elementary
action" depends of what we choose to define as "elementary" in this representation of
functional architecture of the system.
5.2 The intentional notion of a behavior
a) Behaviors as intentional actions
Greatly oversimplifying, one may say that there are two divergent approaches to
experimental biology. The first emphasizes experimentation in the laboratory under
strictly controlled conditions, using experimental paradigms designed with strict
replicability and "quantifiabilty" in mind. This approach, emulating that of experimental
physics, has obvious strengths. However, from the standpoint of the integrative
organization of an animal's behavior, it has serious drawbacks. These center on the fact
that it is the experimenter, rather than the animal, who decides what the animal can do
and how the animal is allowed to do it. In reaction against these experimentally imposed
constraints on the animal, the "animal ethologists" emphasized the importance of
studying the animal acting freely in its natural habitat, and of seeking to understand the
animal's behaviors from the standpoint of their relevance to the animal itself and its
needs.2 Perhaps under the influence of this ethological tradition (and perhaps simply
because it is the intuitive thing to do), one tends to describe the behavior of an animal in
goal-directed terms: food-seeking, avoiding-nuisance, escaping, nest-building,
wandering, etc...
It is clear that this characterization of the behavior is an external observer's
description and interpretation of the actions of the animal in certain circumstances. Based
on observations of a course of actions and their results, the observer "infers" the
underlying "motivations", such as hunger, fear, ... Thus, "causality" in the context of
behavior is linked to "motivation". 3 This illustrates the strong intentional connotations of
the term "behavior". In some sense, the observer lends to the animal his own "intentions"
and "motivations", in effect constructing a putative "internalist" model of the animal.
2 See, for example, N. Tinbergen, "The study of instinct", Oxford U. Press, 1951. "Acting freely" is
not the same as acting primarily "volitionally". The ethologists, in their concern with the animal's
"motivational" states, placed great emphasis on the importance of evolutionarily or genetically "hard-
wired", albeit highly complex, instinctive behaviors or "reactions", controlled via "innate releasing
mechanisms" triggered by environmental "sign stimuli" (perhaps themselves of a "gestalt" character).
(An interesting, though by now quite dated, proposal for a hierarchical integrative architecture for
instinctive behavior, based on these "innate releasing mechanisms" is put forward by Tinbergen in his
book. While acknowledging its own provisional character, he is at pains to contrast the comparative realism
of his own approach, which emphasizes the complex physiological mechanisms underlying instinctive
behavior, with earlier attempts at synthesis, such as Pavlov's reflex theory and Loeb's tropism theory.)
3 This is not to say that one disregards physiological, hormonal, etc. correlates or "causes" of the
various motivational states.
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Correspondingly, "behavior" is attributed to artificial systems only in an
analogical sense, because one feels odd in attributing "states of mind" to a system that
one knows to be artificial. In this respect the notion of "behavior" is complementary to
that of "specification": one speaks of "specifications" in connection with artificial
systems, and only in an analogical sense for natural systems.
b) "Classification" of behaviors
It does not appear feasible to seek to "classify" the behaviors of an organism on
any "sharp", operational basis. For example, in some settings the "natural" criteria might
be centered on "goals", whereas in other cases it is more natural to distinguish a behavior
in terms of which "apparatus" is used to carry it out, and the mode in which it is used.
Nor, in general, is there is such a thing as a "pure" behavior, distinguishable as such
independent of context. As soon as the environment becomes complex and rich, it is
rather difficult for an external observer (even if he can observe the internal workings of
the organism's functional architecture) to divide up sequences of actions into
"behaviors". In particular, even allowing for "overlaps", it is far from clear where one
behavior ends and another begins For example let us assume that an animal sees or smells
a piece of food and goes towards it. But, on its (direct) way, it meets a repulsive stimulus
such as a zone of high temperature. Then, it will deviate from its initial direct trajectory,
go around the repulsive stimulus zone and, when it is on the other side, continue on a
direct path towards the food. Here we might seek to describe a certain sequence of actions
based upon relative salience of various sensory inputs and, intuitively, we could say that
the animal first exhibits a food-seeking behavior. If we know that the animal reaches a
repulsive stimulus zone, we might then say that the animal begins an avoidance behavior
and, finally, we might say that the animal resumes food-seeking behavior. But what if we
do not recognize that the animal has encountered a repulsive stimulus zone? After all, we
may not have a complete list of repulsive stimuli (even assuming that it made any sense
to speak in terms of such a list). In any case, how shall we decompose this sequence of
actions neatly in two distincts behaviors ?4 It is not clear that, placed in exactly the same
circumstances a second time, the animal would follow the same course of actions,
because it is impossible to place the animal a second time in precisely the same
circumstances, due to the fact that it is quite difficult for the observer to control exactly
its internal "physiological" (and "motivational") state; above all, the fact that the animal
has already undergone a first experience of these circumstances, will probably have
modified its future behavior in the same circumstances. 5
We do not deny that "behaviors" have some reality, nor that (say, in invertebrates)
there are stereotyped "behaviors". However, these "behaviors" do not have extensional
4 Cf. also the reference to Mpitsos and Soinila given in the footnotes to Section 7.7b)
5 Certainly, with an increase in the amount of experimentation and analysis done by the observer
there is reason to expect improvement in the verisimilitude of the behavioral models constructed. All the
more so, since we do not insist that the observer's data be limited only to "external" behavior vs. "internal"
functional organization. In particular, the models used need not be as crude as that mentioned in the text.
For example, "behaviors" might be correlated with basins of attraction, or transitions between basin of
attraction, of parametrized families of dynamical systems. However, such characterizations of "behaviors"
are highly model-dependent, and in no sense canonical. They do not lessen our concerns regarding the
difficulties of principle, rather than of practice, encountered by the observer/modeler in attempting to use
"behavior" as an operational concept.
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descriptions, nor can they be broken up into "equivalence classes" in the formal
mathematical sense. We expect that the "natural" way to approach the notion of
"behavior" is from the genuinely "internalist" perspective of how the animal "generates"
or "specifies" its own behaviors, and this leads back to the notion of "vague
specification" (cf. Sections 4.4a) andb), and the references there to other sections; cf. also
Section 3.7c)).
c) Modification of behaviors via learning
Another fact is that a natural system learns. We illustrate with a couple of simple
examples of associative learning: Consider an animal initially equipped to detect sensory
stimuli 1 and 2 (say, for example, two odors) separately. As the animal evolves (in
developmental or somatic time), it may turn out that only the association 1+2 is relevant.
In the same manner, it may be that at the beginning of its life 1 is attractive and 2 is
repulsive but that, due to certain regularities in the environment, 1+2 are often
associated. Then it may turn out that 1 becomes the signal of 2, and so is by itself
sufficient to generate an escape behavior.
5.3 Behaviors vs. classes of sequences of actions
One might be tempted to define a behavior as a class of sequences of actions. But
there are two major criticisms of such a definition. The first criticism was discussed in the
preceding section : In the case of the animal going towards a piece of food while avoiding
a repulsive stimulus, which subsequences of actions should be attributed to one behavior
(food-seeking) vs. the other (repulsive stimulus avoidance)? Now, we could say that the
whole sequence of actions is characteristic of the complex behavior "food- seeking and
repulsive stimulus avoidance", but then, for purposes of analysis, how could we represent
this more complex behavior as the "composition" of the two simpler behaviors ? The
second criticism comes from the following example: Suppose the animal is wandering
and, by chance, finds a piece of food and eats it, although the animal is not particularly
hungry. How are we to designate this sequence of actions? It is not food-seeking
behavior. Still, based purely on our observations of the animal performing this sequence
of actions, we may think that the sequence is a sample of food-seeking behavior,
because we may attribute the fact that the animal has eaten the food to a possible hunger
at the onset of the sequence of actions. This illustrates how a sequence of actions can
constitute a sample of a particular "behavior", or not, depending on the context, the
internal metabolism, the history of the system etc... We see, once again, that the notion
of "behavior" does not lend itself to "sharp" specification, and is not useful as an
operational concept.
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5.4 Behaviors as emergent 6
a) Felicitous sequences of actions 7
As we have discussed in previous chapters (and as we shall elaborate upon in
Section 5B), we may expect an organism to have embodied within it an internal
evaluation and reward system (or "value system") which serves to maintain the overall
coherence of the organism's behavior. Against this backdrop we may speak of the "goals"
and "motivations" of the organism, with the understanding that these may "belong" to the
value system rather than to the organism regarded as a volitional agent. As a consequence
of its goals and motivations, the organism performs certain sequences of actions which
we typically qualify as "behaviors". We have emphasized in Section 2.14 that in the
setting of embedded systems it is more appropriate to think in terms of "coherence" rather
than "consistency". Similarly, it more appropriate to speak of the "felicity" rather than the
"well-formedness" a given sequence of actions by the organism, the determination as to
"felicity" being made by the value system itself.
Precisely how the value system carries out such determinations will of course
depend on the embodiment of the value system within the overall functional architecture
of the organism, and this will in turn depend on the particular class of organism under
consideration. We will defer to a subsequent paper the construction of "model circuitry"
realizing aspects of the schematic functional architecture which we begin to examine in
the present paper (see, in particular, Chapter 7). However, to make the present discussion
somewhat more concrete, and to emphasize the embodied nature of the value system, we
shall provisionally give a metaphorical "neuronal" characterization of the operation of the
primary value system (or more specifically, the "component" concerned with homeostatic
regulation): The "goal" is to maintain the "firing" of certain neuronal populations within
a "baseline" ensemble of firing patterns. 8 In particular, if the firing pattern deviates from
this baseline, it is necessary for the organism to act so as to restore a baseline pattern.
From this vantage point, a given sequence of actions is felicitous or not depending on
whether it results in the satisfaction of this goal.
b) Behavioral architectures of artificial systems
The preceding discussion reinforces the arguments of Section 2.10 as to the
inherently emergent character of the "behaviors" of an adaptive autonomous system. This
implies now the following consequence. If we want to design an artificial system which is
truly adaptive and autonomous, then we cannot impose upon the system architecture
sharply prespecified behaviors, nor a fortiori a fixed repertoire of behaviors ordered
according to a fixed priority hierarchy or coordinated via fixed "arbitration schemes" (cf. :
the discussion of the "subsumption architecture" in Sections 2.10 and 7.11a)). The same
remarks would hold for attempts to transpose such "behavior-based" approaches to the
description of natural systems. Within the functional architecture of an organism we do
not expect to find the counterparts of a hard-wired "wandering module" or "edge-
6 Cf. Section 2.10.
7 We borrow this terminology from John Austin (cf. the reference given in the footnote to Section
2.14).
8 As noted earlier we are using the term "neuronal firing pattern" in a somewhat metaphorical sense
here. (See also the first footnote to Section 5.4c)).
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following module" or "shelter-seeking module", specialized to produce "wandering
behavior", "edge-following behavior" "shelter-seeking behavior",; etc... as building
blocks of the overall "behavioral architecture" of the organism. 9 It may be that for simple
"robots" or "artificial insect models", one can design and implement a behavioral
architecture in this way, and that it will even work successfully according to some
(external) evaluation scheme. But this does not mean that the system will be adaptive and
autonomous: If the designer prewires once and for all the arbitration scheme and/or
priorities among behaviors, the system will ipso facto be unable to learn new priorities,
let alone new behaviors, and will be unable to adapt itself to a new class of environments.
Alternatively, still remaining within this general design framework, the designer may
allow the system the possibility that the hierarchy of priorities is not fixed. But then, the
changing of priorities would be behaviors in their own right, for which the designer
would need to specify priorities, just as for the original hierarchy; e.g., when does a
change of priority have priority over maintaining the original priorities ? 10 Moreover, if
changes of priority are permitted, certain prewired behaviors may become obsolete and
be abandoned as the system evolves (in somatic time). The corresponding "hardware"
modules specialized for the production of these particular behaviors would then become
useless, yet remain intact and unco-optable for other purposes. This is very different from
the picture one has of an actual nervous system in operation.
c)Basic prewired circuitry
As regards "emergence" (on a developmental or somatic time scale) for actual
organisms, it is not that we deny an important role for "prewiring", as should be clear
from our discussion in earlier chapters; see, for example, our discussion in Section 3.3 of
the "basic circuitry" already present as part of the "circuitry" of the newborn animal.
However we think it unlikely that this "prewiring" is done on a "behavior" by "behavior"
basis. Speaking loosely, it might be reasonable to view some "behaviors" as more
prewired than others; which behaviors these are is largely an empirical question,
depending on the specific species of organism in question. Also, we wish to distinguish
between "prewired" and "hard-wired", the latter term suggesting "sharp specificity". 11
9 We recognize (as we shall elaborate in Chapter 6) that there are various distinct interpretations that
can be given to the term "module" (and to the associated notion of "modularity"). In particular, we do not
claim that the modules in a behavior-based decomposition would need to correspond to the modules in a
function-based decomposition. The point we are suggesting is that a behavior-based modular architecture
of the type described in the text could not serve as a reasonable approximation, even at the strictly
behavioral level, to an organism. Our argument here is based largely on the issue of "emergence", and
leaves aside the separate set of concerns focusing on the "reactive" vs. "representational" emphasis
underlying such behavior-based approaches.
10 The simplest case is when there is a prewired context-dependence in the original hierarchy (see
Section 2.10).
11 We should perhaps clarify a couple of points: (i)Even with "vague specifications" the resulting
outcome may have a good deal of "precision", with comparatively limited context-related variability. What
is at issue is more the "unspecification-like" character of the "specification" process than the degree of
variability in the outcome. An example from an embryological context is the differentiation of cells into
distinct cell or tissue types. In some organisms such as C. elegans this process is highly stereotyped, yet is
nonetheless subject to influence by the local context of the individual cells. (ii) We do not intend such
terms as "circuitry" or "wiring" to be taken in too literal a sense. To begin with, even granting that we are
speaking of an organism with a nervous system, we do not want to make too sharp a segregation between
the nervous system and the other structural and functional "subsystems" of the organism. For that matter,
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This brings us back to the issue of "vague" vs. "sharp" specifications, including at the
; ,-?level of genetics and development. (See also the discussion of "diffuseness" in the basic
value system, Section 3.3d)).
Similarly, "emergence" is compatible with significant "specialization" of structure
or function within the resulting architecture. For example, portions of the basic circuitry
can be quite specialized for producing certain sequences of actions, or at least are almost
"primed" to become so. In particular, those portions linked to basic survival needs are
likely to fall within this category. More generally, specialization and "localization" of
function is a basic characteristic of nervous system organization for both higher and
lower organisms. 12 A notable example is provided by the highly specialized "language
areas" of the human brain.
B.Goals and values
5.5 The intentional concepts of goals and values
We emphasized earlier (see Sections 3.3, 4.10, and 4.11) that an adaptive
autonomous system (notably, an organism) has its own goals, in contrast to a non-
autonomous system, whose "goals" are externally imposed by the designer.
Correspondingly, the autonomous system has an internal evaluation and reward system,
or "value system", linked to and arising out of the fundamental proto-goal of the system,
namely to maintain itself as a system. This means, in particular, preserving its autonomy
while maintaining a state of relative adaptation with its environment.
As with the notion of "behavior", such notions as "goals", "evaluation", "reward",
and the like have a strong intentional connotation. Again, we do not envision a fixed list
of goals or evaluation criteria, nor a fixed priority hierarchy among various goals.
Moreover, the system's goals are clearly context- and history-dependent. In particular,
goals do not exist in isolation, but within the context of complementary or competing
goals, as parts of plans or strategies.l 3 Certain goals become obsolete, other goals
emerge. As the situation of the organism evolves, what was initially a "high-priority"
goal, may quickly become relegated to secondary importance.
In seeking to formalize the notions of "goals" and "values", we face similar
difficulties to those associated with formalizing the notion of "behaviors". However, the
former notions are more overtly, as opposed to implicitly, internalist in character than the
notion of "behaviors". This suggests that they may be more amenable to formalization
than the latter. Following up on this intuition we shall, in the next two sections, take some
one expects much of the "basic circuitry" (e.g., involved in homeostatic regulation) to be non-neural in
character, with the neural portions integrated into the overall "control " organization. Moreover, even in
focusing on the nervous system per se, we do not wish to overemphasize exclusively synaptic modes of
"signaling" and communication at the expense of more diffuse modes of interaction, including hormonal
and peptide signaling. In particular, we want to take account of modulatory action.
12 Although one should not interpret this in too "naive" a fashion.
13 As noted earlier, these "goals" or "plans" may "belong to" the value system rather than to the
autonomous system as a "volitional" or "rational" agent. In particular they may, to an extent, constitute part
of the evolutionary or genetic endowment of the system (with these terms suitably interpreted in the case of
an artificial autonomous system). Similarly, various "choices" may more properly be attributed to the value
system than to the autonomous system as a "volitional agent".
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steps towards a general scheme for an (internalist) formalization of the notions of
"goals" and "values", expressed in terms of the structural/functional architecture of the
system. For concreteness, we take the system in question to be an organism, more
specifically an organism with a nervous system, so that we can continue to use the
"neuronal" imagery of Section 5.4a).
5.6 Primary goals and values
a) The fundamental goal of an autonomous system
As we have observed in Section 3.3, every autonomous system has an implicit,
system-referred fundamental goal (or "proto-goal" or "specification"), namely to
maintain itself as a system. This requires that the system maintains a state of relative
adaptation with the environment. In particular, it requires that the system satisfy the
"specifications" associated with the basic constraints discussed in Section 4.2, in
particular the homeostatic constraints. As discussed more fully in Section 3.3, the
satisfaction of the "fundamental" goal, together with the "specifications" and "goals"
concomitant to it (which we shall refer to as the "primary goals"), is supported by the
"basic circuitry" of the system. This "circuitry" incorporates, in particular, sensory
apparatus, sensitive to features of the external and internal environment, and effector
apparatus allowing the system to change its relative situation in the environment, as well
as to modify its internal organization. It also provides the substrate for the "primary value
system", which acts to "bias the system" to actions tending towards the satisfaction of
the above "specifications". (In the present paper we shall more or less take for granted the
fact that the basic circuitry is in place and functioning. We shall defer a detailed
discussion of its structure and function, including how it deals with competition among
various goals, to a subsequent paper in which we shall also experiment with some
"model" circuitry.)
b) The primary goals and values
It will be convenient to use a single schematic to represent the various forms of
homeostatic regulation problem faced by the system: The set of relevant variables (e.g.,
certain metabolic variables) may range over a certain domain D in an abstract space
(which we do not wish to specify further), and the corresponding "primary goal" of
homeostatic regulation is to maintain the metabolic variables inside a certain subdomain
D 1 of D. Depending on the particular homeostatic problem under consideration, this
subdomain need not be fixed, but may to some extent be context-dependent.
Examples of homeostatic regulatory variables include, in addition to metabolic,
variables (e.g., the chemicals needed for the energy supply of the system), variables such
as the temperature of the system, or variables expressing information about the state of
various parts of the "body" (such as kinesthetic information), or chemical or physical
substances that the system should avoid, so that their value should be maintained very
low (for example poisonous substances or unpleasant substances or dryness...). We are
not concerned here with making a comprehensive list of "all" the homeostatic variables
relevant to the system, even assuming this were feasible in principle. Aside from
depending on the particular class of organism considered, such a list would be highly
dependent on the types or "levels" of models used to represent the organism.
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As discussed in Section 3.3 there are also other "primary goals" of the system not
directly corresponding to homeostatic regulation. These include evolutionarily derived
"biases" towards certain patterns of action: for example, avoidance of predators,
attraction to various stimuli, ... Some of these other primary goals may have indirect links
to goals of homeostatic regulation.
c) Realization of the primary goals and values
In connection with the problem of homeostatic regulation, we shall assume that
the prewired basic circuitry contains apparatus to carry out the following functions:(i)
"Monitor" the homeostatic variables in question.(ii) "Signal" when these variables are
entering a dangerous domain D 2 containing D 1. (iii) Generate corresponding actions
tending to return the homeostatic variables to the allowed region D 1. As mentioned in
Section 5.4a), we shall present a somewhat metaphorical picture of the associated
processes in terms of "neuronal activity". Thus, we shall assume that the above signaling
is realized as the deviation of a certain class of neurons (perhaps an isolated neuron or,
alternatively, a neuronal population) from a "baseline firing pattern"; this signaling may
also involve the release of hormonal or peptide modulatory substances. The primary goal
is to effect the return of this firing to a baseline pattern via appropriate interaction with
the environment. This, in particular, relies upon the constraints associated with the
embedding of the system in its environment; for example, the ingestion of certain
substances induces a rise of certain metabolic variables (due to biochemical laws), and
this in turn induces a reduction of the deviation from baseline of certain neural firing.14
The value (or reward or evaluation) of the environmental interaction may itself be
realized as the approach towards a baseline pattern of firing of yet another neuronal
population; we picture this as a population whose degree of deviation from a baseline
pattern is correlated with that of the neuronal population generating the signalling. (This
"correlation" results from the overall pattern of connectivity of the basic circuitry). 15
5.7 A basic "strategy" of adaptive autonomous systems: symbolization1 6
We feel that processes of "symbolization" figure prominently in the functional
architecture of adaptive autonomous systems (cf. Sections 2.19 and 4.10d). As we use
these terms, both "symbols" and "symbolization" are embedded in and emergent from the
structural/functional architecture of the system. In particular, "symbolization" does not
correspond to the abstract syntactic manipulation of disembodied, abstract "symbols" of
the kind associated to formal languages. Moreover, we wish to give rather broad scope to
the term "symbol", so that it in particular might carry some of the non-formalist, non-AI
14 As emphasized in Chapter 4, for an embedded system, the constraints will necessarily operate, and
the correct interaction with the environment will automatically induce its natural physical or biochemical
effect. On the contrary, for a simulated system one has also to simulate the environment and the constraints.
15 Of course the environment may be sufficiently nasty (e.g., not providing adequate food sources) so
as to overwhelm the capabilities of the homeostatic apparatus to maintain the relevant variables within the
normal range D1. For example, in the case of metabolic variables the natural tendency (due to metabolic
constraints) is for the variables to go down and enter the dangerous zone D2 , unless the homeostatic
apparatus can compensate. (Since the system is embedded something will "happen" in any case).
16 The term "strategy" is not intended to suggest a "volitional agent".
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connotations of the intuitive notion of "representation" (or "internal representation").17
We shall discuss "symbolization" at length in Chapter 7 (where we put an emphasis on
the nervous system, and use the terminology "neural symbolization"). However, we wish
to give a preliminary discussion in this section and the next of certain of the roles played
by symbolization.
a) Surrogate symbols
The general idea is that an adaptive autonomous system tends to develop
structures for generating and for manipulating "symbols" of actual experience. Via
manipulation of these "symbolic surrogates" the system tries to predict and avoid actual
"bad" experiences. In the same manner, the system tries to predict and seek out actual
"good" experiences, while avoiding the costs (in terms of energy, time, etc,...) of actual
search of the environment.
b) Contrast with the reflex arc
It may be instructive to contrast this use of "symbols" by the system with the
purely reactive behavior associated to reflex arcs. In the latter case an actual stimulus, in
particular a stimulus of negative value, does indeed generate an instantaneous reaction,
but it should be noted that this stimulus was a "surprise" to the system and that the
system has had to undergo an actual experience, typically a "bad" one. Similarly, such a
purely reactive "strategy" would be a very costly way of giving rise to "good"
experiences.
This suggests an interesting slant as to the "selective advantage" conferred on the
system by having sensory modalities sensitive to "signals" generated at a distance.
Similarly for association, learning, memory, planning and language. 18 These all
circumvent the necessity of dealing directly with the environment, as well as permitting a
wider range of behavioral choice than would otherwise be possible. They allow the
system to build a symbolic environment and "play" with it before committing to specific
courses of action in the actual environment.
17 In the present paper we say very little about "representations" per se, or about the processes by
which representations are formed, manipulated, and modified. This is not because we consider
"representations" as unimportant. Quite the contrary. However, it is not clear to us at the moment precisely
what the relation "is" between the notions of "representation" and of "symbol" (or "neural symbol"),
although they seem very closely linked. We feel that "symbol", at least as we use the term, is sufficiently
broad to incorporate the various senses of "representation", though not vice versa. Thus we have
provisionally opted to place the "representational" burden on the notion of "symbol", and to emphasize
the process of "symbolization" rather than "representation construction". Again, this is not to say that we
regard "representation" as a secondary or derived notion, but merely that we regard "symbolization" as a
better starting point for our work. We anticipate that in subsequent phases of our work the notion of
"representation" will be better elucidated, and will figure in an "independent" capacity. As we stress
throughout this paper, "symbolization", in the sense we use the term, is not associated primarily with
algorithmic, or computational, processes. Accordingly, the same will be true of "representations" in our
sense of the term. Thus, both "symbols" and "representations" take on a different character in our setting
than they do in AI.
18 While language surely adds a whole new "dimension" to symbolization, the processes of
"symbolization" we have in mind would pertain in one form or another to essentially all organisms, and
need not have anything to do with (human) language.
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5.8 Higher order goals or values and their symbolization
a) The primary goals and values as a reactive system
We return to Section 5.6 above and the "basic circuitry" supporting the primary
goals and values. It appears that in its role of homeostatic regulation, this circuitry
functions to a large extent in a "reactive" manner. That is, certain values of the
homeostatic variables may actually need to enter a "danger zone" before the "basic
circuitry" is induced to generate an appropriate countervailing interaction with the
environment. In such a case, the system not only deals directly with the environment, but
actually suffers a "bad" experience, which might potentially threaten the survival of the
system. However, there are other cases where the "basic circuitry" very likely makes use
of symbolization: for example, the mode for avoiding poisonous stimuli presumably does
not allow, let alone require, the system to test the stimuli directly. Instead, what might
happen is that a certain repulsive stimulus will act as a de facto "signal" of the actual
poisonous stimulus.
b) Building up of higher-order goals and values by the symbolic strategy
In the above example of the poisonous stimuli the "symbolization" was "learned"
or constructed on an evolutionary time scale. However, such symbolization can also take
place on a somatic time scale. The strategy uses "association". 19 After a repeated number
of experiences, the experience (either good or bad) becomes associated to another sensory
experience which usually prepares for or announces it due to certain constraints of the
system and its environment. A priori, this new sensory experience was neither good nor
bad in terms of the primary values described in Section 5.6. However, it itself becomes a
new goal, and the reinforcement of the neural firing pattern associated to this sensory
experience becomes a new value.20
So, for example, a repulsive stimulus may be announced by a secondary stimulus
(like a smell or a shape) which can be recognized while the system is still at a distance
from the original repulsive stimulus, which can thus be avoided without being directly
experienced by the system.
19 Here we are using "association" as an intuitive, catch-all term, rather than in any technical sense.
We shall defer any attempt at a technical treatment to a later paper dealing with explicit "circuitry".
However, we do wish to make a few remarks here to avoid possible misunderstanding: (i)We are not
claiming that there is a single, universal type of "association", nor is there a single mechanism or process
for forming such associations. (ii) In particular, we are not assuming that one should look for general-
purpose vs. domain-specific mechanisms (or even principles) for learning, memory, attention, etc... (iii)
Nor do we want to claim that all associations are formed (at a psychological level) via some form of
"conditioning" (cf. Damasio's "somatic marker hypothesis", referenced in Section 2.18). For that matter-, 
we recognize that even in the context of classical conditioning (cf. C. R. Gallistel, "The organization of
learning", MIT Press, 1990) things are complex: Factors of timing between stimuli or between stimuli and
action, etc., play a role. Moreover, the "symbol" is not a complete substitute for the original. (iv)We wish to
consider associations between stimuli and actions as well as between stimuli. (v) We wish to consider also
the learning of relationships as relationships, as contrasted with simply learning instances of the
relationship.
20 We are speaking somewhat loosely here in order to emphasize the main point. Certainly, a more
careful discussion would need to deal with many factors not touched upon here, e.g., with the effects of
"context-dependence" on the firing pattern, with the relation of the neural substrate of the value system to
the "sensory areas" supporting the sensory firing pattern, etc... Indeed, as before, we use the term "neural
firing pattern" in a somewhat metaphorical sense here.
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In the same way, a "good" stimulus can be announced by a secondary stimulus
: - Which the system can recognize while it still at a distance from the original stimulus. This
makes it unnecessary for the system to start a random search for the good stimulus. Such
a search could be very costly in metabolic or other terms and might , in particular, cause
the metabolic variables to approach dangerously low values (as a result of the metabolic
constraints). After this kind of association is developed, the secondary stimulus becomes
a goal in itself and the corresponding neural firing pattern serves as a symbol for the
original stimulus. Correspondingly, the reinforcement of this firing pattern becomes a
new value. Thus, the system will try out certain new kinds of interaction with the
environment, in an attempt to bring about the pattern of neural firing corresponding to
this secondary stimulus.
Underlying the above picture of symbolization is the assumption that the
structural/functional architecture of the system, using the basic circuitry and primary
value system as a kernel (cf. Section 3.3), has the apparatus necessary to form such
associations and to generate the corresponding elaborations of the value system. But, if
so, this process of symbolization and building of higher-order goals and values has no
reason to stop after one iteration.21 Moreover, as the system evolves (in somatic time),
certain new goals will receive "higher valuations" than others, and other goals may have
their valuations diminished, depending on the kinds of environments the system
experiences. It is important to remember here, as stressed in Section 5.5, that individual
"goals" cannot be treated in isolation, but must be regarded as parts of larger, coordinated
patterns. Similarly, the "comparison" of two values is best regarded from an internalist
perspective, as a complex context- and history-dependent process carried out by the
system via the structural/functional apparatus available to it (in particular its internal
evaluation system), and not simply a straightforward rank ordering of "scalar" quantities
according to some external criterion.2 2 Again, this raises the important issue of how
"coherence" of goals and values is maintained (cf. Section 4.10).
c) Richness of the environment and of the system
This strategy of "symbolization" and building of higher-order goals and values
can work only for a system which evolves in a "rich" environment and whose evolving
structural/functional architecture is capable of supporting rich sensory experiences and
associations. In particular, the capacity for sensory experience "at a distance" is
especially important in connection with symbolization. We conjecture that such a
capacity would naturally co-evolve (on an evolutionary time scale) with the
structural/functional architecture for forming "internal representations" of the external
world.
21 We recognize (cf. the reference to K. S. Lashley in the footnotes to Section 3.7c)) that learning
temporal chains of actions involves more than simply learning a sequence of successive pairwise
associations. Similarly for making An into a symbol for Al simply via an iterated chain of intermediate
symbolizations.
22 To illustrate the inappropriateness of looking for a canonical, context-independent ranking
criterion: Is ranking according to "importance" or according to "urgency" of higher priority ?
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6. Some basic analytical notions for autonomous system
description
In this chapter our emphasis will be on methodology rather than on underlying
principles of system organization. That is, we shall be concerned with language for
describing system organization rather than with working hypotheses as to actual
organizational principles. We shall examine three basic notions: "state", "module", and
"control", which we think will play a role in the analysis and description of adaptive
autonomous systems. As may be surmised from our earlier chapters (see, e.g., Sections
2.11 and 2.6d)), and as we shall discuss further in the present chapter, we do not think
that "traditional" treatments of "state" or "control" are well-suited to the description of
adaptive autonomous systems. Thus, we wish to attach non-traditional interpretations to
these terms. The notions of "state" (or "internal state") which we have in mind are linked
to the "value system". This includes both "global" perspectives, associated with the
system as a whole, and "local" perspectives associated with subsystems. We envision a
very broad and flexible notion of "module", as a potential means of formally representing
various types of informal "subsystem decomposition". In particular, the framework of
modules communicating and interacting with other modules will provide a setting in
which we discuss various modes of "control". The most interesting of these, in our
opinion, involves the use of symbolization.
We wish to stress that the discussion to follow is still at an informal level. We are
not attempting here to actually construct a formal descriptive framework, but only to
examine "components" for possible incorporation into such a framework. Since we shall
be discussing artificial as well as natural systems, the viewpoint taken will often switch
between that of description and that of design.
A. States and modules
6.1 States for Turing machines and for abstract models of computation
a) For an abstract, non-embedded system, like a Turing machine, one can define
the "state" as a primitive concept without any semantic content. The Turing machine is
then characterized by a finite number of states (or internal states), so that when the
machine is in a state q and reads a symbol x on the tape, it functions in a specified way:
change the state q, then change x, and then move on right or left along the tape. For a
Turing machine the "environment" is the tape. One thus has a purely "reactive" system
which, "reading" its environment, changes it after a number of moves. 1 We note that this
concept of state has been used by Wonham-Ramadge in their theory of discrete-event
control, but in a finite automaton framework (cf. Section 2.7).
1 As noted in one of the footnotes to Section 2.13, there are several distinct meanings attached to
the term "reactive". Here (as elsewhere in this paper) we use the term "reactive" to refer to the absence of
"control structures" mediating the system's response to environmental stimuli. Some might argue that,
because it has "internal states" mediating the input-output relation, the Turing machine is not reactive.
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b) The Turing machine picture is one of the basic abstract model for computation.
A variant of this picture is that of a Turing machine with three tapes: one of the tapes
contains the input data (a reading tape), another tape is the memory store, and a third tape
receives the output. The memory tape is now to be regarded as an internal part of the
machine, and the "state" of the machine is now what is usually called a "configuration",
namely the previously defined state q together with the word written on the memory tape.
This has the advantage that the description is more "realistic", and the disadvantage that
the state space is infinite.
c) In the above picture (deterministic) finite automata correspond to those cases
where there is no memory tape. Thus, they have no memory beyond the finite-state




Modularity is a basic guideline in the design of engineered systems, whether
embedded or formal (e.g., computer software). 2 That is, one seeks to decompose the
overall system into a set of simpler subsystems or "modules" with clearly delineated
functionalities. The various modules may be concerned with distinct types of functions,
but this need not be the case. For example, as a form of parallelism, it may be desirable to
have multiple copies of essentially the same module, carrying out identical functions, but
at different locations, and acting on different "inputs". One basic feature of modular
design, emphasized particularly in computer science, is "encapsulation". That is, the
individual modules interact with one another and with the external environment only
through specified interfaces.
The decomposition of the system into "modules" is surely not unique. For
example, starting from a given decomposition one can group several modules together to
form a larger module, or look inside a module and decompose it further into smaller
functional or architectural units. Reciprocally, the given decomposition may be a
particular form of "coarse-graining" (or "projection") of a more refined decomposition,
involving not only a larger number of modular units, but also more refined interfaces or
channels of communication than the given decomposition. Moreover, the original
decomposition need not be "canonical". There may well be multiple viewpoints one may
wish to bring, or may need to bring to the system, leading to a distinct modular
decompositions, "incommensurable" with one another. This is particularly to be expected
for embedded systems, where constraints associated with the substrate supporting the
originally envisioned functionalities lead, via "propagation" of effects, to the need for
additional functionalities beyond those originally envisioned. Thus, modular
decompositions may be only "approximate", as well as viewpoint dependent.3
2 It is not unreasonable to regard computer software from the standpoint of a formal system even
though it must eventually be embedded. For the present purposes what is relevant is the extent to which
embedding considerations enter into the design.
3 In the context of the organization of an organism, the need to look beyond "intrinsic" modular
decompositions, and to examine the notion of "approximate" modularity, was stressed in Rockland, C.
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Similarly, it is important to remember that structural, functional, and behavioral
"decompositions" need not correspond to one another in a one-to-one fashion. For
example, the supporting substrate of a functional module (within a particular functional
decomposition) need not be localized structurally. Reciprocally, a given structural
"module" may participate in multiple functions, either simultaneously or at distinct
times. 4 Once one takes account of time, one should also consider the potentially dynamic
vs. static nature of modular decomposition. Indeed, the modular decomposition may be
under the control of the system itself. For example, a "higher order" controller may
configure the motor apparatus into quasi-independent modules for various purposes, the
particular configuration varying with the purpose. Similarly, the relation between
functional "decomposition" and corresponding structural substrate may be dynamic. One
good illustration of the dynamic character of modular decomposition is associated with
the "communicating, interacting agents" approaches to concurrent computation. If one
regards communicating "agents" (or "processes" or "actors") as "modules", then in these
approaches "modules" may come into and go out of existence at all times as a result of
the interaction among them.
These caveats notwithstanding, we shall for various purposes find it useful to
assume that a given decomposition into "modules" has been determined. The modules
communicate with each other and with the global ("external") environment of the system
as a whole. In discussing this communication, it will be convenient to make use of
perspectives localized to individual modules, and to speak of the "proper" environment of
a given module, i.e., those modules and/or the global environment with which the
module is in direct communication. The role of a module, abstractly, is to receive
"inputs" from its proper environment and to communicate "outputs" to its environment,
though not necessarily in a reactive manner. 5
(1989) The nematode as a model complex system: a program of research. Laboratory for Information and
Decision Systems, Working Paper (LIDS-WP-1865 ) 1-115 (plus appendices).
The necessity of considering "multiple modularities" even in the context of engineered systems is
discussed in Rowley, S.G. and C. Rockland (1991) The design of simulation languages for systems with
multiple modularities, Simulation , 56:3, 153-163.
4 However, depending on the system being considered and the questions being examined, it may
well be appropriate to think in terms of a certain degree of "localization of function", suitably interpreted.
This, for example, appears to be the case with the nervous system, provided one interprets "localization"
suitably broadly. Moreover, when dealing with embedded systems, it will be advisable to study both
functional and structural decompositions coordinately, despite (and, to some extent, because of) the lack of
one-to-one correspondence between them.
5 The terminology of "inputs" and "outputs" is convenient, and we shall often make use of it,
despite the fact that a more neutral terminology such as "interfaces with its proper environment" might
carry fewer unwanted connotations. Among the connotations we wish to avoid (except in special contexts,
expressly designated as such) are: (i) The existence of fixed, dedicated input and output "channels". (ii)
The assumption that the "channels" are structureless entities serving purely as passive conduits or
"buffers". (iii) The assumption of strictly point-to-point communication. (iv) The view of "communication"
as a formal vs. embedded process, mediated via abstract "tokens" of homogeneous type. (v) The
assumption that all interfacing between modules or between modules and the global environment involves
exchange or "extraction" of "information". We want the picture of "communicating modules" to be broad
enough to accommodate the various modes of cellular and, in particular, neuronal interaction. Thus, we
wish to allow for non-synaptic modes of interaction, including various forms of "modulation".
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b) Natural systems
The above caveats hold all the more forcefully in the case of natural systems.
Indeed, the emphasis on modularity in connection with engineered systems is associated
primarily with "externalist" perspectives, those of the designer or maintainer (or
"repairer") of the system. The concern is less with the benefits that modular organization
may confer on the system itself than with the resulting ease of description, analysis, fault-
diagnosis and repair, etc. This is not to say that a considerable degree of "approximate"
modularity (and concomitant "specialization") cannot arise in an emergent fashion, nor
that it would not also confer benefits on an autonomous system, as evaluated by its own
value system. However, we believe that such approximate modularity is a rather richer
and subtler affair than the the type of modularity designed into engineered systems;
indeed, we suspect this type of "strict" modularity is responsible for some of the
"brittleness" of the latter. 6
Nevertheless, we think that the introduction of "modular decompositions" can be
a valuable means of facilitating our analysis and description of system organization, as
long as we are careful to distinguish between "intrinsic" modularity , and modularity
which we to an extent "impose" upon the system. In fact, this may be the best route
towards elucidating the notion of "approximate modularity". One basic analytical role we
envisage for "modular decompositions" is to serve as a backdrop against which to
investigate the "gluing together" of the "local logics" of the system, in the sense
discussed in Section 3.8d). We recall that "local logic" refers here to the "coherence" of
various subsystems in relation to their respective proper environments. The questions are:
(i) How should the local logics be glued together so as to maintain coherence for the
system as a whole ? (ii) How does the system bring about and maintain the proper
gluing?7
In the context of the nervous system of an organism (and depending on how
complex an organism is being considered) the relevant structural "modules" (or,
alternatively, structural substrates of functional "modules") could range in size from
individual neurons to large populations. In this setting, and in the setting of autonomous
systems more generally, one basic consideration (we we shall touch upon only
tangentially in the present paper, in Section 6.4b)) will be to clarify the relationship of
"modules" to the various components of the conceptual architecture such as "symbols",
"representations" (cf. Section 5.7), and the "value system". 8
6 In speaking of "approximate modularity" we do not mean to suggest that this is in some sense a
flawed form of "strict" modularity. Rather, we are more inclined to regard the latter as a special "limiting:; 
case" of "approximate" modularity.
7 We wish to allow a good deal of latitude to the "module" notion. In particular, the modules in a
particular "modular decomposition" need not all be at the same "organizational level". In addition, we may
wish to consider multiple modular decompositions concurrently, while taking into account the various
interfaces between them. ( In this respect we are close to the modeling framework proposed in the C.
elegans Working Paper cited in the footnotes to Chapter 1.)
8 An interesting approach to modular organization has been proposed by J. Mittenthal and his
collaborators in the context of the organization of an organism (cf. the references given in the footnote to
Section 3.2a). Their hypothesis ("the principle of matching") is that dissociable constraints on the organism
will be met by dissociable clusters of processes, referred to as "dynamic modules". The modules mutually
constrain one another via the necessity for "matching" at their "interfaces".
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6.3 Finding relevant notions of "state"
The notion of "state", either as a primary or as a derived concept, figures
prominently in models in the physical sciences, control theory, and computer science. We
want to consider whether some variant or variants of the notion of "state" might have a
basic role to play in the description or analysis of adaptive autonomous systems. We do
not insist here on some sort of "canonical" state-space: On the one hand we do not adopt
a reductionist outlook, so we are not concerned with trying to find a "base level"
description specifying "all" the relevant variables. Moreover, we are sympathetic to the
viewpoint of Willems (cf. Section 2.8) that state-space realizations may be highly model-
dependent and non-intrinsic. However, even stopping short of a canonical state-space
picture, it is still reasonable to ask whether there are notions of "state" which might be
particularly suited to the setting of adaptive autonomous systems. In the present section
we shall discuss some drawbacks to transposing standard notions of "state" to this setting.
(This in effect recapitulates, from a somewhat different vantage point, certain of the
difficulties discussed in Section 2B regarding the transposition of approaches from
theoretical computer science and "abstract" control theory to the setting of adaptive
autonomous systems). In the following section we shall examine one possible route
towards relevant notions of state, namely via the value system.
We shall, as a starting point, assume that we have already been able to make some
natural modular decomposition of the system, and shall consider two approaches to "state
assignment", one emphasizing the modules themselves and the other the "communication
channels" between them.
a) Assigning states to modules
We assume each module has its own "state space", with the state space of the
system as a whole being the product of these "local" state spaces. For concreteness, we
picture each module as functioning in a "Turing machine-like" fashion: for each input
and each state, we give a formula for the output.9 (Making provision for non-determinism
would not affect the discussion to follow. We allow multiple input and output "ports" for
each module, but this likewise does not really affect the discussion.). Among the
drawbacks to this approach are the following: (i) Combinatorial explosion. Even in the
extreme case of 2-state ("off' or "on") modules, there are 2N states if N is the number of
modules. 10 (ii) The "inputs" and "outputs" for the actual system can be extremely
complex, context-sensitive, etc. None of this complexity is reflected in the above picture.
(iii) In a related vein, the above approach is too "formal" in its treatment of the "inputs"
and "outputs", regarding them purely as abstract tokens. Instead they should be
represented as "symbols" (in the sense discussed in Chapter 7) having function and
9 While speaking here of "Turing machines", which are intended to carry out terminating
computations, we want to give at least equal emphasis to "reactive systems" in the sense of Pnueli (see
the second footnote to Section 2.13). Certainly, the systems we are interested in are submitted to a continual
flow of "inputs" while producing a continual flow of "outputs".
10 Here we are concerned with "combinatorial explosion" as a problem for us in analyzing the
system, arising as an artifact of our mode of "system decomposition", rather than as a problem for the
functioning of the autonomous system itself. However, if one assumes that the system functions
algorithmically, any necessity for "search" might well pose problems for the system itself.
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content. In particular, they can act by means of their specific physical embedding in ways
'n6t reflected in this "abstract token" picture. The above deficiencies in the representation
of "inputs" and "outputs" are mirrored by corresponding deficiences in the representation
of "states". (iv) The above approach does not throw any light the "logics" of the system
(in the sense discussed in Section 6.2b)).
b) Assigning states to "channels"
In this approach one also specifies the state of each module and the rule of
functioning of each module (which should be "simple"). However, in addition, one
incorporates as part of the state of a module the state of each of its communication
channels (i.e., the "messages" transmitted, or allowed/disallowed to be transmitted on
these channels). This approach, in its stronger use of the analytic decomposition of the
system into modules, is less susceptible to criticism(iv) above, but it does not circumvent
problems (ii) and (iii). On the other hand, problem (i) is significantly mitigated as a result
of the shift of emphasis away from the states of the modules to the states of the
communication channels. (Even assuming "maximal connectivity", with every pair of
modules communicating, this would replace the 2 N states noted above by N(N-1)/2). 11
However, an emphasis on the communication channels introduces new difficulties: (v)
An adequate treatment of the "communication channels" would require greater attention
to questions of time and timing. A couple of examples are: each module requires time to
process its inputs; additional inputs can arrive while a module is still "processing" its
current inputs. Moreover, for many purposes, thinking in terms of "channels" rather than
"interfaces" between modules may be a gross oversimplification (cf. the final footnote to
Section 6.2a)).
c) Summary
Our basic criticism of the above approaches to the notion of "state" is that these
approaches are not really geared for embedded systems, let alone autonomous systems.
They treat "states", "inputs", and "outputs" as abstract entities, and do not take account
of their embedding-mediated "semantic content". Nor are they able to represent other
than "formal" relations among these "entities". This means, in particular, that they cannot
take account of "vague specifications" (cf. Chapter 4). Similarly, they do not take account
of the (basic) constraints on the system, including the constraints associated with time.
6.4. "States" linked to the value system
a) "States" in a non-algorithmic setting
We have emphasized in earlier chapters the non-algorithmic character of adaptive -
autonomous systems. This is, in fact, the basic source of the difficulty in settling upon
natural notions of "state" for this setting. Traditional notions of "state" are linked, either
explicitly or implicitly to an underlying algorithmic picture, and it is not obvious that
analytically useful notions of state can be defined otherwise. Put somewhat differently,
"clean" definitions of "state" very likely are linked to correspondingly "clean" definitions
11 The approaches discussed in Section 2.11, in effect, circumvent combinatorial explosion of the
state space by focusing on the "channels" (or histories of input/output tokens).
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of "state transition". Additional "complicating" factors are the "emergent" character,
and the dynamic vs. static nature of autonomous systems (in the sense discussed in
Section 4.4c)). More generally, the difficulty in formulating appropriate notions of "state"
may parallel the necessity for non-standard notions of "specification" (i.e., the notion of
"vague specification") in the setting of autonomous systems (cf. Section 4.4). Just as
"vague specifications" are not simply "blurrings" of sharp specifications, the relevant
notions of "state" may not be simple "twists" of standard notions of "state". We wish to
emphasize that "vague" is not equivalent to "stochastic" or "probabilistic", although there
will be "vague specifications" where there is a concomitant stochasticity. This is akin to
the point we make in Chapter 3 to the effect that "choice" should not be confounded with
"randomness" (cf. the final footnote to Section 3.6b)(i)). 12
12 We should perhaps be a bit careful in our formulation in the above paragraph. Certainly, an
adaptive autonomous system can be viewed from multiple perspectives (and at various levels of detail),
some of which are concerned only with "physical system" vs. "autonomous system" aspects. For such
purposes physical-science models ( or formal "computational" models) of traditional type may be what is
called for. For example, "dynamical system" models of individual neurons, or of neuronal "circuits"
incorporating various levels of biophysical/biochemical/electrophysiological/morphological/connectional
detail surely are totally appropriate for many purposes, with the specific types of detail included depending
on the purpose at hand. This includes highly schematic "neural network" models. Here, on the other hand,
we are concerned with notions of "state" tied specifically to the system qua autonomous system. Our
assumption, as put forward in earlier chapters (see. e.g., Section 3.6b)), is that the non-algorithmic modes
of operation of the system will not be amenable to algorithmic analysis on our part.
As noted earlier, we are aware that this is an assumption rather than a tautology, a point which is
illustrated by considering physical systems: Thus, motion under the influence of physical forces is "non-
algorithmic" but may nonetheless be computable "algorithmically" based on equations describing the
action of these forces. We are, in effect, questioning whether the analogues of such "equations" exist in the
context of autonomous systems. Even if we are mistaken here, and algorithmic analysis is feasible for
autonomous systems, it is still far from clear that the relevant "state spaces" would correspond in any direct
way to those linked to particular "physical system" models associated to the autonomous system. In a
sense, this question of "direct correspondence" between "physical system states" and "autonomous system
states" comes back to the well-worn distinction between "reducible to" and "supervenient upon". There is,
however, an additional factor in the present setting which distinguishes it from the usual contexts in which
the above distinction is discussed: In the present setting, to say that "descriptive level" A (namely that of
"autonomous system states") is supervenient upon "descriptive level" B (namely that of "physical system
states") tacitly assumes that we, in fact, are in possession of a descriptive level A. However, the issue at
hand is, precisely, to construct such a descriptive level, presumably using a vocabulary linked to the
structural/functional architecture of the autonomous system. Actually, in the present setting, to suggest that
there is a single, "uniform" descriptive "level", drawing upon a single, uniform set of descriptive
"primitives", may be misleading. Our suspicion is that, due to the very nature of autonomous systems, any
description of the system (qua autonomous system) initiated at one "level" will inevitably "propagate" to
other levels.
It is perhaps the case that the relevant "state spaces" would have the property that "vague
specifications" can naturally be "formulated" in them , whereas such specifications can perhaps not be :
naturally formulated in the "physical system" models. Perhaps a corresponding point can be made
regarding the notions of "behavioral equivalence" or "equivalence relations"; cf. Sections 2.10 and
7.3c)(iv). An interesting case in point here may be the differences between performing a spectral analysis of
a speech waveform vs. an analysis into linguistically relevant features, or "phonemes". ( In using the term
"formulate" here, we do not want to suggest a "propositional" formulation. In fact, this may be an instance
where an "internalist" is essential: rather than speak in terms of how a vague specification is "formulated"
or "expressed" in abstracto, perhaps one should refer only to the act or process of "specifying", as carried
out be the system itself; cf. the distinction we make in Section 7D between "categories" and
"categorization". As an amplification of this point, perhaps it is the case that the natural state spaces can
only be approached from an internalist perspective, whereas the "physical system" models are inherently
linked to externalist perspectives.)
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Despite the potential pitfalls noted above, it may nonetheless make sense to keep
these concerns in the background for the time being, and to look for relevant notions of
"state". The question may be rephrased as: what kind of information should a
mathematical or a logical definition of a "state" incorporate? Giving an explicit answer
may be quite difficult, but we are prepared to make a guess as to an implicit partial
answer. It is natural to conjecture that one set of relevant state variables should be the
variables in terms of which the activity of the value system (both in its "evaluative" and
"biasing" roles) can be expressed. We have in mind here the higher-order value system as
well as the primary value system associated with the fundamental goal of the system: to
maintain itself as a system. In connection with the primary value system certain of the
relevant state variables would be those linked to the basic constraints, a case in point
being "the" metabolic variables. 13
b) "Localization" relative to a module
In keeping with our anti-reductionist outlook, we do not think that there is a
natural set of "basic" state variables in terms of which all the others can be expressed.
On the other hand, we do not think that the remedy for this is to attempt to assemble "all"
the relevant state variables into a single macroscopic "state vector". The relevant
variables form too heterogeneous a collection, associated with too many distinct
organizational "levels", for such a list to be useful. 14 Moreover, such a list would not of
itself facilitate the analysis of the manifold relations among the state variables. What is
called for, we think, is to look for approximate "modular decompositions" of the system
that in some sense correspond to (or facilitate the discovery of) approximate "modular
decompositions" of the value system.15 From this vantage point a "good" modular
In the "concurrent constraint programming" approach of Saraswat (cf. the footnote to the
introductory paragraph of Section 2B), the picture of the "store" (or "memory") as valuation is replaced by
that of the store as family of constraints (where, roughly speaking, "constraints" in Saraswat's sense
includes both "constraints" and "specifications" in our sense. We find this an attractive shift of emphasis.
Despite the fact that this approach is formal vs. embedded (so that the "constraints" are formally expressed
vs. physically realized), and despite the considerations raised above, we suspect that this idea may, in some
form, be transposable to our setting. (It is perhaps interesting in this regard that one of the motivation's of
Saraswat's approach is to be able to deal with "partial information", or "partial specifications". One of the
tasks associated with a transposition to our setting would be to determine how to deal, instead, with "vague
specifications"; cf. Section 2.10.)
13 In looking for relevant state variables we do not wish to be dogmatic in restricting attention
exclusively to the value system. For example, we surely want to take account, at some level, of the
processes of synaptic modification linked to learning and long-term memory, and which are at the root of
the self-modifying circuitry of even the most primitive nervous systems. It is not clear to us that the
relevant variables here are necessarily linked directly to the value system.
14 These "levels" need not be arranged, or "layered", in a straightforward "hierarchy" (although there
may well be "local" layerings of this type). Nor can one assume that one could restrict attention to state
variables of uniform "kind". An example of a "kind" distinction (borrowed from "computer
functionalism") is that between the "physical" states of a computer and the "functional" states associated to
the computation being performed.
15 This is slightly reminiscent of the "matching principle" of J. Mittenthal (see the second footnote to
Section 6.2b)). Of course, one may make the reciprocal argument: If one has a "modular decomposition"
which is natural on whatever grounds, then this may point towards relevant state variables, linked to the
value system or not.
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decomposition of the system would be one which is consistent with the "partitioning" of
a particular subset of the state variables into subsets of variables "localized" to (or
naturally "belonging to") individual modules, and interacting only via the module
interfaces. More succinctly, we want modular decompositions which localize various of
the state variables, whether these state variables are linked to the value system or to other
facets of the autonomous system's architecture (e.g., to such other components of the
"conceptual architecture" as are discussed in Chapter 7).16
B. Control:Maintaining Coherence
We have argued in preceding chapters (cf. Sections 2.6d), 3.4, 3.8d) and 3.8e))
that in the context of autonomous systems the primary question of "control" is how the
system achieves and maintains "coherence" of its overall behavior, rather than how it
succeeds in carrying out specific tasks or achieving specific goals. This point of view is
consistent with our "internalist" emphasis, together with our emphasis on the "emergent
functionality" of the system and, correspondingly the emergent character of its control
organization. In the present section we wish to continue our discussion of control from
this perspective. We shall, in particular, use the picture of "interacting modules" as a
convenient backdrop against which to examine several modes of control, including
control making essential use of "symbolization" (in the sense of Section 5.7).
The "modular decompositions" discussed here will be based on functional rather
than on structural criteria. Thus, we shall speak in terms of "sensory" modules, "motor"
(or "action") module, and "control" modules. 17 To forestall misunderstanding we wish to
remind the reader of the points made in Section 6.2 regarding the distinction between
functional and structural decompositions as well as the dynamic vs. static nature of
modular decompositions. In particular, in speaking of "control modules" we do not mean
to suggest that these are necessarily realized as separate physical structures or "devices"
localized externally to the systems being controlled. In addition we wish to add another
couple of comments here. First, the preceding terminology should not be taken to suggest
Cf. , also, Rowley, S.G. and C. Rockland (1991) The design of simulation languages for systems
with multiple modularities, Simulation ,.56:3, 153-163.
16 We speak of partitioning a "particular subset" of the state variables since we think it highly
unrealistic to expect that a single modular decomposition (other than the trivial one in which the whole
system is regarded as a module) will allow the localization of all the state variables. It would not, in fact,
be surprising if certain of the state variables are not in any useful sense "localizable". By "partitioning" we
also include, for example, the "localization" to spatial subdomains of a single variable defined over a
global domain.
One class of state variables which are likely to be highly localizable (for a wide range of modular
decompositions) are the metabolic variables. Indeed, in many cases it is not altogether fanciful to postulate
that the "requirement" on the autonomous system "to maintain a state of relative adaptation with the
environment" (cf. Section 3.1) passes over to individual modules, with "proper environment" substituted
for "global environment". We are thinking here of cases where the individual modules are in some sense
"quasi-autonomous". In such cases there may well be "local" metabolic variables for the individual
modules.
17 It may be useful to bring a broader construction to the term "action module" than identifying it
exclusively with "motor module", so as to accommodate the actions of a subsystem on its proper
environment. Thus, "control" modules (and perhaps even "sensory" modules) may in many instances be
viewed as "action" modules from this standpoint.
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a simplistic input/output "flow diagram" of the form: sensory modules -- > control
modules -- > motor modules . By the same token, neither should "sensing" be interpreted
as a purely passive, receptive process. For example, the sensory apparatus can function in
a "goal-influenced" or "attention-influenced" exploratory fashion, with its particular
"sensitivities" (including its "receptive fields") and modes of operation being dependent
on history and context. 18
6.5 The need for control
a) Resource limitations 19
As discussed in Sections 3.2 and 4.2, the system, in the process of meeting its
"fundamental goal", is subject to various limitations of both external and internal
"resources", among them limitations associated with the "basic constraints" on the
system. For example, the system must interact with a rich, complex environment while
having available only a limited number of sensory and motor modules. This implies, in
particular, that there will be a need to coordinate the "spatio-temporal" access of the
various "goals" or "specifications" of the system to the requisite resources for realizing
them, notably the "action" modules, which are the main resources of the system. Even if
no special coordination were incorporated, the system, being embedded, would "do
something". However, this behavior could well be "incoherent" and even self-destructive.
It is to avoid such incoherence that "control" modules need to be introduced. 2 0
18 Somewhat more generally, we regard the tripartite division into "sensory", "motor", and "control"
modules as a convenient basis for discussion rather than an intrinsic or a priori functional taxonomy (or as a
set of functional "building blocks"), however "coarse-grained". (Thus, for example, while it makes good
sense to ask how different "forms" of memory are realized, it is surely not a substantive question to ask
precisely what kinds modules of the above type are "involved in" memory. The answer would probably
have to be: "All three". To speak of the resulting concatenations of modules as "memory modules" would,
of itself, be nothing more than a terminological convenience.) In fact, we think that, in a more formal
treatment, individual functionalities will not be "definable" in isolation, but will need to be defined in
relation to one another (as is the case with a set of "axioms" defining the primitives of a formal theory), as
well as likely requiring reference to other "levels" (e.g., structural) of the overall system architecture; cf.
the reference to "propagation" from one descriptive level to another (in the first footnote to Section 6.4a)).
Similarly, one may expect that function (in the sense of "role") must ultimately be referred to the value
system (which, reciprocally, must be referred to the structural/functional architecture of the system). The
foregoing remarks do not vitiate attempts at modular decompositions, but merely point out that the
definition of such a decomposition must incorporate a specification of the interface relations among the
modules.
19 In the context of formal semantics for real-time concurrent computation, Joseph and Goswami
have emphasized the necessity for the semantics to take into account the constraints on program execution
imposed by resource limitations. (See, for example, M. Joseph and A. Goswami, "Semantics for specifying
real-time systems", pp. 272-275 in C. Rattray (ed.), "Specification and verification of concurrent systems",
Springer, 1990.)
20 The preceding discussion is deliberately oversimplified in order to bring out the main point.
However, to forestall misunderstanding, it may be advisable to make a few clarifications: (i) In examining
how coherence is achieved it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the "evolutionary",
"developmental", and "somatic" time axes. Our discussion in this chapter is primarily directed at the issue
of how coherence is maintained by the system in "somatic" time, once evolution and development have
already "done their jobs". This to some extent accounts for our speaking as if the sensory and motor
modules exist "prior" to the control modules, although even in the setting of "somatic" time this is surely a
significant oversimplification. (One "image schema" motivating part of our discussion is that of "synaptic
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b) Control as the "gluing together" of local logics
A related perspective towards control is the "gluing" picture, discussed in Section
3.8. Here the overall system is conceived of as being "glued together" from various
smaller "parts" or "subsystems" which, regarded individually, have their own coherent
"logics". 2 1 This "gluing" may take the form of various logical or material overlaps or
interfaces associated with the various constraints or specifications on the system as a
whole. For example, two such subsystems may be "glued together" via the sharing of
common motor or action modules. As noted above, the "local" logics of the individual
subsystems are coherent. But these logics also need to be, or must be made to be,
compatible. The question of "control" may then be viewed as how to "glue together" the
local coherent logics so as to obtain global coherence for the "logic of the system as a
whole. It may require the introduction of additional "control" modules to carry out this
"gluing", or to serve as the "glue". 22
This should be regarded as a dynamic vs. a static process. That is, not only is it
necessary to obtain, but to maintain coherence. For example, the particular "gluing"
necessary for global coherence may be time- and context-dependent. Nor should the
subsystems themselves be viewed as static, although the subsystems may deliberately
have been selected (by the analyst) so as to be "stable" on a longer time-scale than the
"gluing" between them. It may, in fact, be necessary to "work" to maintain the local
coherence of the individual subsystems.2 3 Moreover, it must be emphasized that all this
work must be done by the system itself. That is, part of what constitutes "coherent"
activity by the system (as, presumably, "evaluated" by the value system) is the
strengths" becoming modified over time, in conjunction with the "experiences" of the organism. A basic
question is how such modification is done "coherently"). (ii) In speaking as if the "goals" and
"specifications" of the system must "compete" for resources (including memory "storage" and "access")we
do not mean to suggest that they necessarily exist prior to and independent of the available resources. As
we have stressed in Section 3.3 the system's explicit outward-directed goals (in contrast to it's implicit,
self-referred "fundamental goal") are conditional concomitants of many factors of history and context,
including the available "resources". Putting this very crudely, the system must "learn" (on whatever time
axis) to want what it can get. This is one aspect of "coherence". (iii) The necessity for coordination should
perhaps be viewed from a wider perspective than consideration of resource limitations. For example,
certain behaviors may, via their outcomes, destructively interfere with or vitiate one another even though
they do not make use of the same motor "apparatus". (To take the example of a simple organism,
locomotion may interfere with feeding.)
21 It may, in some instances, be convenient to regard these "parts" or "subsystems" as "modules" in
their own right, though not infrequently we would regard them as themselves having modular
decompositions, and as interfacing to one another via common, or "shared" modules.
22 We emphasize once again that these putative "control" modules may, but need not, require the
introduction of new "structures" as contrasted, say, with modification of "connectivity". (Indeed, it is too
soon to say precisely how useful this "module" terminology will prove to be in the present setting of
control.)
23 For example, certain of the individual subsystems may themselves consist of yet "smaller"
subsystems, themselves "glued together" via "control" modules. However, we distinctly do not wish to
emphasize a "hierarchical" picture of "gluing".
Just as we are assuming the constituent subsystems to be more "stable" than the particular
"gluing" that links them, we also assume that the burden of global coherence can be borne largely by this
gluing, without the additional need for substantial internal modification of the individual subsystems. A
priori this is not obvious. Indeed it is even conceivable that global coherence may require a degree of local
incoherence. After all, once "glued together" the individual subsystems no longer function in isolation.
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maintaining of "coherent gluing" (again, as evaluated by the value system). In particular,
the structural/functional architecture of the system must provide the substrate for this.
6.6. "Principles" for control design
In this section we shall examine control from the point of view of a system
designer. Assuming one were to seriously entertain the prospect of designing an
(artificial) adaptive autonomous system, are there principles or guidelines that one might
naturally seek to impose on the control design? If so, one might also seek to ascertain
whether these principles are, in fact, realized in the "control architecture" of biological
organisms. We shall raise three such "principles" for consideration here. These will form
a basis for the discussion in the sections to follow, in which we shall consider several
modes of control, both in the context of our putative artificial system and in the context of
biological organisms. We readily acknowledge that the putting forward of abstract
principles is no more than a preliminary step to showing how they can actually be
realized.
a) "Gluing" local logics in design time
During the initial, "conceptual" phase of design the designer will typically begin
by trying, on a partially intuitive basis, to "break down" the initial specifications for the
system into specifications for "simpler" component subsystems or modules, which are to
be assembled to form the system as a whole.2 4 This decomposition will be influenced by
what types of "parts" happen to be readily available. Thus, the resulting set of subsystems
will reflect a mix of "off the shelf' and "custom" design. In any case, these subsystems
have their own rules of functioning, which can be rather complex. During this phase of
the design more attention may be given to the specifications for the subsystems than to
those for the interfaces between them. As a result, when these subsystems are put together
the system as a whole may not fulfill the intended specifications, even though the various
individual subsystems may fulfill the specifications set for them (at least prior to being
put together). Indeed, many conflicts and incoherence may arise, so that not only are
specifications not met, but wholly "unintelligent" behavior may result. Correction of the
"problem" (which, typically, will be an iterative rather than a one-step process) may, in
24 Our discussion here is not intended as anything more than a highly simplified and caricatural
depiction of the design process. To some extent what we are doing is transposing our previous discussion
regarding "gluing" from the context of "somatic" time to the context of "design" time.
For purposes of our discussion the term "subsystem" may be interpreted in various ways. Two
extremes are: (i) A "horizontal" decomposition into particular "functionalities" which are "incomplete" in
themselves, and must be integrated to yield "behavior". (ii) A "vertical" decomposition into individual
"behaviors", each "coherent" in itself, which must be properly coordinated to produce the desired over-all
system behavior. (This is one variant of Brook's "subsumption architecture" picture; cf. R. A. Brooks, "A
robust layered control system for a mobile robot", IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, Vol. 2,
Number 1, pp. 14-23, 1986. ) Part of the initial motivation underlying this mode of decomposition is that it
allows the designer to replace, or "subsume", an existing "simpler" behavior by building a more complex
behavior "on top of it" via appropriate interfacing with the "modules" producing the simpler behavior. This
latter aspect of "subsumption" bears a curious resemblance to ideas of John Hughlings Jackson (1835-
1911), one of the founders of clinical neurology, regarding the "evolution" and "dissolution" of nervous
system function; cf., J. Taylor, ed., "Selected writings of John Hughlings Jackson", vols. 1 and 2, Hodder
and Stoughton, London (1931/32); reprinted, Basic Books, New York, 1958).
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the worst case require total reconsideration of the initial "break down" into subsystems,
but in more fortunate circumstances limited modifications or enhancements of the
subsystem specifications may suffice. In the best of cases the subsystems can be left more
or less unaltered, with the burden placed instead on the redesign of the interfaces among
these subsystems. perhaps together with the introduction of additional subsystems or
modules. As in our discussion above of the "somatic" time context (cf. Section 6.5b)), it
may be convenient to regard this as the introduction of "control" modules to "glue
together" the logics of the various subsystems.
In the context of evolutionary biology there is no "designer", nor are there preset
specifications in the above sense (cf. Chapter 4), to be "broken down" into subsystem
specifications. However, there are perhaps some relevant parallels to be drawn. Evolution
does not start from scratch, but begins from a base of "apparatus", or "stuctures", or
"functional subsystems" already at hand, and "glues" them together in new ways, perhaps
modifying them or adapting them to new "roles" in the process. This "gluing" may also
involve the introduction of additional "modules". Certainly, those systems in which the
"local logics" are glued together "incoherently" will be at a selective disadvantage.
Indeed, in some cases adaptive "success" will require that the system be endowed with
the capacity for ongoing modification, during somatic time, of the "gluing" of its local
logics so as to maintain coherence. An implicit concomitant of this is an internal value
system to serve as an "arbiter" of coherence (or of deviation from or approach towards
coherence).
b) Principles for control
The above picture of "coherent gluing" provides a backdrop for discussing some
putative principles, or guidelines, for control design for adaptive autonomous systems:
(i) Emergence
There should be a "division of labor" between the designer and the system itself.
The designer should not attempt to make "decisions" in design time that require
information available only in somatic time. 25 Rather, the designer should "build into" the
system the capacity to modify its own control architecture and the capacity to learn how
to construct and choose between different control "strategies". It is in this way that the
system will be able to adapt to the contingencies of somatic time (see Section 6.10). In
particular, the "full" control architecture should be emergent over somatic time.
(ii) Conservatism
To the extent possible the designer should, like evolution, not design from scratch,
but should instead make use of, and build upon, existing subsystems (say, drawn from
earlier designs) which individually already function coherently. In keeping with this
"conservative" viewpoint, the designer should not seek to modify the internal
architecture of these subsystems, which may be quite complex. Instead, the emphasis of
the design, apart from selecting the relevant subsystems, should be on devising the proper
external interfaces. This is not to say that some internal modification will not be needed.
25 We do not regard "adaptive control", as the term is typically used in the field of control theory, as
transferring enough responsibility (or, alternatively stated, as providing enough latitude) to the system
itself. Here the designer provides a preset parametrized family of control laws. Then the system, at run
time, selects the proper parameter values, based upon criteria also preset by the designer.
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However, in keeping with principle (i) above, this task should, to the extent possible, be
carried out by the system itself, in somatic time, without the intervention of the designer.
That is, the individual subsystem architectures should be "compliant" rather than "rigid",
and should be able to modify themselves as necessary in somatic time, possibly making
use of learning processes. 26
We have discussed "conservatism" in the context of design time, but we think that
the same principle, including the building upon existing subsystems, can be transposed to
the setting of system self-modification in somatic time.
(iii) Opaqueness of modules27
Neither the design of the "control system", nor its functioning during somatic time
should depend on the designer (resp., the control system) having detailed "knowledge" of
the internal structural/functional organization of the "modules" which are controlled.
The only "information" that should matter is that obtainable via interaction with these
modules through their interfaces. 2 8
26 In the picture we have in mind these modifications will be comparatively circumscribed. However,
this may be too simplistic a view, especially if one also wishes (as we do) to consider biological organisms,
where the "developmental time axis" must be taken into account. In fact the associated genotype-
phenotype distinction brings to the fore the following basic consideration: In speaking of incorporating
existing subsystems largely intact one must be careful to distinguish between "slight perturbations" of the
subsystem architecture and perturbations of the "specifications" (sharp or vague) for the subsystem's
"assembly". Even if the assembly specifications and the subsystem architecture each possess a degree of
"modularity", the two distinct "modular decompositions" need not exhibit any straightforward homologies.
(Indeed, the subsystem itself may not correspond to a "module" in the assembly of the overall system.) This
is particularly to be expected if the subsystem is the result of physical interactions of various elements
under the "orchestration" of developmental "programs" or biases.) Thus, a small perturbation in the
(physically realized) assembly specifications could result in major alterations in the structural/functional
architecture of the subsystem. A case in point is provided by the notion of "heterochrony", whereby small
perturbations in certain "control genes" can result in modification of the timing "structural gene" activity,
so as to yield major modifications in the architecture of the system constructed; cf. S. J. Gould, "Ontogeny
and phylogeny", Belknap Press (Harvard U.), 1977.
Our presentation both of the principle of "conservatism" and of the principle of "opaqueness of
modules", to be discussed next in the text, may suggest that what we have in mind are simply variants of
the notions of "design for reusability" and "modular design" which are already being emphasized in
engineering design. However, there are at least two differences: (i) The engineering design approaches
emphasize "formal specification" methods, with sharp specification of module interfaces and of externally
observable module behavior (i.e., observations of interactions at the interfaces). We, by contrast, wish to
emphasize vague specifications. (ii) Similarly, the corresponding engineering design approaches do not.
emphasize "compliance" and "self-modification" of the subsystems.
27 What we are calling "opaqueness" is sometimes referred to as "transparency" in the context of
computer science.
28 It is easy to see why this principle is relevant to the context of engineering design, not least in
connection with software reuse and modification. It encourages the use of appropriate high-level
abstractions and, in the process, facilitates the communication and coordination of the efforts of different
design teams concerned with different subsystems. In addition, it impedes "destructive interference",
whereby one design team introduces "hidden" design modifications which effect the work of others. In the
context of organisms this "principle"(to the extent that it is "used" by the system itself rather than just by
the analyst seeking to describe the system) must be interpreted more broadly, inasmuch as neither
"modules" nor their "interfaces" come labeled as such.
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6.7 Current approaches to design of control laws: state-based and behavior-based
models
In this section we shall discuss two distinct methodologies currently used for the
design of control systems. In the first instance, where accurate models of systems are
available from physical laws, such as in the control of rigid bodies or the attitude control
of a satellite, the evolution of the system is described by ordinary differential equations
relating internal "state" variables x (such as position and velocity) to "control" variables u
(such as force). This set of equations may be regarded as a dynamical system in x
parametrized by the control function u (viewed as a function of time). Certain functions
of the state variables are designated as "output" variables, and are denoted by y.
Typically, these are variables which can actually be measured. Thus, the choices of u and
y correspond, respectively, to a choice of sensors to carry out measurements and a choice
of actuators to carry out control actions. The sensors and actuators may themselves have
dynamics, which then needs to be modeled. It is assumed that this dynamics has been
incorporated into the state-variable description of the system. The objective of control is
to choose u so that the system exhibits some specified behavior. For example, one may
wish the state trajectory to follow some desired path, subject to constraints on the control
(e.g., energy constraints) and possibly on the state. In the case of feedback control, u
should be determined as a function of the past of the measurement y. Very often, as in
problems of guidance and control of aerospace vehicles, the determination of u can be
formulated as an optimal control problem, and can be solved using calculus of variations
or dynamic programming. Process noise and measurement noise can be accommodated
by formulating the problem of control in the context of stochastic dynamical systems and
then solving using stochastic dynamic programming.
Now, almost by their very definition, models of this type satisfy principles (ii) and
(iii) of Section 6.6b), with the control interface provided by the parameters u. They do not
satisfy principle (i), but this hardly seems a drawback here, since the models are already
so simple (conceptually, even if not mathematically). However, this is precisely the point.
Such representations of a system, via explicitly given dynamics linking state-variables
and control-variables, and with sharply specified control interfaces, will only be feasible
in comparatively "simple" contexts, typically where the predominant factors are physical
laws. Situations where accurate underlying models (based, for example, on physical laws)
are difficult to obtain are generally not suited for treatment via such internal state-based
approaches. A key difficulty is that model uncertainties cannot readily be captured in
parametric form in a state-based setting. For example, a basic desideratum is that small
changes in external behavior should lead to only small changes in the state description, in
particular in the dimension of the state vector. However, in most situations the dimension
of the state vector may change drastically, even though the input-output behavior changes
by only a small amount. One approach to this difficulty is via the methodology of
network theory29 : Approximations and interconnections are done externally, and internal
29 Cf. Section 2.6e) and the reference in Section 2.8 to the behavior-based approach to control
developed by Willems. We note that, as used in the present section, the term "internal state" does not have
any connection to a "value system".
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state-based descriptions are constructed only after these approximations and
interconnections have been performed.
An example of a situation where model uncertainty is considerable is the control
of a macroeconomic system by a central bank. The process to be controlled is the
dynamics of the economy. The "control parameters" that the central bank can influence
directly are various rates of interest and government bond offerings. It is far from clear
that internal state-based models of the above type can, even in principle, be used to
represent the system here.The same is very likely true for the control processes of a large
industry or of a large company. 30
6.8 Control of communicating modules
We shall next touch upon two modes of control in the setting of communicating
modules:
a) Control via transition restrictions 31
Our setting will be a highly stylized variant of the scheme discussed in Section
6.5. We assume we have a system consisting of communicating "modules" which, for
simplicity, we shall view here as finite automata (with multiple input and output
channels). To the state-transitions of these automata there are associated "output actions".
These may consist either of actions on or in the "external environment" (e.g., by "motor"
modules; this includes locomotion), or of "messages" sent as inputs to other modules. We
also assume that the system is supposed to satisfy certain specifications, perhaps linked to
some "fundamental specifications" on the internal state of certain of the modules (e.g,
"metabolic" modules) or, alternatively, specifications on a subset of the state variables (e.
g., "metabolic variables") of many of the modules. There are constraints (e.g., the
:"metabolic" variables tend to "run down") which imply that the system needs to act (e.g.,
obtain "food") in order to satisfy these specifications. (In addition, there are constraints
linking system actions to changes in state variables; e.g., linking food intake to alterations
in metabolic variables). As in Section 6.5, we are concerned with coordinating the
"output actions" or state-transitions of the various system modules so that the system
specifications are met. This includes, in particular, coordinating access to common
"resources", including other modules.
30 In the present context it is not quite clear how to discuss the principles of Section 6.6 b), inasmuch
as there are no obvious choices of "subsystems" or "modules" in which to frame such a discussion.
However, we suspect that principle (i) is probably relevant. Given the "control parameters" available,' -;'
principle (ii) is perhaps satisfied by default. It would certainly be a mistake to take too simplistic a view
towards principle (iii), and attempt to interpret economic variables as simple macroeconomic aggregates, to
be regarded as "inputs" or "outputs" of modules.
31 We have actually worked this approach out in some detail in an earlier set of (unpublished) notes.
We shall not, however, do more than give a sketch here, since our conclusion is that the approach is too
weak to be of use in connection with adaptive autonomous systems. In particular, we shall say nothing
about timing, buffering, additional module "parameters", etc.
The Wonham-Ramadge approach to supervisory control of discrete-event processes (cf. Section
2.7) also is based on the use "transition restrictions". However, both their approach and their problem
setting are quite different from those discussed in the present section. In particular, in their setting, what
constitutes desired or acceptable "plant" behavior is sharply specified in advance.
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One can attempt to build a control system by introducing additional modules, i.e.,
"control" modules, whose "output messages" to other modules consist of lists of allowed
transitions. Upon receipt of such a message, the recipient module can only choose a
transition from among those on the list. This introduction of additional "control" modules
may be iterated several times, resulting in successive "layers" of control modules. The
organization is not "hierarchical" (or "tree-like"), however. Messages, including "allowed
transition" messages, can also be sent from "lower-order" to "higher-order" modules, as
well as between modules in the same "layer". The overall system may be organized into
(possibly overlapping) "subsystems" of modules.
This approach to control, at least as it stands, has several limitations which render
it inadequate for adaptive autonomous systems:(i) Perhaps the most serious is that it can
give rise to logical failure. A given module might be subject to control by two control
modules which send two disjoint lists of allowed transitions. In this case the module
would be unable to make any transition (even the "null" transition which consists of
doing nothing). So, in attempting to resolve one set of potential conflicts (over access to
"resources", one may be introducing new conflicts. It is not clear that this problem of
logical failure can be resolved by adding successively more "layers" of control. In
particular, the process may not yield "closure" after a finite number of iterations. (ii)
Moreover this mode of control is at variance with control "principles" (i) and (ii) of
Section 6.6. All the real work must be done by the designer, without any somatic time
"emergence" of control organization. Nor does the approach appear to offer any
particular guidance to the designer. Also control modules would need to have a detailed
knowledge of what is going an inside the modules or subsystems they are supposed to
control. This may be expected to lead to combinatorial explosion problems as soon as the
modules or subsystems reach any degree of complexity. 32 (iii) This approach does not
provide the various modules with "choice procedures" for selecting from among allowed
transitions. One could leave this choice up to chance, but this seems highly unnatural.
b) Control via subsumption
A different mode of control, focusing more directly on control of communication
channels, is related to a variant of Brooks' "subsumption architecture" for autonomous
robots (cf. the footnote to Section 6.6a)). More specifically, this mode of control is
associated with a technique of "incremental design", by which the designer may replace
a given "hard-wired" behavior (or "level" of behaviors) with a more "sophisticated" level
of behavior (intended to add new functionality or to compensate for deficiencies in the
original level), without having to carry out a major ab initio rewiring of the overall,-'
system. The idea is to layer the new behavior level on top of the old one, in effect
drawing on the resources used to generate the original behaviors. For example, one may
begin with a level n°l robot design (say, a "wandering" device) which works perfectly
32 In the present setting, where the control is not "emergent", these would be problems for the
designer. To get an idea of the kinds of problems that can arise here, it may be worthwhile to consider
analogous difficulties in the Wonham-Ramadge theory . In the case of incomplete observations of the plant
to be controlled, the problem of supervisor design is intractable in the sense of computational complexity
theory. (See J. N. Tsitsiklis, "On the control of discrete-event dynamical systems", Math. Control Signals
Systems, 1989, 2: 95-107.)
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well in a certain environmental contexts (for example, where there are sufficient
uncluttered spaces, and where the robot is idle and has sufficient power reserves). But
perhaps the robot does not function properly, in the sense that it tends to bump into walls,
or in the sense that it does nothing useful. Then one may attempt to incorporate additional
behavioral competences (e.g., such as inhibiting wandering and putting the "motor
modules" to other use when obstacles are detected) in a succession of "higher-level"
designs layered on top of one another.
In this setting a "behavior level" may be realized via a family of communicating
modules (among which we may include the "environment"). The method of "layering" or
"control via subsumption" (as we wish to use the term) may be described as follows: We
start with two communicating modules , say M 1 -> M2 . In control via subsumption
another module, say N, associated with a different behavioral level, may either suppress
the output of M1 towards M 2 , or may replace the message sent by M1 to M2 with its own
message. This may be represented by the diagram: M1 -- M 2 . Here it is not M 1 whose
N- I
function is modified, but the communication channel between M 1 and M 2.
This control procedure satisfies principles (ii) and (iii) of Section 6.6, this in
some sense being the main point of the procedure. (Of course, in actual practice, this
procedure, as well as these two "principles", must be interpreted as "guidelines" for
design rather than as rigid rules.) Just as clearly, principle (i) of Section 6.6 is not
satisfied. This is part and parcel of the difficulties with "behavior-based" approaches,
incorporating predetermined priorities among behaviors. We discuss our objections to
such approaches in some detail elsewhere in this paper; see, e.g., Sections 2.10, 2.14,
5.4b) and 7.1 la).
We wish to conclude this section with two observations regarding the behavior
"levels" which figure in the above picture. First, lower "levels" cannot control higher
"levels". Second, the various distinct "levels" are really of uniform type, all of them
being generators of behavior in the external environment. They do not correspond to
different levels of abstraction or representation.
6.9 Control of interface relations via symbolization
From this point onward our emphasis shifts back to biological vs. artificial
systems. In keeping with this emphasis, we shall freely make allusions to "neural
systems". However, unless we explicitly state otherwise, our use of such "neural"
terminology is intended in a metaphorical rather than literal sense. We are not attempting
here to make assertions about the actual neural organization of specific organisms. (In
particular, we don't wish to make claims as to the existence or character of specific
"neural modules").
Our discussion in the present section will deal with a special case of the "control
as gluing" picture: namely, the situation where two modules M, N each have interfaces
to the same module E. The problem we shall consider is the coordination of "access" to E
(regarded as a "shared resource") via control of the interfaces to E. We shall contrast two
modes of control at opposite extremes of "directness". The first ("reciprocal inhibition")
is a particular mode of "direct control", where no additional "control modules" need to be
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introduced. The second is an indirect mode of control making essential use of
symbolization.
a) Direct control of interface relations
We start again with the picture of "control of interface relations ": M 1 - M 2
N-1
discussed above in connection with the "subsumption architecture". Here N is a module
which controls the communication or interface relation between M 1 and M 2 . However,
we want to work at a more "abstract" level than in the preceding section. In particular, we
do not want to insist that N be a component of a " behavior generator", nor that N be at
a "higher level" than M 1 or M 2.
Perhaps the most basic means of "conflict resolution" within neural systems
(both internally and at the periphery, where the systems interface with the environment) is
"reciprocal inhibition". We shall transpose this notion to our more abstract setting. It is
represented schematically in Figure 6.1, via the symmetric arrows drawn between the
two modules M and N both having access to the same module E. Depending on the
relative strengths (and on the timing) of the reciprocal "signals" passing between M and
N, one of them inhibits the other and "gains control" of E.3 3 Notice that here
coordination of access to E or, alternately phrased, the control of the interface relations
between M and E (resp., between N and E) is achieved without the intervention of a
higher-level "controller". We shall assume that control via reciprocal inhibition can arise
in two ways: as part of the "pre-wiring" of the system and also via "circuitry
modifications" linked to learning (in somatic time).
b) Control via symbolization
As we have seen in Section 5B, it may be advantageous for the system to be able
to build a symbolic environment in which to experiment before committing to specific
courses of action in the actual environment. We illustrate such a use of symbolization in
the above setting, in which there are two modules M, N both having access to the same
module E. We shall assume, for concreteness, that E is an "effector" module, which
carries out action, motion, etc.... As an alternative to having the control of E be
determined by the direct competition of M and N (via reciprocal inhibition), it might be
preferable if the "decision" could be based on the anticipated results of the outcome.
That is, it might be preferable if the system were able to "project" plausible courses of
action by E in the two alternative cases where M or N had control, and were able to test
the effects of these courses of action on an "internal representation" of the world. This
process could be realized by, or regarded as, a "higher-level controller" which constructs
a representation of the environment and acts symbolically on this representation. Based
on an evaluation of the results of the symbolic actions, the controller decides to "give
permission" to one of the actual actions and to inhibit the other. Thus far we have
regarded E as an effector module acting on/in the external environment. But E could
33 Lest our reference to "signal strengths" and "signal timing" obscure this point, we wish to stress
that our "modules" and their "communication channels" or "interfaces" are intended to be taken at a fairly
abstract level, and not (for the present) associated to specific structural/functional substrates. For example,
we are not attempting to identify "channels" with axons, or "signals" with sequences of action potentials.
99
equally well be a different type of module, not at the periphery of the system (i.e., not
directly interfacing with the external environment). While not acting on the external
environment, E nonetheless acts on its own proper environment (cf. Section 6.2a)),
perhaps via quite abstract neural actions. The "strategy" of symbolic action on an
internalized symbolic world carries over equally well to the present setting. The only
difference is the higher level of abstraction: the world being symbolically represented is
the world of a module (or subsystem) inside the system rather than the external world of
the system. Such symbolic action (together with its evaluation) forms a basic component
of "planning".
c) Control via symbolization: reprise
We wish to give a slightly more detailed (though still rather crude) formulation of
"control via symbolization". As above, we begin with two modules M and N, having
access to the same module E, which acts on its proper environment. The "controller"
consists of a set of processes which:
(i) Have available (and if necessary, construct) a symbolic representation of the
proper environment of E.
(ii) Carry out symbolic actions on this symbolic representation "mimicking" the
actual actions of E on its proper environment, corresponding to the two alternative cases
when M or N has control of E. (The determination or "estimation" of what the actual
actions of E would be in each of these two cases might itself involve symbolization
processes.)
(iii) Evaluate the results of these symbolic actions on the symbolic environment using
symbolic values.
(iv) Compare the results of these evaluations. (Actually, there may not be a clean
separation between the processes of evaluation and comparison. In any case, it will likely
be necessary to provisionally "store" either the results of the symbolic actions, or the
evaluations of these results, in some form of "working memory"). 3 4
(v) Give permission to M or N and inhibit the other.
The primary problem with the preceding picture of "control via symbolization" is
not its high degree of abstraction; indeed, we shall have to deal with much worse in
Chapter 7 ! Rather, it is the fact that no provision is made for M and N to override or
34 We do not wish, at this stage, to speculate on "mechanisms" or structural/functional substrates for
the various forms of "memory". We do not think that it is feasible to discuss memory in isolation, simply as
an abstract set of "storage" and "retrieval" processes. This would, in particular, not provide us with the
means to distinguish the memory processes of an organism from those of a computer. Rather, we think that
"memory" must be discussed as part of an integrative and comprehensive structural/functional architecture.
We believe that certain of the components of the "conceptual architecture" which we discuss in the present
paper (especially in Chapter 7), such as "symbolization", "categorization", and "the value system" will be
relevant to such a discussion of memory. However, at the same time, we think that this architecture needs to
be fleshed out further before one enters on such a discussion. Similarly, as discussed in the second footnote
to the introduction to Section 6B, our "module" terminology is as yet too crude and too general to be of
real use here as a means of representing "memory" processes.
For the same reasons we shall not, in the present paper, propose specific mechanisms for the
various forms of "learning", but shall limit ourselves to some general remarks in Section 6.10 on
connections between "learning" and "control". In a subsequent paper we shall experiment with approaches
for incorporating memory and learning more explicitly as part of our system architecture.
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circumvent the "symbolic" control procedure and to act on E directly. To take an extreme
example, this may be necessary in case of "emergency". More generally, the control
architecture should allow the system more latitude in "choosing" between direct and
"symbolic" control, depending on the circumstances. In other words, the relation between
controller and controlled modules is not quite satisfactory in the above picture. We shall
have more to say about this in the next section.
6.10 Learning as control and learning to be controlled
a) Learning as control 35
It may be appropriate to view the learning of "associations" between sensory
inputs and actions (or between sensory inputs themselves) as itself constituting a basic
form of "control", perhaps still falling under the rubric of control as "gluing of local
logics". That is, depending on the modular decomposition under consideration, the
formation of these associations may be realized via the alteration of the interfaces
between modules ( including, perhaps, the modification of the modules themselves, or the
incorporation of new modules) 36 . In any case, such learning is a basic concomitant of
other control processes. Among its roles are: helping to build up the symbolic
representations or "world pictures" discussed in the preceding section, and "facilitating"
certain actions of various modules. This form of "control" very likely operates on a
slower time-scale than the "interface relations control" discussed above, and may
perhaps be viewed as providing a backdrop for the operation of the latter.3 7
b) The learning of control
We have emphasized the picture of control as "interaction among modules"
(including the action by one module or class of modules to modify the interactions among
others ). As with any action of one module on another (or on the interfaces between other
modules), this kind of action can be learned (in somatic time) via association and
35 We shall be speaking rather crudely here of associations involving "sensory inputs". A better
picture of what we have in mind may be obtained from Section 7D on "categorization".
36 The obvious analogy here is "synapse formation" and modification of "synaptic strengths".
37 Very crudely speaking, the former control the nature of the communication channels, and the latter
control the "traffic" along these channels.
Even if (as suggested in the text) this form of "control" is realized via the alteration of module
interfaces, this still leaves open the question of what kinds of processes carry out, or bring about, this
alteration. As in the case of "memory" (cf. the footnote to Section 6.9c)), it is unlikely to be helpful to
attempt to "localize" the processes of associative learning (even in a functional vs. structural sense) to a
particular "module". More likely, whole networks of modules will be involved. At this stage, we do not
wish to speculate as to particular mechanisms; however, we expect, at a minimum, the following
conjunction of factors:
(i) Synchrony (or approximate synchrony) of occurrence of certain "inputs" and "outputs". The temporal
order in which "events" occur may also be expected to be a factor.
(ii) Biochemical/molecular biological mechanisms for reinforcing/refreshing synaptic connections on a
long-term basis. This may include mechanisms of "long term potentiation".
(iii) An internal value system, either primary or higher-order (as discussed in earlier chapters), which is the
ultimate arbiter of control.
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"reinforcement" processes.3 8 In connection with this learning we envision a fundamental
role for the internal value system which, in a sense, is the ultimate reference for control
(cf. the final footnote to the preceding paragraph).
c) Learning to be controlled
However, this is not the end of the story. As we have seen in Section 6.9c), the
relation between controller and controlled module cannot simply be one-way, from
controller to controlled. This consideration is extremely important, because it may even
impact on the survival of the system. Thus, there should be an additional kind of learning:
namely, the module should learn both how to be controlled and how to circumvent
control when necessary. The module should learn how to reroute its output to a higher-
order "planning center" and await permission to act. In some sense, the module should
learn patience, yet also irresponsibility (although, as usual, we would not wish to phrase
this as a strict and universal rule). Speaking somewhat metaphorically, if certain driving
inputs to the module are rather low, the preference for being controlled should win out,
but if these driving inputs are sufficiently strong, decisions should be taken at the lower
level. Again, this should be an emergent behavior of the module (or of the
module/controller combination): the way the module makes use of control should be a
learned process.




In this chapter we shall seek to bring out what are the central characteristics of
"symbols" as we conceive the term, and to begin the development of a framework for
discussing and analyzing the processes of "symbolization", i.e., the construction and
manipulation of symbols. We have already briefly examined "symbolization" in Sections
5B and 6B. As discussed there, we believe that symbolization has a central role to play in
the functioning of adaptive autonomous systems. An additional aim of the present chapter
is to propose elements of an integrative functional architecture schema centered upon
processes of symbolization.
The term "symbol" has many connotations, only certain of which we wish to draw
upon, and others of which we wish to de-emphasize. In particular the term will not be
used in its traditional linguistic sense, nor as it is commonly used in AI. Thus, as will
become clear, our own approach runs basically transversal to the much debated "physical
symbol system" vs. "connectionism" polarity. Our thinking on "symbolization" is
primarily influenced by, and directed towards, biological organisms endowed with
nervous systems; hence, our terminology of "neural symbols". However, in the present
paper we are not attempting to scrupulously mirror the neurobiology of specific model
organisms, but are only aiming at the more modest goal of biological "plausibility" (in
the sense of Section 3.8c)).
A. Characteristics of neural symbols
7.1 Physical description and role of neural symbols
a) Physical description
In a nervous system communications between neurons (and also other cells), and
between "modules" is supported by a range of neural symbols. At a small-scale
intercellular level these may be realized, for example, as action potentials,
neurotransmitters, neuropeptides, or hormones. Within an individual cell, the physical
realization may, for example, be via ions, enzymes, and gene regulation. On a larger
scale the physical realization may take the form of firing patterns (or, more generally,
"activity" pattern, including detailed biochemical states, etc.) of a population of neurons;
moreover, this population need not be localized within a small delimited area, but may be
(widely) distributed within the nervous system (either "diffusely" or in "clusters"). In
particular, a neural symbol should not be thought of as a simple discrete unit, nor as an
element of a fixed discrete "alphabet".
b) Role of neural symbols
The roles of neural symbols are: 1) to maintain an ongoing interaction of the
organism with its environment both at the levels of perception and action, and involving
internal as well as peripheral sensors and effectors. 2) to maintain the integrity and
identity of the organism as a system. For all organisms this includes the regulation of the
homeostatic support processes. In the case of higher organisms it may also include the
constructing and maintaining of some sense of self. These roles are carried out, first, by
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the creation of neural symbols at the level of sensor organs and by the action of neural
* symbols on the effector organs and, second, via interaction between different neural
symbols.
7.2 Comparison and contrast with the notion of "symbol" in AI and linguistics
Our concern here is with the notion of "neural symbol", rather than with the
notion of "symbol" more generally. Accordingly, we shall not attempt to enter into an in-
depth discussion of either Al or linguistics, but shall limit ourselves to some brief
remarks, consisting largely of pointers to later sections of this chapter.
a) Comparison with AI
From the perspective of AI, the "system" is a computational engine.
Correspondingly, "symbols" are abstract entities, with form essentially decoupled from
content, introduced to serve as the substrate for formal computational manipulation by
the system. This viewpoint, by focusing exclusively, or predominantly, on the processes
of computation, leaves out of consideration the crucial (and more difficult to analyze)
non-computational "background" processes which form the essential substrate for the
computation. These processes, ultimately carried out externally, by the programmer,
include the introduction and "interpretation" of the symbols, i.e., the association to them
of content or reference. By contrast, "neural symbols" emerge from within the system,
and their content is linked to their physical action within the system (cf. Sections 2.9,
7.4a), and 7.4b)). More generally, as emphasized throughout this paper, the modes of
functioning of adaptive autonomous systems are primarily non-algorithmic. Accordingly,
the processes involving "symbolization" are primarily not computational in character.
b) Comparison with linguistics
One parallel between "neural symbolization" and linguistic construction is the
absence of "type" restrictions (cf. Section 7.3a). In natural languages, statements can refer
to any construction of the language and "reason" over it. One can begin, for example,
with a purely descriptive proposition, and then treat it as an object, qualify it by
predicates, etc.... (Cf. the discussion in Section 7.10 of symbolization by a subsystem, in
particular the constructions associated with "higher order" planning).
A basic difference between neural symbols and linguistic expressions centers on
"decomposition" into parts. Linguistic expressions are composed of smaller parts, and
can be syntactically analyzed. On the other hand, a neural symbol is not a priori
analyzable in "smaller parts", but is homogeneous (cf. Section 7.3(c)(v)). Moreover, its
semantics is not a composition of the semantics of the syntactic constituents (cf. Section
7.4c)).
7.3 "Homogeneity" of neural symbols
a) "Type" questions in formal language systems, logics, and natural languages
Our use of the term "homogeneous" is nonstandard. We do not seek to suggest by
this terminology that neural symbols are internally undifferentiated, nor that they are
indiscriminately interchangeable, nor of a uniform complexity. Neither do we seek to
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deny the patent heterogeneity of cell types or circuit architectures. Rather, we wish to
address the issue of presence or absence of "type" in the formal language sense.
The introduction of "types" is ubiquitous in the settings of formal languages,
logics, set theory, and languages for computer science. This is true also of formal
language approaches to natural language semantics, such as Montague's intensional
logic. The term refers to the imposition of a kind of hierarchy of "levels" among the
symbols or expressions in the theory, together with rules of well-formedness for
compound expressions based on the "types" of the corresponding constituent expressions.
One notable example of an untyped formal language is the untyped X-calculus of
Church and Kleene. This calculus, originally intended as a instantiation and formalization
of the notion of "effective computability", lies at the foundation of the Scott-Strachey
approach to "denotational semantics" of programming languages. Very roughly speaking,
all the expressions in the calculus are "functions", and functions can act on, or be applied
to other functions (including themselves) indiscriminately. It is something of this
character, though surely not the calculus itself, which we seek to carry over to the context
of neural symbols.
This character is also manifested in natural languages. In a very basic sense the
usual language of human discourse is not "typed", because anything can be referred to at
any level. Certainly, there are syntactical categories and grammar rules (or principles) to
be respected. Still, on the other hand, abstract nouns can be the subjects of concrete verbs,
and propositions can themselves be referred to by other propositions, and can be assigned
a grammatical function. Also, certain words can have purely context dependent meanings
or referents (e.g., pronouns, demonstratives, adverbs, indexicals ... ) rather than intrinsic
signification. Phenomena such as these are hallmarks of an almost total absence of "type"
in a classical logical sense (and, indeed, go beyond the bounds of even a loosened type
discipline which admits of "polymorphic" types).
b) A trade-off between paradoxes
"Types" were introduced into mathematical logic by Bertrand Russelll, and soon
thereafter incorporated into Whitehead and Russell's "Principia Mathematica". The
reason for their introduction was to circumvent the so-called "set theoretic paradoxes"
arising in attempts to formalize the intuitive notion of "set", as well as a related family of
"semantic paradoxes" associated with issues of self-reference. An example of the former
class of paradox is provided by "the set of all sets which are not members of themselves".
Is this set a member of itself or not ? As easily checked, either case leads to a
contradiction. (This is sometimes expressed more picturesquely as the "barber paradox".
In a town there is a (male) barber who shaves those and only those men who do not shave:i- i
themselves. Does he shave himself ?) An example of the semantic paradoxes is the "liar
paradox": Epimenides the Cretan says that all Cretans are invariable liars. Should we
believe him ? A related introduction of a "levels" hierarchy is due to Tarski.2 He argues,
roughly speaking, that to avoid inconsistencies in the use of a "truth" predicate requires
1 See Russell's "Mathematical logic as based on the theory of types", 1908.
2 See A. Tarski "The concept of truth in formalized languages", (translation of 1933 paper).
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an infinite hierarchy of meta-languages, each containing the truth predicate of its
predecessor. 3
While (perhaps) circumventing the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, the
introduction of type or level hierarchies seems to bring us up against a worse (we would
argue) class of paradoxes, the well known "infinite regress" or "homunculus" paradoxes
which are prone to arise in theories of brain organization. A related set of problems
centers on issues of "combinatorial explosion" or "computational complexity". Our
view, which we shall argue for below, is that a proper schema of "neural symbols" can
avoid both classes of paradoxes. (See, for example, our discussion in part c) below, our
discussion of higher order planning in Section 7.10c) below, and our discussion in
Section 7.12 of avoiding regress to infinity).
c) The case of neural symbols
The homogeneity of neural symbols manifests itself in several different senses,
among them the following:
(i) Complexity
The logical "degree" and the content realized by a given symbol are not
necessarily reflected in a corresponding complexity of this symbol nor in the symbol
manipulation in which it participates. For example, the construction of an association
among various symbols is, in general, realized by a neural symbol which is not more
complex than the "constituents" of this association. This example (and others to follow)
illustrates a basic point: the logical complexity of an external observer's description of
the functioning of a neural symbol may inhere in the observer's descriptive framework,
and need not be mirrored by a corresponding complexity in the actual neural symbol
manipulation.
(ii) The question of hierarchy
A related point concerns the question of "hierarchy". As a case in point, we
ourselves, for purposes of description and analysis will be led to speak (as we have
already done) of "higher level" or "more abstract" symbols and the like. Thus, it may be
convenient to speak of the "type" or "function" of a symbol in order to emphasize certain
distinctions. For example, one symbol "emitted" by a "module" 4 may pass directly to an
3 The set-theoretic and semantic paradoxes are still issues of controversy. A good introduction is
provided by R.L. Martin "Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox", Clarendon Press, 1984. Another
interesting treatment is given by R. C. Koons "Paradoxes of belief and strategic rationality", Cambridge
University Press, 1992. Koons argues that it is possible to construct a "type-free computationalism" which
nonetheless can circumvent the liar paradox. Moreover he argues that such issues will be crucial in making
the transition from rational agent models of the social sciences to frameworks involving institutions, rules,
and practices.
4 We remind the reader that we use the term "module" (discussed more fully in Section 6.2) in a
variety of senses. Depending on the setting, we may have in mind "behavioral", "functional", or
"structural" modules, associated to distinct (and surely not isomorphic) modes of "subsystem
decomposition". Thus, a given module associated with one such decomposition need have no "counterpart"
in another decomposition. In particular, the structural (or functional) substrates "supporting" a given
behavioral module need not be sharply localized, but may be (widely) distributed. Moreover, this
supporting substrate need not be static, but may be history and context dependent.
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effector organ or motoneuron, while another symbol emitted by the same module may
instead contact a higher order system or module in the "hierarchy".
Yet, just as in the above discussion of "complexity", this "hierarchy" is, at the
least, very heterarchical. A given element or subsystem may participate in a multiplicity
of organizational modes (possibly concurrently), with its "rank" differing from mode to
mode 5. Moreover, even within a single "mode" (e.g., some form or instance of planning
or decision-making), the attribution of a "rank" ordering may be very much viewpoint
dependent. For example, it is misleading to think in terms of rigidly ordered "pathways"
for "flow of information", or in terms of rigid "chains of command", with successively
higher-order decision-makers sending "information" up the chain and "commands" down
the chain. As an example of the subtleties involved, we recall Section 6.10, where we saw
that "lower" centers can learn to be controlled. Thus, questions such as "who decides to
do planning" are surely badly-posed. Such a formulation ignores facts like the following:
The system plans in a "parallel" fashion, and must also learn to plan. "Lower" centers
may work (quasi-)independently unless they "fail" (for example, fail to meet
expectations) or if they encounter conflicts, in which cases they may request (or require)
the intervention of "higher" order centers for arbitration or planning; this process may
itself be learned. (The "criteria" for failure may be those of the "lower" center itself or,
alternatively, may derive from "higher" centers. For example, the activity of the "lower"
center may be linked to the execution, or attempted execution, of a higher-order plan; cf.
the discussion of "error monitoring" and "expectation" in the last footnote to Section
7.9d), and also the discussion of "plan revision" at the end of Section 4.4b).) Moreover,
in case of "emergency", the hierarchy can be bypassed, with the lower centers overriding
the higher centers, and taking control of the whole system.
This absence of an absolute "hierarchy" is due, in part, to the "homogeneity" of
neural symbols (in the various senses discussed in this section). Reciprocally, it gives rise
to an additional sense in which neural symbols are "homogeneous".
(iii) Specialization
While there is a striking degree of specialization and specificity within neural
systems (e.g., as regards connectivity, morphology, intrinsic membrane properties, and
transmitter "profiles" of neurons or neuronal subpopulations), this does not necessarily
impose a corresponding specialization or differentiation on the neural symbols supported
by these cells (or cell populations).6 To illustrate, suppose in the preceding example
(discussed above in (ii)) that the module is a neuron whose axon has multiple collaterals
(possibly forming "biochemically" heterogeneous classes of synapses), which project to
distinct targets in the nervous system, at varying functional "levels". In this case (unlike-
in the interpretation above), when the neuron generates action potentials it may be more
appropriate not to attach any "type" distinctions to the neural symbols emitted by these
5 Even in considering an artificial vs. natural system, it may be appropriate to construct a range of
functional and structural diagrams (e.g., consider the design of a large aircraft). There is no reason to expect
these all to be simply progressive refinements (i.e., incorporating progressively greater degrees of detail) of
a single top-level "master" diagram.
6 At an intracellular level, a related kind of homogeneity, or lack of sharp "type-specificity" of
interaction, is mediated via the general mechanism of "allostery", whereby arbitrary metabolic circuits can
interact without the need for any direct steric matching of constituents.
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different collaterals at the various synapses. As another example where "type"
distinctions may be out of place, a firing pattern in one neuronal population may induce
firing patterns in a range of other subpopulations, including itself. 7 (As in Chapter 5, we
are not concerned in the present chapter with assigning a precise meaning to the term
"neuronal firing pattern".)
(iv) Specificity
Much of the specificity of a neural symbol, especially in its details, is strongly
dependent on context and on the (internal) state of the system. For example, the "same"
neural symbol will never be instantiated twice via exactly the same neuronal firing
pattern. Moreover, in contrast with most "mathematical" contexts, this is not a sharply-
specified "non"-specificity. Thus, it is most likely inappropriate to speak of an
"equivalence relation" in the formal sense (since "transitivity" probably fails to hold).
Nor, for that matter, is it clear that the notion "statistical ensemble of firing patterns" is
adequate. This "non"-specificity is all the more striking when one considers that it is
"iterated"; i.e., neural symbols interact with other neural symbols, giving rise to yet other
neural symbols.
A particular manifestation of this context dependence is a kind of "just-in-time"
specificity, whereby the full details of the construction of a given neural symbol are not
"decided" until the symbol is actually needed to act.
(v) Internal structure
"Homogeneity", in this sense, refers not to an absence of internal structure, but
rather to the absence of an a priori, canonical, decomposition of a neural symbol into
"smaller parts". There may be no "meaningful" decomposition or, as may more often be
the case, several concurrent decompositions, depending on the context. (See also
Section 7.4c) below, on non-compositionality of semantics).
7.4 The content of a neural symbol
a) "Acting is being"
We have already mentioned several times that for an embedded system there is no
natural content-free syntax, while the opposite is true for a formal or simulated system.
This is in particular the case in the setting of neural symbols. Simply by virtue of its mere
being, a neural symbol acts, and one might say that the rationale of its being is its action. 8
7 At first glance, the remarks above as to homogeneity of symbols hold also for computers or
robots, at the level of their actual hardware. By "symbol", in this setting, we refer to the electrical or
magnetic activity patterns sustained within the hardware. However, we draw attention to three basic
differences with the natural system context. First, there is the basic role which value systems play in the
latter setting (see Section 5B). Second, in the case of computer or robotic systems the primary description is
the high-level description provided by the designer or programmer, and its instantiation on any particular
machine is simply one realization of this high-level representation. In the neural context, on the other hand,
the primary representation is generated by the value system, in conjunction with the creation of neural
symbols at the sensor level (because the system is autonomous in the strong sense). Third, in the case of a
computer or robotic system the various evaluation criteria for the symbol language are all "external", rather
than for the "benefit" of the system itself.
8 Corresponding comments can be made for the symbols used in the hardware of computers, robots,
and the like, but with the same caveats as in the preceding footnote.
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b) Distinction between syntax and semantics for certain neural symbols
In the present context an insistence on the traditional syntax/semantics distinction
is problematical, and may even be inappropriate and irrelevant.
Still, for purposes of analysis, it is possible, at least at the level of sensors and
effectors, to attach a semantic content in the traditional sense to a neural symbol created
by a given sensory organ, or acting on a given effector organ.
For example, consider a stimulus a and a stimulus b to which the animal is
sensitive. (We mean here that there are certain sensory neurons which fire when the
animal is exposed to a, and that a neural symbol "a" is generated. 9 Similarly for b. Then
the symbols "a" and "b" do whatever they have to do.) Now, it may be of importance for
the system to be able to recognize the co-occurrence of a together with b, while a and b
alone are of no importance. Then the system will learn to develop an association symbol
"ab" which is "emitted" (at a certain higher level) when the animal is exposed to a and b.
Thus, for example, "ab" can be a signal for food, while "a" and "b" separately are not
associated to food.
A semantic content can also be attributed to neural symbols manipulated by
certain higher order neural structures whose functions, in the traditional sense of the term,
have been clearly identified. Among the examples which arise are those involving
"memory" or, as we shall see below, "planning" modules.
c) Non-compositionality of the semantics of neural symbols
We see, in this example, the main phenomena of the non-compositionality of
semantics.1 0 The content of "ab" is not a function of the content of "a" and "b". It may
not be interesting or useful for the system to be able to reconstruct the symbols "a" and
"b" once "ab" has been created. The association symbol "ab" acquires its own content
and connotation, triggers other modules (while "a" and "b" would not), makes its own
associations (for example the system may associate "d e f' with "ab" but not with "a"),
may become a higher-order value (i.e., become tied to the higher-order value system),
while "a" itself has no value, etc. A related possibility is that "a" has a certain content
(say, communicating with certain modules or inducing certain actions), while "ab" (by
virtue of the circuit architecture) will induce unrelated actions.
All this says that the symbol "ab" acquires a new status by itself which is not a
function of the content of "a" and "b" separately. 11
9 A word as to our notation. We distinguish the neural symbol "a" from the actual stimulus a via the
use of quotation marks.
10 This non-compositionality stands in contrast to the Montague semantics and denotational
semantics referred to in Section 7.3a).
11 Remark concerning the logical failure problem: The fact that neural symbols have a function
which is their semantics (although for description purposes we may introduce an artificial distinction) is
extremely important because it explains why the system cannot enter into a logical failure (see Chapter
4.B). In fact such a neural system does not compute or manipulate symbols in a Turing machine sense
(which, as we have seen can induce logical failure) It is clear, though, that the system can fail, since it
eventually dies. But this is not the same as logical failure. When a neural symbol is emitted, it actually
does actions on the modules to which it is sent and these actions will finally induce certain actions on the
environment. On the other hand, the symbols of the tape of a Turing machine do nothing.
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B. Encoding
7.5 The combinatorial strategy
a) The basic conflict : richness of the environment / scarcity of resources
An adaptive autonomous system satisfies the principle of relative adaptation: it
must maintain a state of relative adaptation with its environment.
Let us recall briefly the issue we face here: in general, the environment is complex
and changes. Certain characteristics of the environment can change very easily, but others
are rather stable and fixed. On the other hand, the system "extracts information"1' 2 from
the environment (and from its own internal state, see Section 6A) and can act on the
environment (so that because of the constraints, the internal state will change
accordingly). The problem is that the system has very few sensors (compared to the
phenomenological richness and unpredictability of the environment) and it has also very
few effectors (compared to the tasks it must do) and moreover the constraints give rise to
conflicts (either of sensory type or of action type). But in any case, the basic conflict any
adaptive system must face is the conflict between the richness of the environment and the
scarceness of sensory and action resources.13
b) The combinatorial strategy
The strategy used by adaptive systems to resolve these basic conflicts is
combinatorial, both at the sensory and at the action levels.
(i) At the sensory level
A priori, the system does not know what are the relevant associations of sensory
data, nor the relevant emergent "categories" which are needed to maintain a state of
relative adaptation with its environment, which may vary significantly. Consequently, the
system requires a basis for constructing a very broad range of possible complexes of
sensory data.
One of main tools available to the system to construct such complexes is the
chronological coincidence and/or the spatial co-occurrence of "feature data" and, also, the
temporal succession and/or spatial juxtaposition of data in various "modules" of the
system.
On the other hand, at least in the case of higher organisms, these complexes of
data, by their very construction, will very likely be used by the system in the construction
12 We use this terminology merely as a convenient mode of expression, and do not intend thereby to
suggest a reification of "information", as something pre-existent in the environment which is simply to be
filtered and transferred from the outside to the inside of the system. Rather, we regard categorization of
"feature data" to be an active, constructive process carried out by (and upon) the system. We shall discuss
categorization at length in Chapter 7D.
13 We do not wish to oversimplify here. The sensors and effectors may themselves be complex, and
the interfacing with the environment may be at multiple "levels of abstraction"; cf. the discussion of
"layered hierarchical systems" in Section 2.6e), and also the discussion of "sensitivity" vs. "sensors" in
Section 3.3c).
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of its own chronology 14, and in the elaboration of internal representations of (itself as
embedded in) its spatial environment.
(ii) At the action level
At the action level, the system must construct and coordinate a rather large and
not a priori specified set of actions; but it has very few effector devices, and is also
submitted to constraints which even further reduce the combinatoric possibilities of
action. So the system conceives complexes of actions, carried out either in parallel or in
temporal succession. A priori, when the system is learning (and it is always, to some
extent, learning) it must allow for a broad range of possible combinations of elementary
actions. ( For the notion of "elementary" action, see Section 5.lb).)
Surely, in the course of the learning process, only a circumscribed number of
combinations, either of sensory data, or of elementary actions will be retained, but a
priori, the system must allow for many more. (Surely also, evolution has restricted the
number of possible combinations by imposing a basic circuitry).
We have spoken above of "sensory" and "action" levels. We do not mean to
suggest by these expressions that there is a sharp segregation between these two, either in
a functional or structural sense. Certainly, there is communication between the two
"levels" via intermediary processes. Somewhat more directly, the system needs to
maintain some form of sensory monitoring of the state of its effectors and, reciprocally,
the effectors are needed to act upon the physical apparatus mediating the sensory
functions. In addition, the sensory-motor functionalities are by no means limited to the
periphery of the system (where it interfaces with the external environment), but will be
present internally in various forms. Moreover, as noted in Section 3.3c), the sensory
apparatus (in conjunction with the effector apparatus) need not function in a purely
"passive" manner, but may actively "explore" for "relevant" signals. What the system
treats as "relevant" may be context-dependent, and will be linked to other aspects of the
system's functional architecture such as categorization, memory, planning, and the value
system.
c) Expansion-compression / encoding-decoding
The issue we address now is indicated in the schematic "input-output" diagram
shown in Figure 7.1, with data "flowing in" at the sensory side, and action "flowing out"
at the effector side. 15 The sensory side of this diagram indicates an expansion of sensory
data, whereby the system builds new neural symbols encoding combinations of sensory
features (occurring either simultaneously or in temporal sequences). These combinations
reflect certain statistical regularities of the environment, as made use of by the organism.
There is a corresponding bottleneck on the effector side of the diagram. This is intended
to indicate a compression of effector data, whereby the system, starting from certain
14 Presumably, the construction of its chronology will also draw upon the presence of "biological
clocks", both at a (sub)cellular level and at a more global level.. (As regards the latter, Damasio (1994),
suggests such a role for rhythms such as the heart-beat.) A partial list of the "problems" of chronology
facing the organism includes the following: the sense of time of occurrence of events, the notion of
ordering of events, object "permanence" (i.e., the construction of "objects" on the basis of a temporal
succession of snapshots), and "permanence" of the self.
15 This picture of "information/action flow" is not intended to be taken literally. See the footnote
accompanying Section 7.5a).
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neural symbols encoding combinations of effector features (again occurring
simultaneously or in temporal sequences) must decode them to transfer them as actual
complexes of actions for execution by the effector system.
The intermediate portion of the diagram indicates neural symbol construction and
manipulation by the system. These processes of symbol construction and manipulation by
the system are used to "glue" together the sensory and effector sides of the diagram (or,
alternately phrased, to "coordinate traffic" between the two bottlenecks)16. Near the
sensory side (resp., the effector side) of the diagram, neural symbols constructed and
manipulated by the system have a semantic content of an essentially sensory (resp.,
effector) character. As one moves further from the periphery (either sensory or effector
periphery) the corresponding semantics of these symbols is deprived of a clear-cut
sensory or effector character. This notion of "semantics" can refer either to the
organism's internal semantics (as discussed in Section 7.4) or, equally well, to the
viewpoint of an external observer.
d) Combinatorial • discrete
In emphasizing a "combinatorial" strategy, we do not wish to emphasize a
discrete-mathematics character. In particular, the encoding-decoding processes must be
carried out in an environment which imposes on the organism a continual flux of inputs,
while requiring from the organism a continual flux of outputs. Thus, the organism is not
confronted by an orderly succession of distinct "problems", but by an ongoing
asynchronous flux of "problem-complexes". Time (and timing) constraints (see Section
4.1) are a major consideration. As an example of the type of resource allocation
involved, the organism must "buffer" varieties of inputs and intermediate outputs until it
can allocate the resources necessary to further "process" them.
7.6 The necessity of encoding by symbolization
The question is how to implement this combinatorial strategy in an effective way.
It is quite difficult to manipulate complex combinations of features as such, or to refer to
them, store them, or manipulate them, as such . It is clear that, for many purposes, it will
be preferable for the system to create a single neural symbol "ab" for the co-occurrence
of a and b rather than maintaining and dealing with a pair of distinct symbols "a" and "b"
(keeping in mind that these symbols must be physically instantiated). A fortiori, this kind
of argument will be valid for the extremely complex combinations of neural symbols that
the system will construct, in particular given the fact that these neural symbols may
themselves be higher order constructs.
In other words, the system avoids an extensional expression of complexes of
"features" (or of other symbols) by encoding such complexes using just a single symbol.
This need not imply that the symbols at the source of a given complex are not
individually maintained or reconstructable. The fact that complexes have semantics
which may be largely independent of the semantics of each individual symbol (as we
discussed in Section 7.4 c) ) means that each new complex thus created will have a "life"
16 There are fundamental issues associated with this "gluing": What constitutes a "coherent" gluing ?
What are the processes or mechanisms whereby this coherence is brought about and maintained ?
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of its own. That is, it will participate in other associations as, and be manipulated as, a
unit. This is why the system will tend to develop structures which can represent each
complex of symbols as a unit.
7.7 Example: a schema for associations
a) There are many aspects to the gluing processes discussed in Section 7.5.
Among them, one can distinguish the processes for association. By this we do not simply
mean purely sensory-sensory or purely motor-motor associations, but also sensory-motor
associations, not necessarily at the periphery. Here we wish to address these issues only
en passant, briefly introducing some schemata which we plan to elaborate elsewhere
(incorporated into a more comprehensive architecture).
We do not envision a canonical schema for associations. Among the various
distinctions that can properly be made, we limit ourselves here to one broad distinction:
that between prewired circuitry, on the one hand, and associations which must be learned
or acquired in somatic time, on the other hand.
b) Prewired schemata
We have in mind here not only reflex-arcs, or reflex-like associations, but also
more complex prewired behavior patterns (such as the "fixed action patterns" of
invertebrates).
Even in this setting of prewired schemata there are problems of coherence of
behaviors. One is the "singleness of action" 17 which is necessary for coordination of
behaviors. Another is the need for task-dependent and phase-dependent modulation of
reflexes. 18
c) Associations requiring learning
Such associations can take place at any level of combinatoric expansion or
compression. Nor does "learned" necessarily mean that the association takes place only
between highly complex sensory and effector sequences. For example, one can envision
the learning of reflex-like associations, i.e., linking to a basic sensory feature a certain
elementary action, bypassing the whole architecture of combinatoric expansion and
compression.
17 This term was introduced by Sherrington [Sherrington, C., "The integrative action of the nervous
system", Yale University Press, 1906] in his studies of the interactions between simple spinal reflexes in
mammals. He concluded that "singleness of action" results from a competition between the different
reflexes. Similar themes, involving the "behavioral hierarchy" of the mollusc Pleurobranchaea have been
pursued by Davis, Mpitsos, and collaborators. (An early representative article is W. J. Davis et al.,
American Zoologist 14 (1974), pp. 1037-1050. A reassessment of the whole issue of rigidly characterized
(hierarchies of) behaviors vs. context-dependence of action, etc., is discussed in G. J. Mpitsos and S.
Soinila "In search of a unified theory of biological organization: what does the motor system of a sea slug
tell us about human motor integration?", pp. 225-290 in K.M. Newell and D.M. Corcos, eds., "Variability
and motor control", Human Kinetics Publishers (1993).)
18 This is reviewed on pp. 282-284 of K.G. Pearson, "Common principles of motor control in
vertebrates and invertebrates", Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 1993. 16:265-97.
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In order to lend a bit more concreteness to this discussion, we will briefly sketch
one plausible 19 association schema, which we shall elaborate in a later paper. This
association schema involves the following mechanism:
It consists of an association "module" which, a priori (before learning is begun)
associates various sensor symbols, value symbols, and effector symbols which are
actually put into execution on the environment. When the "correct" effector symbol has
been selected and put into execution (and this may be discovered by chance at the
beginning of the learning period), it is reentered into the association module. This leads,
due to the presence of constraints, to the production of a value symbol. This value
symbol, in conjunction with some form of "LTP" (long term potentiation) mechanism
linked to the underlying circuitry, gives rise to an association whereby the sensor symbol
(which was just previously produced in temporal coincidence with the action symbol
which was actually executed) "reinforces" the production of this action symbol.
.* If no value symbol is produced (because the action symbol put into execution is
not the "correct" one), no reinforcement takes place. The notion of "correctness" used
here is not of an "instructive" character. In other words, the learning of this association is
done without a "teacher", in an autonomous fashion. The basis for this whole process is
the fact the organism is embedded in its environment. The corresponding constraints both
mediate and provide the rationale for the activity of the value system. Thus, the "correct"
action in the environment induces, reciprocally, on the organism the production of a
value symbol (which serves as a "reward", i.e., which has a positive valence). This is a
consequence of the constraints which induce (or strongly bias) the production of this
value symbol. We note here that these values need not be primary, but may be higher
order (see Section 5.8). In particular, the value system itself may be only in part hard-
wired, and may involve a learning or acquisition process. In a similar vein, we comment
that the above association schema is completely general, in the sense that it works equally
well at any "higher" level (with sensor symbols being replaced by inputs of certain
"modules", and effector symbols being replaced by outputs of certain other "modules").
C. Maintaining autonomy
7.8 Preservation of autonomy and relative adaptation with the environment
a) In Section 3.1 we saw that a cardinal characteristic of natural systems is to
preserve their existence and autonomy, while maintaining a state of relative adaptation
with their environment. This takes place in the presence of various constraints. A range of
these constraints was discussed in Section 4.1, namely homeostatic constraints, effector
and sensory constraints, chronological constraints, and constraints on the internal
structure of the system. Finally, the resources that the environment affords and that the
system is able to draw from it are, in general, limited.
b) The previous facts manifest themselves in several forms. Among these we can
distinguish (and this list is not exhaustive):
19 By "plausible" we do not mean that this schema bears close similarity to any actual biologically
instantiated association circuitry. We mean only that it is not obviously at variance with any biochemical
or biological constraints or "principles".
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(i) The need to acquire resources, as signaled by the value system. Here we have in
mind not only the acquisition of "positive" resources, but also the avoidance of
"negative" resources, such as noxious substances or dangerous situations. Either case
implies a tendency, or even a necessity, for action.
(ii) Reciprocally, a tendency to preserve its own resources as much as possible. In
contrast with the above cases, this implies a tendency to defer actions in the environment.
These two reciprocal tendencies (acquisition of resources and preservation of
resources) give rise to the strategy of symbolization, as we shall elaborate later.
(iii) The system tries to maintain an autonomy of choice of actions. This involves the
ability to construct a broad range of relevant choices for action while, at the same time,
not being overwhelmed by this breadth of choice. That is, the system must maintain the
ability to select among the choices constructed so as to act in a timely fashion. This may
require the resolution of conflicts not only among competing choices of action, but
among competing processes of evaluation of choices.
(iv) On the other hand, in many situations, e.g., if the environment is simple, or
familiar, so that "failure" does not occur (cf. Section 7.3c)(ii)), or if no conflicts arise, or
in case of "emergency" (requiring reflex-like actions), the system will tend to act in a
more-or-less reactive form, without referring to higher order modules. An extreme case is
the reflex arc, where the link from sensor to effector organs is direct. This strategy of
avoidance of intervention by higher order "centers" realizes an economy of metabolic
resources and/or of time resources (as in the case of emergency).
So, roughly speaking, the strategy of the system is to act in a purely reactive way
whenever possible, without referring to higher order centers. (However, this statement
should not be interpreted too simplistically; cf. Section 7.3c)(ii)). We give an additional
illustration: Certain sequences of actions may initially need to be acquired via attentive
learning, involving higher centers; however, once acquired, their control and execution
can be transferred to an essentially reactive level, bypassing the higher centers.
In many situations, such a purely reactive strategy is too limited, however. First,
the organism, in general, needs to perform complicated actions in a rich environment,
while subject to the basic constraints at the sensory and action levels, as noted earlier.
Second, the environment and the internal state (e.g., metabolic levels, neuronal activity
patterns, etc.) can give rise to conflicts which must be resolved.
In either case, both when a reactive policy is adequate and when it is
inappropriate, the strategy of symbolization is needed. In fact, certain reactive procedures
may not be as direct as a simple reflex arc, and may involve memory processes for
"storage", recall, and recognition of relevant constellations of features or patterns of
action. Furthermore, in certain circumstances the choice between a purely reactive policy
and a recourse to higher order centers, if both of them are possible, itself involves
decision-making by the organism. (See also Section 7.3b)).
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c) Adaptation is not universal
It is clear also that an adaptive system can adapt and behave intelligently only in
certain classes of environments. If the sensory modalities are not adapted to the
environment, the living system will probably develop a clumsy behavior which we can
qualify as "unintelligent". But we qualify it "unintelligent" only because we know the
answer to the decision problem, and we know what we ourselves would do if we were in
this situation, and how we could solve the problem. But we don't know what we would
do, given the information, the possibilities, and the values that the organism actually has.
Somehow the trivial mistake of (one traditional form of) Al is that it wants to
define a system which could adapt to any environment, say a robot able to wash dishes,
walk on the moon, have social relations, attend a math class...
d) An example : the bee and the window
Let us consider a familiar example of a bee (say), which is prisoner in a room
where a window is still half-open. The bee begins to wander within the room and,
because it is attracted by the sunlight, it goes towards the window, where it bumps against
the glass. Surely, the bee is not equipped with a sensory modality detecting glass
windows at distance (nor, for that matter, are we), so the bee begins bumping and
bumping again into the glass. Now, the bee can detect the window where it bumps into it.
But the bee, being unable to detect the window at a distance, cannot form a global view
of its local landscape (namely, recognize the window is half-open). After a while, the bee
stops bumping and usually goes back in the room, until finally the sunlight stimulus
attracts it to the window where the bumping behavior starts again. Finally, after a certain
number of trials bumping and wandering, the bee, by mere luck, finds the opening and
leaves the room. Now the point is not, as some AI practitioners would do, to qualify the
bee's behavior as unintelligent. In fact, probably the most clever thing the creature can do,
given its sensory possibilities, is precisely what it does: namely, try by force (but not too
much, and not too stubbornly) to get out, and then wander for a while to try to find a
better opportunity. Thus, in some sense, the bee's "strategy" is the best one. 20
7.9 The general symbolization strategy
a) In general, because of the complexity of the environment and the complexity of
the actions to be performed, the system will "try" to develop (on an evolutionary time
scale) or to use (on a somatic time scale) structures which circumvent the need to
continually carry out repetitions of the same kind of analysis and synthesis of sensory
data or of actions. This leads inevitably to the construction and use of memory
mechanisms ("storage", recall, and recognition) in conjunction with processes of
categorization. This implies that complexes of sensory features or of actions must be
encoded in an effective way so as to be easily manipulated, "stored", and "retrieved",
whenever necessary. When a new situation is encountered, and when this situation is
recognized as "similar" to a situation previously met and dealt with, the system need not
engage in a lengthy and costly process of random or exhaustive search to select or
construct an appropriate course of action. Instead, drawing on its processes of memory
20 This viewpoint may sound somewhat Panglossian, yet be correct for all that.
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and categorization, together with its value system, it need only consider relevant
possibilities for action, which are further modulated and refined by the specifics of the
new situation.
b) Memory
At present, aside from the association schema sketched in Section 7.7, we have
little to say on the complex and controversial issues surrounding "memory" in its various
forms. 21 However, we do wish to make some brief remarks on memory in connection
with neural symbols.
(i) Short term memory
Short term memory is indispensable for building neural symbols registering the
combinatorial temporal succession of short sequences of basic sensory features or of
elementary actions (or of other, more abstract, neural symbols).
A precise circuitry for building such neural symbols will be described in a later
publication. The question is, essentially, to "stop" time for a short period. As we shall
show, this can be realized (not so easily) by reentrance and "short term potentiation".
(ii) Long term memory
Long term memory will be used to build an efficient planning schema (so that the
organism can draw upon previous experience and not always have to plan the same
course of actions). We have, as yet, no biologically plausible 22 scenario for building such
a memory circuitry.
c) Planning and decision-making
In case conflicts arise, it can be advantageous to the system not to actually venture
new courses of action, which may fail to be successful, or may even be disastrous. This is
the reason why the system (at least in the case of higher organisms) develops and uses
planning structures (see also Section 6.9). Planning allows the system to avoid engaging
immediately in real actions on the environment.
Instead, it carries out: (i) Virtual actions on internal representations of the
environment; (ii) Virtual evaluations of the results of these virtual actions. These actions
and evaluations, while virtual with respect to the external environment, are carried out by
actual manipulations, via neural symbols, of the internal representations. (iii) Once this
process has been carried out, a "correct" virtual action is chosen and "translated" into a
neural symbol for the execution of an action on the external environment, which is
21 The literature on learning and memory, from invertebrates to humans, is vast, ranging over a
multitude of experimental, clinical, theoretical, and computational approaches drawn from many
disciplines, and encompassing work at all levels: molecular, cellular, "systems", and intact (or brain-
damaged) organism. In particular, in the settings of neuropsychology and cognitive (neuro)science, various
distinctions have been drawn, e.g., "procedural" vs. "declarative", "episodic" vs. "semantic", "long term"
vs. "short term" vs. "working" memory. In our brief remarks in the text we shall make a broad distinction
between "long term" and "short term" memory. However, at least at present, we use this terminology only
in an intuitive, rather than technical sense.
22 In the sense discussed in the footnote accompanying Section 7.7c). Surely, a long term memory
anything like a computer RAM fails, on many counts, to meet this plausibility requirement.
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eventually carried out. (iv) This virtual action may be associated to the picture of the
environment, and this association may be stored for future use. 23
We wish to stress that the process of virtual evaluation, as well as the concomitant
decision-making process, have to be learned, and are carried out using the value system
(see Section 5B). We also emphasize the fact that this evaluation process is not simply an
optimization procedure in the usual sense. More basically, it is not an "effective", i.e.,
algorithmic, procedure (although it may "call upon" algorithmic procedures).
The external/internal dichotomy introduced above can usefully be refined as
follows: one part of the internal environment may be external relative to another, and
corresponding processes of planning and decision-making arise in this setting. For
example, the process of deciding between a purely reactive behavior (if available) and a
more complicated planning process is of the same type as the decision process discussed
above. Thus, this discussion carries over to the present setting. We shall further elaborate
on this in Section 7.10 below.
d) Persistence of attitude and shift of attention
Typically, a behavior is not punctate in time, but involves a sequence of action
complexes. Thus, a related class of problems that we shall need to address is how the
system architecture enables the organism to strike the proper balance between
"persistence of attitude" (i.e., having begun a given course of action, following it to its
intended completion) and "shift of attention". By the latter we mean, roughly speaking,
the interruption of the current course of action if it appears likely to fail, or becomes
inappropriate, or if another goal acquires greater "salience".
This type of question is well illustrated by the example discussed above (see
Section 7.8d)) of the bee and the window. The organism should persist in its attitude, but
not insist too much. If it has no persistence of attitudes, it's behavior becomes completely
incoherent and erratic and can be qualified as "unintelligent", not because we decide so,
but because the system does not maintain adaptation even in a rich environment. For
example, suppose an animal is at a certain distance from two pieces of food (and it sees or
smells the food at distance). One could imagine that the animal 24 would hesitate and
approach one piece of food, then the other one, doing a kind of oscillatory motion
between the two and finally starving in front of two pieces of food. That this fact does not
occur is due to the persistence of attitude; namely, after perhaps a short period of
hesitation, the animal decides to choose one piece of food, and is not troubled by the
presence of the other piece of food.
On the other hand, this persistence of attitude must not be pushed too far. As an
example, we can consider an animal separated by a small obstacle from a piece of food.
The animal will bump against the obstacle (trying to reach the food) but its attitude
(namely following some gradient line) should not persist too much, and the animal should
finally go around the obstacle, or perhaps wander around trying to find another source of
food.
23 We will not address here the basic question of how the passage from actual to virtual, and vice
versa, is effected and learned by the system.
24 Traditionally, Buridan's ass.
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Achieving the desideratum that attitudes not be stubbornly persistent when they
reach no success may involve various "levels" of the system's circuitry. For some
purposes, as in the example above, reactive processes may suffice. One such process
might be a natural habituation or fatiguing of the firing of the "module" controlling
forward movement, and a sensitization of the sensory module registering the bumping
against the obstacle. Still, the animal must associate (maybe in a permanent form) the
"move forward" neural symbol2 5 with the sensory neural symbol elicited by the bumping.
At a higher level, issues of "error monitoring" and "expectation" may be involved.26
7.10 Symbolization by a subsystem
a) Adaptive subsystems of an adaptive system
We have seen above that the basic tendencies of an adaptive autonomous system
lead to the development and use of symbolization procedures. Assume, for the sake of
argument, that one has identified a set of modules of the given system which can, in some
sense, be regarded as a subsystem. It is useful, for various purposes, to consider this
subsystem as having an environment of its own. This environment is that "portion" of the
world with which the subsystem interacts directly. This includes the other subsystems of
the whole system and, perhaps, a "portion" of the environment of the whole system. We
shall refer to this environment of the subsystem as its "proper" environment.
The subsystem receives inputs from its proper environment and acts by outputs
upon it. These inputs are neural symbols created by other subsystems, or may be sensory
inputs from the environment of the whole system. The outputs of the subsystem are
neural symbols which are created in other subsystems as a result of their interaction with
the given subsystem, or may be certain effector outputs on the environment of the whole
system. As in the case of sensors at the periphery, i.e., interfacing with the external
environment, the subsystem need not be simply a passive recipient of inputs from its
proper environment, but may actively "explore" for "relevant" signals. (The remarks in
the footnote to Section 7.5a) also apply here.)
In any case, the subsystem has its own processes of neural symbolization, and will
make use of such symbolization for the same reasons as discussed above for the whole
system. At least, this will be the case provided that this subsystem is sufficiently adaptive,
and presents a sufficient degree of autonomy relative to its proper environment. In
particular, it will tend to develop and use memory devices, planning devices, etc., relative
25 This labeling of the neural symbol as "move forward" is not intended to be construed in an overly
simplistic manner.
26 As discussed by Swash [M. Swash, "Order and disorder in the motor system", pp. 113-122 in C.
Kennard and M. Swash, eds., "Hierarchies in Neurology", Springer, 1989] this monitoring for errors may
involve not only input from the periphery, but also an "internally perceived feeling of a mistake". He notes
that monitoring strictly from the periphery could introduce unacceptable delays, and consequent cumulative
errors via negative feedback. He thus suggests that such peripheral monitoring may be more relevant in
conjunction with the learning of a "motor program" than for guiding the execution of a skilled motor
performance.
The role of "expectation" in motor organization is discussed by J. Kien, in the setting of
hierarchically-nested time frames, where each time scale provides a long term context influencing the lower
level time scales. See J. Kien, "Remembering and planning: a neuronal network model for the selection of
behavior and its development for use in human language", pp. 229-258 in K. Haefner, ed., "Evolution of
information processing systems", Springer, 1992.
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to itself. In addition, it tends to develop means of pattern categorization and recognition,
ifor patterns produced by its proper environment.
b) External localization
These "devices" for memory, planning, etc., may be physically localized within
the subsystem itself (as in the case where the "subsystem" is the whole system). But in
addition, the subsystem may draw on portions of its proper environment as an auxiliary
mode of localization. Similarly, "internal" representations constructed by the subsystem
may actually be localized outside the system, in its proper environment. That is, while the
"logical" localization may be internal to the subsystem, the "physical" localization may
be external to the subsystem. This will turn out to be significant (see Section 7.12 below)
in avoiding "homunculus" problems. (Such "external localization" is, in effect, a basic
concomitant of Damasio's "convergence zone" schema for memory [cf. Section 2.18a)
and the footnote to Section 7.12(iii)]. In this setting it also serves to circumvent
"homunculus" problems.)
c) Example: "higher order" planning
In connection with the following discussion, the reader may refer to Figure 7.2.
We consider a system S with a certain "basic level" set of modules L which are fairly
directly connected to the external environment of S (through the sensor and effector
devices). The system S develops a set of planning modules P which construct internal
representations of the environment of S, on which P carries out actions corresponding to
virtual actions of S on the environment (as we have seen in Section 7.9c)). Now let us
consider P as a subsystem of S. The whole system S will "try" to develop a set of "higher
order" planning modules M which play the same role in relation to the actions of P on L
that P plays in relation to the actions of S on the external environment. This set M will
construct internal representations of the "environment" of P (constituted by L), on which
M carries out actions corresponding to virtual actions of P on L.
Stated more fully, M "plans" in the following sense:
(i) It constructs internal representations of the inputs from L to P. These inputs would be
neural symbols "signaling" the possible requirements of L for intervention and eventual
control by P.
(ii) It builds neural symbols acting on these internal representations. These actions
correspond to (or may be regarded as) virtual actions of P on L.
This means precisely that M "controls" the decision-making procedure "deciding", in
effect, whether L can act directly on the external environment, i.e., without requiring the
intervention of the planning modules P, or if, instead, L will act on the external
environment only after having required the intervention of P. In some sense, M is
"thinking" or "reflecting" on the representations 2 7 that P constructs of L, and on the
possibility of actions of P on L. Succinctly, M plans the planning by P.
27 A word of caution as to terminology. The "representations that P constructs of L" are not to be
confused with the "internal representations" that P forms of the external environment of S. They form,
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This is already quite complicated, but even more is necessary. The organism has,
in fact, to learn to carry out this whole process. Moreover, P also has interfaces with other
subsystems as well as L and M, a notable case being its interface with the value system.
In addition, at least in principle, the above construction can be carried out repeatedly, at
successively "higher" levels.
7.11 Decision-making procedures
We have briefly alluded to decision-making in connection with "planning", in our
discussion of the general strategy of symbolization. Here we wish to comment on
decision-making in the wider sense.
a) Artificial systems
For unembedded systems (such as an AI program), the designer typically attempts
(in principle) to anticipate in advance 2 8 all the "situations" that could possibly arise, and
specifies in advance, if not the specific decisions to be made by the system, at least the
decision-making "policies" that the system must use. Generally, this specification takes
the form of "If ... then ... " behavior rules which "fire" via a process of "pattern-matching"
against the "state" of the environment. The state of the environment is explicitly
characterized in "propositional" terms, and updated by the system via the application of
another set of rules specifying how a behavior undertaken by the system alters the
environmental state. In addition the designer specifies the "search" policies to be used by
the system to generate pattern-matches. 2 9 A somewhat less rigid form of behavior and
decision-making specification, allowing for a kind of "adaptation" by the system is
provided by the ("genetic algorithm" based) "classifier systems" of Holland.30
A prototype example of how "behavioral choice" is handled in the context of
embedded systems ("autonomous" robots) is the "subsumption architecture" of Brooks.
(We shall treat this as a specific architecture, but it is, more properly speaking, an
evolving set of principles or guidelines for architecture design). Here the designer builds
(via hard-wiring, which includes the use of a formal programming language, i.e., the
"behavior language") a set of behavior-generating modules, together with an essentially
hard-wired priority hierarchy among the modules. The over-all behavior of the robot is
purely "reactive", with switching between behaviors mediated "through the world". That
is, the behavior of the currently active module brings about a state-of-affairs (in the real
world) which triggers the action of a different module (which, at the same time, inhibits
the action of the original module). The hierarchy need not be completely rigid or linear.
Thus, some degree of context-dependence of the prioritization is possible. However, this
rather, the analogue of the representations that S forms of the external environment, via the neural symbols
constructed by its sensors.
28 This does not imply that the designer necessarily "gets it right" the first time, or the n-th time.
There is a lengthy design-test-redesign-test... loop.
29 The specifications for state change can also be at a meta-level, i.e., specifying changes in the
system's rules or search policies, etc.
30 See, for example, J. Holland, R. Nisbett, and P. Thagard, "Induction: processes of inference,
learning, and discovery", MIT Press (1986).
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context-dependence of behavior is itself hard-wired and reactive, and does not involve
"choice" by the robot.
It is important to note here an important contrast between these embedded robots
and the unembedded AI programs discussed above. As we saw in Section 5B, it is
essentially impossible to give a formal-language specification corresponding precisely to
one of our natural language characterizations of a "behavior", e.g., "avoid obstacles".
Thus, the real world "behaviors" which result from the hard-wiring are only
approximations (and this was all they were ever expected to be) to the "informal" or
"vague" natural language "behavior specifications" which are taken as the points of
departure for the design of the hard-wiring. This process of approximation to "vague
specifications" can help mitigate the "brittleness" resulting from a purely formal
approach but, at the same time, can introduce new problems. Thus, as progressively more
modules are incorporated, a purely reactive mode of behavioral coordination can give rise
to "incoherence" of behavior. For one thing, even assuming that some form of (context-
dependent) priority hierarchy is adequate, how can the designer work out in advance what
it should be ? Second, it is clear that "emergency" situations can arise where low level
modules should seize control. It is unlikely that even a context-dependent hierarchy can
accommodate this type of policy shift. It seems that some modes of autonomous (as
opposed to pre-wired) decision-making are necessary.31
b) Methods of decision - making
It is clear that the decision-making issue is of primordial importance. This is a
problem which is solved all the time by any living system however primitive.




The mode of prewired choices is essentially the one used for artificial systems (as
discussed above). In the context of biological systems, it is probably reserved for choices
or decision-making which have survival value, but that the system would not be able to
learn in somatic time. However, prewiring, of itself, does not permit adaptation or the
development of "intelligence".
c) Situated choices
Here, depending on the situation of the environment, the system may depart from
the strategy of prewired choices, and learn new associations of sensory inputs and
effector outputs. At the minimum, this requires time. The problem now arises: What is
the (instantiation or realization of) the decision procedure which decides when to shift
from prewired choices to learned choices ?
31 An early version of the subsumption architecture is presented in R. A. Brooks, "A robust layered
control system for a mobile robot", IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, Vol. 2, Number 1, pp. 14-
23, 1986. A discussion of the incoherence problem, phrased as a problem of "lack of modularity", is
presented (together with a proposal for a solution, via control interfaces among the modules, incorporating
"motivation" and "arbitration") in R. Hartley and F. Pipitone, "Experiments with the subsumption




We have already discussed this in Sections 7.9 and 7.10. Again, the question
arises of knowing how one decides to change from situated or learned choice to planning.
So, it seems that one gets a regress to infinity, the decision-making centering
now on the choicebetween choice-modes.
7.12 Avoiding a regress to infinity in decision-making
The discussion above of decision-making and planning (see Sections 7.9 - 7.11)
raises the spectre of an infinite regress in decision making, requiring the intervention of
ever higher order decision-makers. The potential sources of trouble include: the choice
between choice policies (see Section 7.11); successively "higher order" planning (see
Section (see Section 7.10); and the possibility of infinite "oscillation" or "dithering" (see
the discussion of "persistence of attitude" in Section 7.9d)). We shall give several
arguments below as to why, in the kinds of system architecture we are considering, such
problems of regress to infinity are apparent rather than real.
(i) Finite termination
The most straightforward observation is that there is no a priori reason why the
system should, in any actual instance, need to avail itself of more than a small, in
particular finite, number of "levels" in the above sense. (Indeed, the second-order level of
"higher order" planning, i.e., the level of the modules M discussed in Section 7.10c), may
well be sufficient).
(ii) Homogeneity of neural symbols
Another escape from this trap is provided by the homogeneity of the neural
symbol system, as discussed in Section 7.3c). (See, in particular, paragraphs (i) and (ii),
discussing the viewpoint-dependent character of "complexity" and "hierarchy" in the
neural system setting).
(iii) Internal representations can be external
The succession of "functional" internalizations associated with successively
higher "levels" need not imply corresponding physical internalizations of the actual
circuitry supporting these successive "levels". These realizations may, in fact, share
common supporting circuitry. [Cf. Section 7.10b) above, discussing "external
localization"].32
32 This argument is reminiscent of the manner in which A. Damasio circumvents homunculus
problems in his proposal for a systems-level architecture for memory and consciousness. (See, for example,
A. Damasio, "Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: a systems-level proposal for the neural substrates
of recall and recognition", Cognition, 33 (1989), pp. 25-62). In this proposal, the integration of various
"feature-based" sensory and motor fragments does not require a succession of mappings bringing all the
"information" together centrally in one place. Instead, the "information" is brought together in time, i.e., via
the synchronous reactivation of the original neuronal firing patterns (corresponding to the original feature
images), at their original sites, the primary sensory and motor cortices.
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(iv) The value system
We believe that the value system (cf. Sections 5B) will play a fundamental role in
preventing infinite search, or infinite "dithering", or the construction of an actual
"infinite" sequence of control. (See also Section 7.9a). It is worth reiterating here that the
value system is a concomitant of the actual embeddedness (or embodiment, in the case of
an organism with a "self') of the system. This holds in a direct sense for the primary
value system and, hence, also (though perhaps less directly) for the "higher order"
values, which ultimately derive from (and in many instances are functionally linked to)
the primary value system. Thus, the value system circumvents the "infinities" by means
of a grounding in the world, via the physical embodiment (and "self-involvement") of
the system. 33
(v) Grounding via constraints
Additional modes of grounding the system in the world (contributing to the
circumventing of the "infinities") come from the various constraints associated with
embedding in the world (see Section 4.1). These, in fact, tend to merge imperceptibly
with the primary values discussed above. We illustrate this with some examples.
A case in point concerns the metabolic variables. Even if a system does nothing,
its metabolism degrades. This cannot be allowed to persist indefinitely, and so serves as
an internal "motivation" for (relevant) action.
33 The role of the body (in the sense of an envelope separating the individual from the external
environment) as a ground reference for the individual's construction of conceptual categories is argued by
M. Johnson and G. Lakoff. (See, for example, M. Johnson, "The body in the mind: the bodily basis of
meaning, imagination, and reason", U. of Chicago Press (1987); G. Lakoff, "Women, fire, and dangerous
things: what categories reveal about the mind", U. of Chicago Press (1987)). A major emphasis of this work
is the proposal to replace traditional "objectivist" semantics by a kind of "cognitive" semantics.
In G. M. Edelman's theory of neuronal group selection a system of evolutionarily "selected" value
units, or value repertoires (roughly speaking, associated to basic survival needs) plays a key role in biasing
and shaping the organism's behavior, in particular its "perceptual categorization". (See, for example, G.N.
Reeke, L.H. Finkel, O. Sporns, and G. M. Edelman, "Synthetic neural modeling: a multilevel approach to
the analysis of brain complexity", in G.M. Edelman, W.E. Gall, and W.M. Cowan (eds.), "Signal and
sense: local and global order in perceptual maps", J. Wiley & Sons, New York (1989).)
In A. Damasio's "somatic marker" hypothesis (see A. Damasio, "Descartes' error", forthcoming,
1994, Putnam, Grosset Books) a system of (visceral) body-based, emotionally-mediated value markers
(both "positive" and "negative"), becomes associated (via the individual's nervous system) to the
consequences of various courses of action, on the basis of the individual's experiences. This mechanism of
somatic marking plays a fundamental role in guiding and shaping the individual's decision-making. The
clinical case studies presented by Damasio, in which medial frontal lobe damage leads to disruption of the
somatic marking mechanism, strongly suggest that in the "real world" (i.e., in the domain of "social
cognition" vs. formally-structured artificial problem domains) a purely "rational" decision-making process,'
not grounded by a body-based value system, often leads to infelicitous consequences. Among the mildest of
these consequences is a tendency towards "infinite" dithering.
The use of a formal (vs. physically embedded) type of "grounding" to truncate a potentially
infinite "interpretation" process is put forward by P. Parikh in the setting of communication between
"rational agents" using a shared "situated" language (see "Language and strategic inference", Ph.D.
dissertation, Stanford University, Dept. of Engineering-Economics, 1987). Parikh, drawing on Barwise and
Perry's situation theory and on game theory, discusses how (under appropriate hypotheses) the structure of
the "embedding circumstances" of the communication (as reflected in the structure of the corresponding
"ambient game") relieves the agents of the need for the potentially infinite set of nested intentions
postulated by Grice's approach to communication.
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On the other hand(as mentioned in Section 7.9c), the repetition of the same action
without any success for a long time may lead, via metabolic or biochemical constraints,
to the fatiguing or habituation of the module issuing the neural symbol for that action,
and this module will consequently stop "firing" . This may be contrasted with another
mode by which harmful actions may be terminated, namely via the (primary) value
system. Thus, if the system acts in a stubborn way, for example bumping and bumping
against an obstacle, certain sensory devices may fire so much that "pain" will be induced,
so that it will stop bumping. 34
D. Categorization
7.13 Preliminary remarks: the process of categorization
We begin with an intuitive delimitation of the notion of categorization before, in
the next section, giving a characterization of this notion more closely linked to the
framework of this paper. Intuitively speaking, "categorization" is the process of
classification carried out by the autonomous system (or "organism") in order to build
coherent "pictures" of the world, and of the actions of the organism on the world. Here,
"world" includes both the environment and, to varying degrees, the organism itself.
a) Categorization as a process
We emphasize "categorization" vs. "categories". Categorization is a process
carried out by the organism, on the basis of its neural architecture, and in conjunction
with its continual activity in its environment. "Categories" are not pre-existent externally;
rather, they result from the process of categorization by the organism. A concomitant of
this viewpoint is that a category cannot be treated in isolation, but must be considered as
embedded in a categorical architecture which is physically realized by the system's neural
architecture. This neural architecture is never static, since the system is in continual
interaction with its environment, and is continually learning (with the processes of
learning and of categorization bootstrapping off one another). Thus, the whole categorical
architecture continually undergoes alteration, and is highly individual and history
dependent.
The process of constructing a new category is not simply a process of appending
or adding a new entity to a pre-existent collection of other entities, themselves unaltered
by this addition. Rather, it in general involves modification of the whole architecture.
This process of modification has a steady, on-going character, in contradistinction to the
abruptness with which concept acquisition may enter the awareness (in higher
organisms).
b) Link of categorization to the value system
The categorization by the organism emerges from the following conjunction of
factors. First, the categorization is constrained by the sensory capacities and effector
capacities of the organism. Second, a necessity for the categorization process, and
34 For a discussion of pain "pathways" (and links to somatic-based value- markers) see the book by
Damasio cited in the preceding footnote.
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learning processes in general, is the repetition of similar neural symbols, produced by
similar experiences. Third, similar experiences are possible precisely because the
environment presents regularities of association of data features, due to various
constraints. Fourth, the organism is constructed in such a way that its value system
produces neural symbols in coincidence with experiences having relevance (either
positive or negative) for the organism. In this way the value system attaches valence to
various associations, and thereby biases the processes of categorization, and of behavior
more generally. (Cf. Section 7.12(iv). As in that section, we refer here both to the primary
(or prewired) value system and the higher order value system, introduced, respectively, in
Sections 5.6 and 5.8).
In other words, the value system channels the categorization process of the
various experiences of the organism into modes "relevant" (either positively or
negatively) for the organism. As at various points in this paper, there is a non-vicious
circularity at work here: What is "relevant" determines the value system and,
reciprocally, the value system determines what is "relevant".
c) Link of categorization to behaviors
As we have emphasized in Section 5A, the notion of "behavior" in the context of
autonomous systems does not have a sharp-edged character. In particular, one ordinarily
cannot give an extensional or operational definition of a given behavior. This should not
be surprising. For purposes of "thinking about", planning, and deciding about its
behavior, the system must make use of the perceptual/conceptual categories available to
it. Hence, one should expect the "vagueness" of its behavioral "specifications" to be
congruent to the "vagueness" of its conceptual architecture. [Cf. Sections 4.4b) and
4.4c)]. This (for humans) is mirrored by a corresponding lack of "sharp-edgedness" to
natural language (lexicon, syntax, semantics, etc.).
This "vagueness" is a reflection of richness and suppleness, rather than of
imperfection and deficiency. True, for an external "observer" who wishes to formalize
and/or simulate the system's behavior, this seeming lack of precision may be a source of
difficulties. However, for the organism itself, this lack of "specificity" is highly apposite
and appropriate. 3 5 For example, in directing its own activities, the organism need not
determine the sharp instantiation (and details of execution) of a particular behavior until
the time of action, and these details can be strongly conditioned upon both the external
and internal context. (In the literature on (voluntary) motor control is not uncommon to
find references to "motor programs". Were one to use such a computer metaphor, one
might speak here of a highly context-dependent "compilation" process. However, it is
important not to interpret this too literally. True "compilation" involves an algorithmic,
top-down, translation from one "high-level" formal language to another "low-level"
formal language. The present process is something much subtler, being neither
algorithmic, uni-directional (in particular, not top-down), nor a process of translation in
any precise sense.)
The "vague" character of the construction of behaviors and categorization
processes is consonant with the character of the physical substrate of these processes,
35 Putting the matter somewhat simplistically, being susceptible of formalization and simulation is
unlikely to confer any selective advantage on an autonomous system. (Here "selective" refers to natural
selection vs. selection by a designer).
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namely neural symbols and their manipulation. For example, two neural symbols can
never be completely identical in a physical sense, i.e., as neuronal activity patterns and
detailed biochemical states (see Section 7.3c)(iv)). (This, however, is not meant to
suggest that there is any "vagueness" inhering in "individual" neuronal activity patterns
or biochemical states). Another, more subtle, consideration is that the production of
neural symbols will, in general, modify the architecture of the system, e.g., in connection
with learning processes.
d) Types of categorization
For purposes of the present paper, we use the term "categorization" in a broad
sense, without seeking to distinguish between distinct "types". For example, we intend
this term to encompass both perceptual and motor categorizations. 3 6 Also we are not
concerned here with the dichotomy between (the "lower order") "perceptual" and (the
"higher order") "conceptual" categorization, which figures in the approach of Edelman.3 7
In any case, such distinctions are somewhat blurred in our setting (see Sections 7.3 and
7.5 dealing, respectively, with the homogeneity of neural symbolism, and the architecture
of expansion-compression supporting the combinatorial strategy).
In a related vein, in discussing categorization here we do not insist on
concomitant processes of awareness, consciousness, or properly linguistic activities (in
the case of humans).
However, we shall seek to determine lines of demarcation between purely reactive
systems (which, as we shall see below, do not carry on categorization activities, properly
speaking) and genuinely autonomous systems (which can, and perhaps must, support
such activities).
7.14 A schema for categorization: modules observing other modules
a) The purpose of categorization
The system, embedded in its complex environment, has to make decisions
regarding courses of action, and must resolve the ensuing conflicts among the various
decision-making processes. The purpose of categorization, in abstracto, is to assist the
system to resolve its conflicts, and to arrive at decisions in an efficient way. (As another
example of the non-vicious circularity discussed earlier, categorization also plays a role
in giving rise to, and helping give form to, such conflicts). We do not intend here to
suggest that these decision making procedures, or the categorization associated to them,
must be of a conscious character. (In particular, we want to stress once more that
categorization is not a priori linguistic, and does not require language as a vehicle. Surely,
36 Edelman (see the references in the following footnote) has emphasized the critical role of motor
activity as part of the processes of perceptual categorization by the organism. This is consistent with the
fact that one "aim" of perceptual categorization is to facilitate actions (relevant actions), on the internal as
well as external environment. In speaking here of "motor" categorization we have a somewhat different
emphasis in mind, namely the necessity of the organism to categorize its own (potential) motor activities.
This categorization can certainly be expected to take place at a "pre-conceptual" as well as at a
"conceptual" level..
37 See G.M. Edelman, "Neural Darwinism", Basic Books (1987); "The remembered present", Basic
Books (1989).
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humans' capacities for categorization are greatly expanded (and modified) as a result of
interface with and access to a system of language, but this is a different question.)
b) An example
To make things more concrete or pictorial, we describe a very simple example of
categorization. We consider a system which, among many modules, contains a basic set
of modules L in direct relation with the environment, so that L is sensitive to stimuli a
and b, and produces neural symbols "a" and "b", accordingly. Suppose also that L is able
to form the association a+b when a and b are co-occurrent. This means, among many
other things, that L produces the neural symbol "ab". Moreover, we assume that L is able
to act on the effectors in certain ways.
We refer now to Figure 7.3. In this diagram we have two planning modules P and
Q. These planning modules "contain" 3 8 internal representation modules which "observe"
the behavior of L. This means the following. When symbol "a" is produced by L, the
module P can "observe" it, which means, in turn, that a neural symbol ""a"" is produced
inside the internal representation module of P. We also assume that P can observe "ab"
(so that the symbol ""ab"" is produced); but we assume, on the contrary, that P does not
observe L sufficiently well, and does not notice the production of "b" (so that no symbol
""b"" is produced). 3 9 P contains another module producing "symbolic" actions, namely
neural symbols acting on the internal representation module of P, and eventually
rewarded by the "symbolic" value system of P, which is under the control of the value
system of the autonomous system. ( In fact, it may be appropriate to include under the
heading of "value system", comprising both the primary and the higher order value
systems, such "symbolic" value systems as well).40 These symbolic actions act on the
symbolic representations inside P, and when a "successful" action is produced, it is
transferred over (by neural symbol manipulation) to an actual action, which is then
effected. The above-noted "success" is a symbolic one. The corresponding actual action
may or may not result in an actual success (see, for example, the footnote on "error
monitoring", Section 7.9c)). We shall return to this point below.
The structure of the planning module Q corresponds to that of P, but with the
roles of "a" and "b" reversed. That is, Q observes the production of "b" (but not "a"), and
so produces ""b"". Also, it observes the production of "ab", and so produces " "ab"' ".
(Notice here the extra ' which is intended to indicate that " "ab"' " is not the "same" as
""ab"" in P. These two higher order symbols are distinct because they are constructed
with respect to the distinct modules Q, P (even though this construction may be
physically mediated and localized by identical modules)). Like P, the module Q has a
symbolic-actions module, acting on the internal representation module of Q, and a
38 Not necessarily in the sense of physical localization (cf. Sections 7.10b) and 7.12(iii)).
39 Iterated quotation marks indicate a symbol of a symbol. As emphasized earlier (see Section 7.3c))
in connection with the homogeneity of neural symbols, this logical "type" distinction does not imply a
corresponding distinction as regards physical realization.
40 While utility functions play no role in our setting, the notion of symbolic value, as used here, is
curiously reminiscent of the notion of "symbolic utility" introduced by R. Nozick. (See p. 48 of "The
nature of rationality", Princeton University Press, 1993). According to Nozick, symbolic utility, rather than
being a different kind of utility, is a different kind of connection , namely symbolic, to standard types of
utility. "The symbolic utility of an action A is determined by A's having symbolic connections to outcomes
(and perhaps other actions) that themselves have the standard kind of utility...".
128
symbolic value system of its own (distinct from that of P), under the control of the value
system of the autonomous system. In general, P and Q would work in parallel, and would
issue symbolic actions which are different (both at the symbolic level, and at the level of
the corresponding actual actions), since these actions are adapted to different symbolic
values.
We are now ready to discuss what we mean by "categorization" in this setting.
We say that a is categorized by P, but not by Q, because: (i) P "observes" the production
of "a" (while Q does not); (ii) P can symbolically manipulate the stimulus a; (iii) P can
evaluate the result of its symbolic manipulation, using a certain symbolic value system
Vp. In the same way, stimulus b is categorized by Q but not by P. Moreover, ab (the co-
occurrence) of a and b) is categorized both by P and Q, but in different ways. For
example, the symbolic actions that P and Q carry out on their respective internal
representations may not be the same, and the symbolic value systems of P and Q, namely
Vp and VQ, may be unrelated.
This raises two questions concerning conflict resolution: (i) How does the system
go about choosing between conflicting "recommendations" coming from two distinct
categorization/evaluation schemes which have both been incorporated into the system
architecture? (ii) What determines which of the incipient categorization/evaluation
schemes that emerge are actually retained and incorporated into the system architecture?
The first question is not of direct concern to us here. In any case, it is a conflict of
"classical" type, suggesting the application of classical solutions: e.g., P and Q may
reciprocally inhibit one another or, alternatively, jointly be under the control of another
("higher" or "lower" level) module R, etc.). We shall, however, briefly address the
second question. 41 In our view, the "evaluation" of incipient categorization/evaluation
schemes is tied to the potential mismatch, noted above, between "symbolic" and actual
success. If, over a range of contexts encountered by the system, the extent of mismatch is
low, the corresponding categorization scheme will be reinforced or "stabilized";
otherwise, it will be weakened, or allowed to weaken. (Notice that this tacitly requires
that some actual actions be performed on the environment, so that a basis for evaluating
mismatch exists). There may also be weakening as a result of "competition" with other
categorization schemes that may arise, or as a result of alteration in the degree of
mismatch (due, for example, to a change of contexts). We do not wish, at the present
time, to propose a specific "physical" mechanism for effecting such stabilization or
destabilization; however, it will be a mechanism acting at the level of (the physical
realization of) neural symbols and symbol manipulation.
c) Towards a definition of categorization
The previous section points to the following general definition of categorization-.
Suppose we have a set of modules L receiving input from their proper environment (as
defined in Section 7.10a)). Denote these inputs as a, b, c, ..., ab, bc, ... , abc, ... (with the
juxtapositions indicating co-occurrence). We may also take into account temporal
sequences of such inputs. Then we would say that the input a is categorized by an
41 It is this second question which is, in effect, central to the neuronal group selection theory of
Edelman. (See the footnotes to Sections 7.12.(iv) and 7.13d)). As part of his strong emphasis on selectionist
vs. instructionist processes, Edelman is also concerned to provide a general mechanism for generating the
diversity on which selection can act.
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"observing" module P, if the production of the neural symbol "a" in L induces the
production of a neural symbol ""a"" by P, in an internal representation module of P on
which P can symbolically act, and for which P has a symbolic value system able to
evaluate the results of symbolic actions.
We wish to stress three points: (i) The input a may itself be a neural symbol, since
a need only be an input from the proper environment of L, rather than an input from the
external environment of the system as a whole. Similarly, the discussion above regarding
evaluation of categorization/evaluation schemes can be transposed to the present setting,
with "proper environment of L" substituting for "external environment". (ii) The
categorization is relative with respect to an "observing" module. Thus, the input a can be
categorized differently by various distinct modules P, Q, R, ... each observing L. (iii) As
noted several times above, localization with respect to the abstract functional architecture
need not correspond to localization in the sense of physical realization. For example,
from the standpoint of the functional architecture the internal representation modules of P
are kept distinct from the representation modules in the set of modules L. But with
respect to physical realization, the two may coincide. (Cf. A. Damasio's retroactivation
schema, referenced in Section 7.12(iii), footnote).
In light of point (iii) we can allow for the possibility of two modules L and P
observing each other. Moreover, P is a part of the proper environment of L and, as such,
creates neural symbols which can be inputs of L. As a consequence, P may be able to
categorize its own neural symbol outputs, at least towards L, via the reciprocal inputs it
receives from L. Two "special cases" are worth noting: (i) The case when P is the whole
system, and L is the external environment. Here we may speak of the system as carrying
out a categorization of the environment (and its actions on the environment). (ii) The
case when P and L are both taken to be the whole system (or, alternatively, when L is
taken to be the whole system plus external environment). Here we may speak of the
system as carrying out a categorization of its own internal symbol manipulation as well as
of the external environment.
d) Remarks about "sameness" and linguistic categorization
Suppose we start with a set of modules L to which two stimuli a and a' are
presented (say, from the external environment), and which issue two neural symbols "a"
and "a' " ( assume simultaneously, for simplicity). We suppose that the module P is able
to categorize each of the two stimuli. We could say that a and a' are categorized as the
same by P if the neural symbols ""a"" and ""a' "" produced by P are the same.4 2
42 This, of course, raises the question of what it means for two neural symbols to be "the same" (see
Section 7.3c)(iv)). There are several intuitive answers, all of the following type: "They are the same if,
via interaction with the same neural symbol, they (would) yield the same neural symbol ". This is yet
another illustration of the (non-vicious !) circularity endemic to the neural symbol setting. There is a
tempting resemblance of this "definition" of sameness to the various notions of equivalence of processes
(e.g., "bisimulation equivalence") discussed in theoretical computer science in connection with R. Milner's
CCS (calculus of communicating systems) approach to concurrent process theory. (See, e.g., R. Milner,
"Communication and concurrency", Prentice Hall, 1989). However, the differences between the neural
symbol setting and the CCS setting are profound. For example, the thrust of CCS-like approaches is
towards "invariance"; i.e., towards implementation-independence (both hardware and software), context-
independence, etc. . In this setting, any particular realization is intended as an instantiation of the same pre-
existent abstraction. In the neural symbol setting, on the other hand, everything is highly dependent on the
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Somehow, P abstracts away the features distinguishing a from a' . If a and a' are
objects they cannot occupy the same physical position in external environment, so we
can assume that there will be some other module Q observing L which will not categorize
a and a' as the same. (Here we will not enter into a discussion of "object permanence",
i.e., of how two stimuli a and a' presented at two distinct times could possibly be
categorized as "the same" by P. This would lead us, at the minimum, into issues of
"memory" that we are not prepared to address at this time.)
From this perspective, linguistic categorization is the categorization done by sets
of modules P which, in addition to properly non-linguistic modules, incorporate or
interface with very specific linguistic modules which exist only in humans. For example,
the ability to use language can modify the over-all categorization architecture, so that
even "non-linguistic" stimuli, e.g. visual presentations, might be categorized differently
than they otherwise would be. Linguistic judgments as to the "sameness" of a and a'
are tantamount to the categorization of a and a' as the same by these modules P. What is
special in the case of linguistic categorization is that these judgments can also be
communicated linguistically. Moreover, this communication may itself invoke the
concept "same", as does the question: "Are a and a' the same ? " This not being a formal
language, one can draw a range of responses: not only "Yes" or "No", but "I don't
know", "I don't care", ...
individual system, on its history, and on the context. Moreover, the neural symbol system "emerges" from
the particular physical realization , rather than being an "instantiation" of anything.
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On the left side, a few sensors extract information from the world. This
information is treated combinatorially. Various neural symbols representing associations
are created. A complex association is encoded by a simple symbol (this is a data
compression), but the list of data is expanded. On the right side, very few effectors act on
the world. Again, a complex parallel or temporal association or pattern of action can be
encoded by a simple neural symbol: this compressed data must be expanded to be
expressed by the few effector resources.
Figure 7.2 - Planning module
The system is in contact with its environment through a reactive module L. A
planning module P is constituted by a symbolic representation SRp, symbolic actions
SAp (acting on the SRp) and a symbolic value system SVS. This module P makes an
internal representation of the environment and can act symbolically and evaluate
symbolically the results of its symbolic actions: it makes plans and transfers these plans
to L. Module M observes P and the relation between P and L. It makes an internal
representation of P and of the relation between P and L. It contains the same kind of
constituents as P.
The value system VS evaluates the state of the environment and the results of
actions of L on the environment. It also creates symbolic value systems SVS inside P and
M for evaluation of their respective symbolic actions on their internal symbolic
representations.
Figure 7.3 - categorization
On the right side, the environment contains stimuli a, b,... either in isolation or in
combinations a+b... The reactive module creates corresponding neural symbols "a", "b",
"ab",... and can act directly on the environment. It can happen that a, say, is categorized
in P, because the creations of the neural symbol "a" is observed by P and internally
represented in SRp under the form of a neural symbol "("a")". In the figure, a and a+b
are categorized by P, but not b. While, b is categorized by Q and a+b is categorized in a
different way by Q.
136
